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CHAPTER I 
        RELIGION AS POETICS OF THE PEOPLE 
The Conned Man 
Here’s the way it went. I sat eating and reading alone at a table in a Nashville location of the 
Wendy’s Old Fashioned Hamburgers franchise when I spotted, out of my periphery, a heavy man 
at a table nearby with a collection of shopping bags on the floor next to his chair. He ate quickly, 
but his face registered no agitation as he stared straight ahead. Upon finishing his meal, he made 
his way to the door. From there, the restaurant’s large glass windows afforded me a view of the 
man’s progress across the parking lot, and I was intrigued to note that his next destination was a 
Domino’s Pizza at the nearest corner of a strip mall just a few yards away. Within minutes, he 
exited with a Domino’s bag added to his collection and went directly into a TCBY (“The Country’s 
Best Yogurt”). He followed the same pattern as he exited with a new bag and then finished off, as 
far as I could tell, with the Subway Restaurant next door, disappearing around the corner with 
bags in both hands. I’ve seen him around town many times since, always bearing a diversely 
branded burden that may or may not contain brand products within. 
 Reflecting upon this episode, I began to concoct a thought experiment. What if the fellow 
suffered from an emotional disorder that rendered him incapable of incredulity and therefore 
peculiarly vulnerable to commercial claims, so vulnerable, in fact, that he believed—could not not 
believe-- all commercials? Whereas most people appear capable of filtering out the myriad forms 
of sales pitch, guarantee, promise, and false covenant foisted upon public minds via billboards, 
posters, product placement and all manner of electronic media, perhaps this unfortunate soul 
could not. And if this were the case, I reasoned, something as seemingly insignificant as 
exposure to a three-minute commercial break might suffice to send him on his way searching, 
enthralled along a perverse pilgrimage that would consume the length of his progressively less 
healthy life. In this way, he is successfully enlisted in an endless series of faith-based initiatives 
provoked by and based in the alluringly situated but necessarily insincere signals, the deliberate 
fictions, of a brand culture which, taken together, render him the subject of a cruel psychological 
experiment. His work, we understand, will be cut out for him, and advertising strategies ostensibly 
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crafted to move a few units, to sell a little confidence here and there, will have unwittingly come 
together to reduce the beleaguered existence of this imperiled soul to a psychic nightmare.  
 I intend this account of a conned man to serve as an instructive caricature as I take up the 
problematic of religion, the ways the religious sphere has been conventionally ordained, and how 
religion, as a category, might be more meaningfully and critically deployed. The mental bind, the 
illusion, in which the conned man lives, moves, and has his being, need not involve theistic 
confessions or metaphysical claims to be understood as an ineluctably religious one (“religio” as 
binding influence), and the same goes for the high budget, high tech processes of religious 
formation whereby his emotional health has been compromised. He has become what various 
brand agencies once beheld and in fact bargained for when they took a theoretical interest in him 
as a potential target market. Such interest is admittedly limited to his purchasing capacity, but an 
advertising campaign, to be successful, must seek to address the whole self, the everyday 
emotional life of individuals, with the imaginative constructions of brand culture (no less binding, 
we understand, for being mere constructions). The narrative associations of a brand are designed 
to prey upon and cater to every discerned aspect of the individual’s social imagination, conjuring 
desired behavior by creating, if only momentarily, a loss of identity that can be most reliably 
recovered by way of accessing a certain proffered product. The conned man has received and 
incorporated (or has perhaps been incorporated by) these calls to worship, these carefully 
calibrated mystifications, one after the other, and has come to believe that the answer to his 
meaning-problem resides within these stories in which he’s been successfully enlisted. He will 
know no lasting satisfaction on his quest, because too much is never enough and, as my 
caricature has it, he won’t stop believing. He is an ensnared civilian immersed in a religious crisis. 
 What do we gain by considering the plight of the conned man through the lens of religion? 
By doing so, we’re afforded a tool for critically examining the kind of immersive campaigns that go 
some distance in overcoming his powers of discernment, a space for raising the question of 
agency—always a religious question—for this mobile buyer moving through a fantasized space, 
and a pivot-point for envisioning the possibility of creative countermeasures. In this way, religion 
is a term that characterizes the net we’re held within, whether willingly or unconsciously, a net 
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that is alternately woven and unwoven. If, as is the case with the conned man, we see religion as 
a kind of nightmare from which we mean to awaken, the awakening itself is also religious.  
As a thick accounting of practice, religion names the binding and the loosing of hearts and minds, 
the entrenched means to status-quo fulfillment as well as the open spaces that lay outside them, 
the rituals to which the likes of the conned man would have been converted to as well as those 
they’ve been converted from. All are illumined and brought into dramatic relief by the problematic 
of religion.  
 In the interest of widening the scope and applicability of the conned man’s clinically gullible 
imagination, the caricature might be helpfully moved beyond fast food franchises to include other 
forms of brand culture. Consider the ostensibly mature adult whose waking moments expend 
primary energy not toward self-actualization or discerning and meeting the needs of a close 
relative or neighbor but to feeling rage toward famous strangers: competing media pundits, 
celebrity politicians, sports figures, or participants on a televised dance competition. Imagine the 
armchair activist e-mailers, anywhere along the ideological spectrum, who primarily speak in 
conversation-stoppers, who can’t change their minds and won’t change the subject. Consider 
also the consumer of luxury goods, the talk radio enthusiast, the political party apparatchik, the 
soul whose emotional life is increasingly enthralled by and conducted through online social 
networks, or the magnetic pull of an Apple store.  
 While largely uncoerced and free to weave their way amid distractions, commodities, and 
various service options, these figures are obedient to certain given scripts and symbols of human 
flourishing characteristic of brand culture even as they convert their attention from one distraction 
to another many times on a given day. While their consciences evade, to some extent, the 
endless moral injury of the conned man, any attempt to represent these phenomena in a non-
compartmentalized fashion will return us to the question of religion; or, to risk redundancy, the 
issue of performed religiosity remains in play, religion as practice as opposed to conscious 
profession. If we think of a brand campaign as a form of proselytization, the strategies and tactics 
at work within reigning technopolies challenge the popular separation of the merely secular from 
the ostensibly sacred. Whether geared toward securing votes, moving units, developing a 
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following, selling tickets, or organizing military recruitment, the colonization of the targeted 
imagination, from whatever sphere, will ignore our habitual distinctions. Frames of mind and 
forms of consent are being religiously cultivated and maintained through popular postures of 
passive reception upon which successful conscription is performed. This is the exchange of 
confidence connoted in the work of con artistry (the con game of the con artist is a matter of 
selling confidence). If religion is a thick descriptor of the instruction we’ve received, for better and 
worse, it is both the terrain of the con and the naming of said terrain. Religion is the name of the 
con game. If to be conned is human, confessing to having been conned is an act of religious 
awareness.  
 
Religion is Non-optional 
 Against accounts of religion which imply that it operates in a space outside of everyday 
practices, concerns, and motivations, the theory of religion I posit keeps the question of religion 
open, allowing it to designate any number of social bonds avowedly religious or otherwise. Rather 
than framing religion as a set of propositions to which the critical subject can lend or withhold 
assent, I take religion to be a neutral social fact which will often include, rather than eschew, the 
rational sense we make (or try to make) in our representations of our worlds. I take religious belief 
to be instrumental, formative, and, with the anthropologist Talal Asad, “a constituting activity in 
the world.”1
Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopedic compendium, its logic in 
 Understanding, with Marx, that religion can effectively name those forms of 
consolation (other-worldly and/or market-driven) which anaesthetize the popular imagination into 
submission, the “illusory happiness” of the conned man and his ilk, there is nevertheless more to 
the picture. Marx also gives us the more comprehensive account in which religion names as well 
the stock inventory of word and image on offer for narrating historical processes, an assemblage 
of ways of putting matters, explaining the how’s and why’s of life and how it might yet (or should) 
be lived: 
                                                 
1 Talal Asad, “The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category” in Genealogies of 
Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1993), 47. 
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popular form…The wretchedness of religion is at once an expression of and protest 
against real wretchedness. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a 
heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions…2
 As an expression of material wretchedness that is also a protest against it, Marx views 
religion as a form of creative labor. This language recasts religion as not merely the opiate of the 
masses but, more broadly, the poetics of the people. Like ritual, symbol, or ceremony, religion 
isn’t something one can be for or against or decide to somehow suddenly engage. Religions are 
always already underway. Or as the old Palmolive commercial once put it, we’re soaking in them. 
Their engagement precedes us, having already formed our imaginaries. It is in this sense that 
Marx insists that “the critique of religion is the prerequisite of every critique.”
 
3
 
 It is that with which 
we have to do (or the way we do everything we do or think we do). It binds us for better and 
worse till we begin to critique it religiously and relentlessly, in view of the possibility of better 
boundedness, different and more redeeming orientations, or, to put it a little strangely, less bad 
religions. Religiosity, in this sense, is a sort of non-optional sociality, an open-ended form which 
funds the more settled forms we usually have in mind when we speak of religions. And one’s 
religiosity is never not in play in one way or another. It names the patterns, shifting or consistent, 
avowed or unavowed, of all our interactions. 
The Myth of Critical Detachment 
 In this way, economies of meaning (read religions) are what we have to talk about as well 
as what we have to talk about. We can call them consensual fictions or, in Daniel Dubuisson’s 
phrase, “cosmographic formations” whose apparent purpose is “to describe the world and tell this 
or that group of humans, or even all of humanity, how to live in it.”4
                                                 
2 Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right,” trans. Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 137. 
 But to be deployed critically, 
meaningfully, and helpfully, religion will have to refer to more than the scams we imagine 
3 Ibid. 131. 
4 Daniel Dubuisson, The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology, 
trans. William Sayers (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 17-18. 
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uncritical or unenlightened others consistently fall for. If, within our usage of the category, religion 
only names the ideological delusions of other people, we have yet to deeply realize the 
pervasiveness of freeing and binding artifice.  
 In his essay “Imagination as Value,” Wallace Stevens is especially helpful here. Reason, as 
he has it, is “the methodizer of the imagination,” but ““the truth seems to be that we live in 
concepts of the imagination before the reason has established them."5
 This is where my theory of religion diverges from Bruce Lincoln’s account of religion in his 
“Theses on Method” even as I play off it as a point of tangency. Beginning with Thesis 1, Lincoln 
asserts that history’s claim (as method) upon religion is “proprietary” and, as such, it is “a relation 
of encompassment” to religion, “the object of study.”
 What we take to be a 
critical hold of a concept or a construct of the imagination does not change our immersion within 
or our dependence upon it. Reason brings its critical witness to the imaginative communal 
witnesses that, in no small way, sustain it. Reason normalizes, gets hold, and posits, but 
analytical posturing is the latecomer to meaning-making. The mythic imagination precedes the 
analytical (sustains and underwrites it, in a manner of speaking). And if the religious imagination 
rehearses and names the myths, the stories whose artifice both frees and binds, religion, properly 
understood isn’t merely representative of that which might momentarily escape rational analysis. 
It generates analysis as a form and, when heeded, it will awaken analysis to its own pretensions. 
The term “religion” might even be broad and comprehensive enough to deliver analysis from the 
myth of critical detachment. 
6
                                                 
5 Wallace Stevens, “Imagination as Value” in The Necessary Angel: Essays on Reality and the 
Imagination, (New York: Vintage Books, 1951), 154.  
 Without apology, Lincoln is employing the 
language of mastery, of a comprehensive hold upon religion without remainder or, it would seem, 
surplus meaning beyond critical grasp. And already, there is a notable distance between Lincoln’s 
characterization of the task at hand and Jonathan Z. Smith’s more self-effacing assertion that, for 
the student of religion, the “foremost object of study” will have to be one’s own relentless “self-
consciousness,” because “There is no data for religion. Religion is solely the creation of the 
scholar’s study,” and what is there to scrutinize and examine is merely “the imagination of 
6 Bruce Lincoln, “Theses on Method” in Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 8.3, 1996, 225. 
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religion.”7
More specifically, according to Thesis 2, religion “is that discourse whose defining 
characteristic is its desire to speak of things eternal and transcendent with an authority equally 
transcendent and eternal.” While there is undoubtedly no lack of discernible discourse (popularly 
termed “religious”) and centuries of interpretation  which seem to perfectly fit this “defining 
characteristic,” it can hardly be said that all religious practices, speech, or the majority of texts 
deemed religious fit the bill. Within various religious traditions, there certainly are claims to God-
inspiredness and anticipation of postmortem bliss, but this doesn’t begin to describe (or 
encompass) the whole of religious expression. To be faithful to the “rigorous critical practice” with 
which Lincoln sets history’s authority “in the sharpest possible contrast”
 In contrast, Lincoln maintains that there is indeed a manifest discourse--not a mere 
concept--that can be isolated fixed upon, described, and encompassed, and it is called religion. 
8
In this way, our theory of religion will have to consider the generative matrices of religious 
speech by way of what Mikhail Bakhtin termed heteroglossia:  “All languages of heteroglossia, 
whatever the principle underlying them and making each unique, are specific points of view on 
the world, forms for conceptualizing the world in words, specific world views, each characterized 
by its own objects, meanings and values.”
 to religious authority, the 
historian of religion will have to be attuned to the fashion in which the religious voice (or the voice 
preserved by religious tradition) seeks to simply tell it like it is, to be observationally honest (apart 
from otherworldly, metaphysical considerations) about the way things are, and to assert, often out 
of an ominously beleaguered state, a word of testimony in the direction of hoped-for, but 
sometimes not-within-reach, justice.  
9
                                                 
7 Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), xi. I find Smith’s assertion compelling but would place within the list of 
tasks to be taken up by the aspiring student of religion an aliveness to the myth—as myth—of 
critical detachment. 
 While the conceptualizations of religious speech will 
often assume the power of popular myth, commanding widespread (perhaps largely 
unanticipated) attentiveness and allegiance to its narratives, they shouldn’t be characteristically 
defined as desiring or constantly aspiring toward the status of metanarrative (read “eternal and 
8 Lincoln, “Theses on Method” 225. 
9 M.M. Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel” in The Dialogic Imagination, trans. Caryl Emerson and 
Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 291-292. 
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transcendent”). The conceptualizations are often generated out of earthbound, everyday 
concerns. Sometimes religious speech is simply one human voice saying, in an especially 
persuasive fashion that somehow binds the listener, how life looks and feels from a particular 
standpoint. It could even be something as seemingly quotidian as a commercial, a talking point, 
or a plug for a product. 
 
You Can’t Step in the Same Religion Twice 
With Thesis 3, Lincoln draws a neat line between the discourse (history of religions) 
which will always “insist on discussing the temporal, contextual, situated, interested, human, and 
material dimensions” and the other discourses (ostensibly religious practices and institutions) 
which “characteristically represent themselves as eternal, transcendent, spiritual, and divine.” 
This dichotomy is deeply problematic. It shouldn’t be denied that many self-described religious 
institutions (which often enjoy tax-exemption status) represent themselves in this way, as safely 
sequestered away from political and economic matters but usually willing to offer their services in 
the role of chaplaincy or “spiritual counsel.” But this positioning of a religious tradition is frequently 
challenged as misrepresentation from within the religious traditions themselves by religious 
adherents who insist on speaking to and within the very dimensions Lincoln characterizes as the 
exclusive concerns of historical discourse. These are the agents of socio-religious reform who 
point out the false advertising, false witness, unjust practice, and unfaithfulness at work in 
disembodied (spiritualized) representations of religion and seek to resist, disrupt, and turn around 
the (for now) prevailing, bad faith discourse. This, too, is religion. When it comes to this aspect of 
religious discourse, the line Lincoln draws is a historical fiction, though he might conceivably 
resort to placing the voices of religious reformation on the side of the practitioners of “history of 
religions” discourse.   
In the same vein, Thesis 4 insists that religious discourse must be made to endure “the 
same destabilizing and irreverent questions one might ask of any speech act.”10
                                                 
10 Lincoln, 225. 
 This is most 
assuredly the case, and one name for this uproarious, unseemly, and unstable mumbo-jumbo of 
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an endlessly self-interrogating process is religion. Lincoln here echoes the prophetic imperative at 
work at the margins (and sometimes the center) of every religious tradition. Prophetic traditions 
ensure that religions aren’t static or monolithic (except according to some self-described 
adherents who also play their parts, heretical or otherwise, within the traditions). One can never 
step into the same religion twice, because religions are always in flux, always changing. The 
devastating, destabilizing questions put to religion don’t begin with the application of historical 
method. It is religious discourse itself that is present within and, in some sense, engendered by 
way of such questions being put to reigning religious normatives. Such questions are the stuff of 
religious discourse. The neat cleavage Lincoln presumes between the critical and the religious is 
untenable. 
Whether haplessly or profoundly, religious discourse is often at least an attempt, we 
might say, at good conscience. And interestingly, in Thesis 5, Lincoln places good conscience at 
the center of scholarly virtue (a religious commitment?). Reverence and the good manners the 
decision to revere might generate, Lincoln consigns to the realm of religion. Why the distinction? 
The historian of religion, by Lincoln’s lights, is committed to the truth of all matters while the 
religious pilgrim seems to want otherworldy consolation at the cost of rigorous truth. Why a 
hermeneutic of reverence and a hermeneutic of good conscience must be viewed as mutually 
exclusive isn’t made clear. 
 
The Ideology of Others 
In Thesis 6, Lincoln locates an unwillingness to bring critical inquiry to religions on 
account of the cultural relativism informed by “a certain displaced defensiveness” and “the guilty 
conscience of western imperialism.”11
                                                 
11 Ibid. 226. 
 This is certainly right, insofar as it’s wrong to withhold the 
ministry of critical inquiry from religious peoples we feel compelled to leave to their unenlightened 
plight out of a sense of, as Lincoln might put it, politeness. But there is also a posture (sometimes 
equated with cultural relativism) that rightly recognizes—or confesses--a tendency, within 
ourselves, to mistake a deeply dogmatic and subjective account of another person’s (or people’s) 
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belief and practice for a more-than-sufficiently objective representation of our object of study. We 
have to keep before us the question of whether or not we’re doing justice to what we presume to 
understand, and this question has to remain open. Or, as Hans-Georg Gadamer puts it, we have 
to discover repeatedly “what is common to all modes of understanding,” namely that 
“understanding belongs to the being of that which is understood.”12
Thesis 7 presents the danger of attributing stability to cultures in a manner that stresses 
continuity and whereby “internal tensions and conflicts, turbulence and incoherence, permeability 
and malleability are largely erased.” This is indeed the danger of ideology and the place where 
history is transmogrified into propaganda, but it isn’t necessarily at this point that narrative takes a 
turn, as Lincoln has it, for the religious. Here again, Lincoln renders religion synonymous with 
ideology in a fashion that doesn’t do complete justice to the way religions function. 
 
In Thesis 8, Lincoln actually addresses this concern by noting how scholars, in treating 
religious groups, will “mistake the ideological positions favoured and propagated by the dominant 
fraction for those of the group as a whole,” and, as a result, they “replicate the recognitions and 
misrepresentations of those the scholars privilege as their informants.” But in a similar fashion, 
Lincoln let’s the most widely disseminated and loudly broadcast versions of ostensibly religious 
discourse (the conversation-stopping power of fundamentalism) be the “defining characteristic” of 
religion as he represents it in the theses. Representing religion accurately will involve “probing 
beneath the surface”13
Theses 10 and 11 offer a very good word for the (note the careful wording) “would-be 
student of ideology.”
 of the most popular versions of religion and the unexamined 
presuppositions of scholarly discourse. Lincoln advises as much in Thesis 9. 
14 The consciousness with which we bring (or try to bring) our thoughts to 
bear upon ideology “is itself a product of that (ideological) system,” and “the system’s very 
success renders its operations invisible.”15
                                                 
12 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall 
(London: Continuum, 2004), xxviii. 
 But fortunately, by studying “the ideological products 
and operations of other societies” which are “initially unfamiliar” and by which we have yet to be 
13 Lincoln, 226. 
14 Ibid. 227. 
15 Ibid. 226. 
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bombarded in the way we’re pummeled by and immersed within our own, we can perhaps glean 
useful lessons to apply to ourselves as we attempt to self-apply the critical inquiry we so easily 
level at the alleged ideology of others. In his conflating of the two, might the ideology of others 
serve as Lincoln’s best definition of religion? 
Thesis 12 observes that “many students of religion” denounce critical inquiry as 
“reductionism,” and Lincoln maintains that the intent of the charge (and he identifies no other) is 
“to silence critique.” Whether within or without one’s religion, critique is indeed a hard pill to 
swallow (perhaps especially when unaccompanied by a discernible sense of reverence or respect 
toward the object of critique), and there will often be an attempt on the part of religious adherents 
to silence that which calls their beliefs and their practices into question. But the intent of the 
reductionism charge isn’t always a matter of trying to shut someone up. It might often be a more 
casual, friendly observation (a counter-critique) that the way a religious tradition is being 
characterized within the work that calls itself critical inquiry is not a sufficiently thick description; 
that it isn’t even functioning as representation; that it reduces the object of study; that it is, in fact, 
an instance of shoddy ethnography. It need not be an instance of a pouting student of religion 
wishing that the critical inquirer would ratify a religion’s purported “claim of transcendent nature 
and sacrosanct status.”16  On doing the job (history of religions) well, Clifford Geertz’s word on 
ethnography is especially helpful: “Doing ethnography is like trying to read (in the sense of 
‘construct a reading of’) a manuscript—foreign, faded, full of ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious 
emendations, and tendentious commentaries, but written not in conventionalized graphs of sound 
but in transient examples of shaped behavior.”17
                                                 
16 Ibid. 227. 
 An intense attentiveness to “transient examples 
of shaped behavior” can assist in avoiding the dangers of reductionism, and it might also require 
a willingness to bracket (for at least a time) the perceived claims to transcendent nature as a side 
issue and not necessarily the primary (or the defining) characteristic of religious discourse. The 
bracketing procedure might be more helpful to the practice of critical inquiry, as a starting point, 
than beginning with the refusal to ratify claims that aren’t even necessarily on the table. 
17 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, (New York: Basic Books, 
1973), 10. 
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The final thesis, Thesis 13, announces that the historian (or scholar), performing her 
function, won’t allow those one studies to define the terms in which they will be understood (in a 
certain tension with Gadamerian sensibility) and will never fail to distinguish between “truths,” 
“truth claims,” and “regimes of truth.”18
But historically, religious discourse exposes itself (sometimes willingly, sometimes not) to 
the risk of fresh analysis, better thinking, and it happens from within more than Lincoln seems 
willing to grant. Religious discourse, whether in text, image, or practice, will often mask reality, 
certainly, but, like scholarship, it also unmasks. It doesn’t only always abuse. It also disabuses. 
And it often contains the means, through new and better readings, interpretations, and 
performances to call its own perceived claims into question. Just like scholarship. To even put it 
this way begins to make the line between religious and scholarly discourse seem a little less 
definitive, and a complex space for the giving and receiving of critical witness begins to appear. 
Might a kind of self-conscious mythologizing animate the accounts, the representations, the tales 
we tell concerning our alleged objects of study? 
 This is mostly acceptable, but, as is the case throughout 
the theses, it seems as if scholarship is being let off the hook; that ideology runs rampant 
throughout religious discourse and history is more easily and blessedly made immune. It’s as if 
Lincoln would worry less if he believed religious discourse worried more about its ideological 
tendencies and submitted to a more fine-grained examination (history of religions) of its own 
thinking. He doesn’t believe it submits easily to the critical gaze. And this is certainly true. 
 
Let Us Compare Mythologies 
Lincoln offers a provocative analysis of this wider terrain of human mythmaking in 
Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship, and it places his “Theses on Method” 
within an extremely helpful context. In the epilogue, “Scholarship as Myth,” we receive the word 
on scholarship we longed for in the theses: “I not only grant but insist that scholarship—like 
human speech in general—is interested, perspectival, and partial and that its ideological 
dimensions must be acknowledged, ferreted out where necessary, and critically cross-examined.” 
                                                 
18 Lincoln, 227. 
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Here, Lincoln makes the same critical demands upon scholarship that he brings to religious 
discourse.  
What sign of good faith will scholarship bring to demonstrate its struggle against the 
merely ideologically driven? Footnotes. Footnotes signal “sustained engagement with the data” 
and a posture of open-handedness and transparency toward a community of interlocutors who 
will “act as a check on ideological manipulation.”19
He even describes an occupational hazard that sits very nicely alongside the theses: 
“Students of myth seem particularly given to producing mythic, that is, ideological, narratives, 
perhaps because the stories they tell about storytelling reflect back on them as storytellers 
themselves.”
 And lest we suspect Lincoln is still privileging 
the study of myth (and religion) as a way of transcending ideology-saturated mythmaking, he lays 
down a provocative aphorism: “If myth is ideology in narrative form, then scholarship is myth with 
footnotes.” 
20 In view of such on-the-job pitfalls, the relentless self-consciousness that Jonathan 
Z. Smith commends to the would-be student of religion is especially needful, and this self-
consciousness will be fueled by a heightened awareness of the limitations and the historical 
situatedness involved in students’ attempt to mythmake (study religion) well: “As students of 
myth, we can turn our attention to the mythmaking of our scholarly, as well as that of other, 
ancestors, secure in the knowledge that our descendants will one day return us the favor.”21
Taken together, Lincoln’s theses and the epilogue to Theorizing Myth serve as an 
admonition to proceed with caution, to slow down, and to enter into (and receive) the communal 
accountability that makes just speech, better (less illusory?) mythmaking, and critical resistance 
to ideology possible. While Lincoln once grandly set aside the practice of reverence as a religious 
(non-scholarly) virtue, one is left with the sense that tact and care are very much called for in his 
sense of proper practice in the study of religion. A sense of relentlessly self-conscious 
mythmaking—open to the creative possibilities the traditions under examination might yet 
 
                                                 
19 Bruce Lincoln, Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999), 208. 
20 Ibid. 209. 
21 Ibid. 216. 
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generate--seems in order if we’re to actually see and somehow understand what we too often 
presume to hold at a critical distance. “Sustained engagement with the data” appears to demand 
as much. How might the mythmaking of scholarly engagement bear witness to the witness of 
meaning-making traditions?  
Accepting footnotes as one sign of such serious, sustained, and sufficiently self-
conscious engagement, I’d like to extend this creative component (often knowingly creative) to 
every form of narratival (and therefore mythic) witness. And here, we return to the question of 
binding and freeing artifice and the possibility of giving, receiving, discerning, and crafting 
witnessing forms. Re-presenting, commemorating, or giving form to human experiences and 
insights is the work of traditioning itself, of setting down and passing down a communal—or 
potentially communal--witness. In reference to the legacy of Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī as a 
“courageous bricoleur” within Islamic traditions, Ebrahim Moosa describes this as the “imaginative 
work of tradition” where “different narratives” are “forged.”22 And this witnessing work is 
undertaken within, and perhaps to some degree even conjures, an in-between, “liminal space” 
which somehow “frames all other spaces,” a “threshold area” crucial to any claims of inside or 
outside, a terrain “that one crisscrosses daily” as one would move from the entrance of a private 
dwelling into the perceived public of the street. Borrowing an Arabized Persian word from 
Ghazālī, Moosa calls this space dihlīz, “a mobile force field…[that] lends itself to nontotalitarian 
modes of being and thought.”23
Moosa reveals, in a footnote fittingly enough, that this way of translating dihlīz comes to 
him via Talal Asad who posits the concept of  “complex space and complex time” which might 
afford us a vision “of embodied practices rooted in multiple traditions, of the differences between 
horizons of expectation and spaces of experience—the differences that continually dislocate the 
present from the past, the world experienced from the world anticipated, and call[s] for their 
revision and reconnection.”
 
24
                                                 
22 Ebrahim Moosa, Ghazālī and the Poetics of Imagination, (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2005), 27. 
 Asad in turn credits Anglican theologian John Milbank for this way of 
23 Ibid. 48-49. 
24 Talal Asad, “Muslims as a ‘Religious Minority’ in Europe” in Formations of the Secular: 
Christianity, Islam, Modernity, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 179. 
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figuring complex space. Milbank notes that the ways traditions impinge upon one another and 
“complexly overlap” can’t be rightly reckoned within an “enlightenment simple space” which is 
always “merely an abstracting, idealizing project,” compared to “complex space,” because “there 
is no such thing as absolute non-interference; no action can be perfectly self-contained.”25
In a demonstration of the productive play afforded by a self-conscious situating within 
dihlīz itself, a professor of Islamic studies, an anthropologist, and a theologian together here 
make a way –or perceive a way—where the conventions of popular and much academic 
discourse only allow for dead-ends. They describe a space for decentering the alleged center, 
rendering possible a scene of recognition concerning historical and contemporary witnesses as 
well as an awareness of their mutual imbrication as a given. This is more than a space for inter-
religious dialogue, comparative theology, or an exchange of ideas; dihlīz is a space in which 
meaning and orientation are given and received, by and through, the witness of others and 
where, in Jonathan Z. Smith’s terminology, we keep our bearings by holding to our 
representations loosely to better recognize that the data we believe we have on one another, the 
differently religious other, and ourselves is, to some degree, imagined data.  
 In a 
world of such complex overlap and mutual imbrication, it would be incredibly difficult to speak of 
religion, myth, or symbol in terms of their alleged roles (i.e. the role of religion, religion’s role) as if 
they keep to the corners we designate in our attempts to manage what we take to be their 
meanings. Doing so is to fail to adequately register the living, interweaving dialectic of dihlīz. 
Holding to the concept of dihlīz as the threshold space which frames all other conceived 
spaces, the site of the giving, receiving, discerning, and confessing of mythic accounts, I’d like to 
thicken and expand it further by incorporating it into the relational dimension Judith Butler terms 
“the structure of address.” In the attempt to give or even formulate an account26
                                                 
25 John Milbank, “Against the Resignations of the Age” in Things Old and New: Catholic Social 
Teaching Revisited, ed. F.P. McHugh and S.M. Natale (New York: University Press of America, 
1993), 19. 
 of ourselves that 
can “conform to norms that govern the humanly recognizable,” we are already interrupted and 
enabled by “a sociality that exceeds” whatever we take to be exclusive to ourselves. This sociality 
is the structure of address that “establishes the account as an account,” an irretrievably relational 
26 For my purposes, Butler’s account is largely interchangeable with my understanding of witness. 
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account, we understand, because “no account takes place outside the structure of address.” No 
myth, narrative, representation, or witness can have its meaning alone. “It is only in 
dispossession” that it can be communicated at all.27
And in a move that should serve as an admonition against presumed mastery or 
proprietary gestures of encompassment, Butler suggests that the structure of address   
 
is the enabling interruption when it comes to the stories we tell ourselves to ourselves, the stories 
we live by: “The moment the story is addressed to someone, it assumes a rhetorical dimension 
that is not reducible to a narrative function. It presumes that someone, and it seeks to recruit and 
act upon that someone…it is invariably interlocutory, ghosted, laden, persuasive, and tactical.” In 
this sense, an awareness of the structure of address is itself an assertion of complex space an 
understanding of which reveals our stories as always-already hybrid, porous, and open-ended, 
our every meaning dependent upon a crossroads of meaning. When a note of judgment or critical 
assessment arises, it can’t proceed as if “unbeholden to the ethics implied by the structure of 
address” and without tending toward a kind of violence in its presumed “break with relationality.”28 
And even within a proper sense of mutual interdependence, Butler believes judgment always falls 
short of recognition (“Recognition cannot be reduced to making and delivering judgments about 
others”29
 It is here that I’d like to bring the imagery of Moosa’s dihlīz and Butler’s structure of address 
together to deploy religion as, in one sense, the creative work of binding and freeing artifice; 
creative work, in various forms, that precedes and saturates us long before we count ourselves 
as having been in any way addressed by it. To claim to be against religion, in this sense, is as 
incoherent as being for it. One could just as well take attempt a principled stand against symbols, 
constructs, promises, or social bonds. When we think of it this way, the myth of critical 
detachment we often bring to our discourse concerning religion begins to ring hollow. Butler is 
particularly instructive on this point concerning the loss of absolutely self-possessed knowing 
when we begin “to accept not just that we address others when we speak, but that in some way 
). 
                                                 
27 Judith Butler, “An Account of Oneself” in Giving an Account of Oneself, (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2005), 36-37. 
28 Butler, “Against Ethical Violence” in Giving an Account of Oneself, 63. 
29 Ibid. 44. 
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we come to exist, as it were, in the moment of being addressed, and something about our 
existence proves precarious when that address fails.” And in the stronger sense, “what binds us 
morally has to do with how we are addressed by others in ways we cannot avert or avoid; this 
impingement by the other’s address constitutes us first and foremost against our will or, perhaps 
put more appropriately, prior to the formation of our will.” According to Butler, when we’re 
unconscious of or believe ourselves to be impervious to the action of address, “we miss the very 
mode by which moral demands are relayed. That is, we miss the situation of being addressed, 
the demand that comes from elsewhere, sometimes a nameless elsewhere, by which our 
obligations are articulated and pressed upon us.”30
 
 To draw Butler’s discussion into my own, what 
we miss when we resist awareness of our situation of being—and having been—addressed is the 
social fact of religion. 
Don’t Believe Everything That You Breathe 
 While I wouldn’t have dreamed of bringing “religion” into it at that stage, it is precisely an 
aliveness to the situation of being addressed that I once hoped to cultivate in my daughter when 
she was a toddler. Faced with the difficulty of maneuvering her around in the seat provided her in 
a shopping cart while responding to her demands for candy and brightly colored pieces of plastic 
placed strategically at her eye level in the aisles and checkout line of our nearest grocery, it 
eventually occurred to me that making more explicit the forms of address in which she had been 
ritually immersed might prove helpful. “They’re trying to trick you,” I told her. I hasten to add that a 
more nuanced consideration of a market economy in which we live and move and have our being 
would follow in the years to come, but I was pleased to hear her whisper, on more than one 
occasion, “You’re trying to trick me,” in the presence of mildly predatory advertising strategies in 
those complex spaces where the con is always on. A counter-mantra, we understand, is often 
called for. I would suggest we begin to cobble them together, almost instinctively, when we see 
how and why we’re being addressed, when we begin to see the religious situation. 
                                                 
30 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, (London: Verso, 2006), 
130. 
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 To my mind, to describe the situation thusly is to expand the space of—and make a 
way for—the exercise of critical consciousness. Religion is probably the only term comprehensive 
enough to begin to name, with Marx31
 This is powerfully exemplified in what Northrop Frye takes to be a culturally crucial 
achievement of Samuel Beckett. Beckett gives us narrative voices who chart the ways they are 
“oppressed by the pervasive lying of the imagination, by the way in which one unconsciously 
falsifies the facts to make a fiction more symmetrical” while lamenting the resigned revelation 
“that there is no escape from fiction.”
, those forms of ideological mystification that disorder and 
perpetuate dysfunction as well as the emergence of emancipating forms that might transform the 
scene, the complex space—the field of action--for tying and untying, binding and freeing artifice; 
that valley of decision where we might begin to see myths otherwise powerful and pervasive 
enough to conceal their own contradictions for what they are, or better, for what they’re doing. In 
this vein, the neutral fact of consensual fictions that govern and form a culture—that, in some 
sense, are culture—isn’t a problem, but presuming we’re operating outside of them in a myth-free 
or religion-free zone, effortlessly wise to their pull, is probably ideology in action. In its resistance 
to the perverting, formative power of bad narratives, the critical poetic work of being aware and 
enacting reformation is itself relentlessly narratival. 
32
Unfortunately it’s a question of words, of voices, one must not forget that, one must try 
and not forget that completely, of a statement to be made by them, by me…some 
process no doubt, that I’ve got stuck in, or haven’t yet come to…impossible to stop, I’m in 
 In keeping with this, the narrator of The Unnamable 
manages to articulate a witness concerning his own immersive environment of signals and noise, 
static and desire, even as he seems to drown within it, losing, it seems, all hope of orientation. 
The guiding metaphor which the narrator has to struggle to see clearly again and again, 
reluctantly but resolutely, is the matter of voices and words:  
                                                 
31 “Religion, and we will come back to this, was never one ideology among others for Marx.” 
Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New 
International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), 42. 
32 Northrop Frye, “The Nightmare Life in Death” in The Hudson Review 13.3, 1960, 448.  
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words, made of words, others’ words, what others, the place too, the air, the walls, the 
floor, the ceiling, all words, the whole world is here with me.33
For Beckett, this assessment is nothing more complicated or profound than a reading on a local 
situation, an effort to objectify, if only for a moment and mostly unsuccessfully, the process of 
ones own confusion, a setting down of the testimony of one more beleaguered mind comparable 
to that of the conned man. Best to keep at it: “All words, there’s nothing else, you must go on, 
that’s all I know…you must say words, as long as there are any…you must go on, I can’t go on, 
I’ll go on.”
 
34
 Though it comes to us as a radically thinned-out summons
  
35
 And here we consider again the image of the conned man and the commercially concocted 
dramas that operate within, even as they depend upon, his nervous system. In such a scenario, is 
a spark of recognition even possible? We here recall Theodor Adorno’s assessment of the way it 
works: “It is part of the mechanism of domination to forbid recognition of the suffering it 
produces.”
, it seems to me that 
Beckett is delivering a charge concerning the imperative of poetic resistance within ones, for 
better and worse, inescapably religious situation, the obligation to tie and untie and tie again the 
knot that you need with available materials (words, for instance, “as long as there are any”), to 
have a go at binding or setting down an intuition concerning likenesses and differences in the 
direction of an arresting—if not redeeming—construct, to make a space, at least for recognition. 
36 But in spite of the culture formed and forming around, within, and for him, we can 
stop short of construing his crisis as one in which his hope of resisting or even experiencing 
himself consciously has been irretrievably cut off,37 what Adorno grimly terms “liquidation.”38
                                                 
33 Samuel Beckett, Molloy, Malone Dies, and The Unnamable: Three Novels, (New York, Grove 
Press, 1959), 534-537. 
 The 
raw given data of received artifice, that artifice which, in the case of the conned man and his ilk, 
34 Ibid. 577. 
35 “The expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from 
which to express, no power to express, together with the obligation to express.” Beckett, “Three 
Dialogues” in Disjecta: Miscellaneous Writings and a Dramatic Fragment, (New York: Grove 
Press, 1984), 139. 
36 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (London: Verso, 1978), 63. 
37 “People’s last possibility of experiencing themselves has been cut off by organized culture” Ibid. 
65.  
38 “In the age of the individual’s liquidation, the question of individuality must be raised anew.” 
Ibid. 129. 
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only engulfs and overwhelms, need not liquidate personality inevitably, as the Orwellian story 
goes. There often remain avenues for counter-artifice, that seemingly ineffective poetic act that 
undertakes what Robert Stepto calls the “transformation of data into metaphor.”39
 
 This is Stepto’s 
characterization of W.E.B Du Bois’s narrative method in The Souls of Black Folk, an attempt to 
join his own scholarship with songs, making sound work against crushing realities, attempting 
exorcism, conjuring a space for recognition, analysis, and a provocative account of what’s going 
on, a space for the bearing of poetic witness. 
Monitor the Pictures (To Be or Not To Be) 
While the work we call poetic is certainly something more, we do well to keep in mind that it is 
also never anything less than the setting down—or the intoning of—a construct, the creative 
positing of new forms which often strip down the old ones, the practice of the artistry of social 
change. Whether descriptive, lyrical, or weirdly explanatory (telling it slant, in Dickinson’s phrase), 
the construct gives witness. In this way, the specifically sacramental poetics I have in mind self-
consciously strives to conjure better, more redeeming stories than the ones that currently 
structure the given world, and its practitioners understand that critical detachment from this 
complex, storied, and therefore religious space is, in no small way, a delusion. To reconceive, 
even out of thin air, the given formations or to decree them deformations is to reconfigure the 
sacred status quo with counter-commemorations. Or as Adorno puts it, “In creating cultural 
categories we give shape to this world, and whoever manages to change the categories thus 
changes the shape [of a given world].”40
                                                 
39 Robert B. Stepto, “The Quest of the Weary Traveler: W.E.B. Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk” 
in From Behind the Veil: a Study of Afro-American Narrative, (Champaign: University of Illinois 
Press, 1991), 53. 
 To draw upon the all-too-unproblematized idiom of ones 
immediate culture and transform given data into new and better forms is to recognize a religious 
imperative of engagement. While it is discerned in conditions as complex as Moosa’s dihlīz, 
responding, with an engagement of one’s own, to the fact of having been addressed is as simple, 
straightforward and commonplace as the everyday, intellectual drive to somehow make sense of 
ones situation. There is more than one way to sing, draw, remix, versify, or simply speak an 
40 Adorno, 99. 
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alternative world into existence within the shell of the dominant one, more than one way to 
respond artfully, and therefore redemptively, to atmospheric conditions hostile to life. The cost of 
neglecting to do so, of not engaging the forms by which we are engaged, is playfully but 
devastatingly explored by E.E. Cummings. 
 In a self-penned introduction to his novel The Enormous Room, a fictional account of 
his months in a prison camp in Normandy during World War I, Cummings’ introduces himself to a 
fastidious interlocutor. Anticipating exasperation over the very idea of a literary offering in troubled 
times, he begins with an admonition that seems intended as a kind reassurance, “Don’t be 
afraid.” But his listener sneers at the suggestion, which he attributes to Cummings, that art could 
ever hope to be “of vital consequence.” 
 “Did it ever occur to you,” he asks, “that people in this socalled world of ours are not 
interested in art?” A note of resentment concerning what he takes to be Cummings’ self-important 
presumption creeps in, “ I dare say you don’t say precisely why you consider your art of vital 
consequence.” 
 Cummings’ retort implies that the possibility of individual consciousness, the possibility 
of experiencing oneself as a self, resides in artistry: “Thanks to I dare say my art I am able to 
become myself.” 
 So is artfulness the only avenue of human development? “What do you think happens 
to people who aren’t artists? What do you think people who aren’t artist’s become?” 
 “I feel they don’t become: I feel nothing happens to them; I feel negation becomes of 
them.”  
Of all the nerve. “Negation?” 
“You paraphrased it a few moments ago…’This socalled world of ours.’” 
“Labouring under the childish delusion that economic forces don’t exist, eh?” 
“I am labouring.”41
If I read him correctly, Cummings is laboring against the possibility of human insentience, 
his own and others, and for a creative witness that might somehow testify to something beyond 
 
                                                 
41 E.E. Cummings, Introduction to The Enormous Room, (New York: Modern Library, 1934), vii-x. 
I owe my awareness of this text to Durs Grünbein. 
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the merely mechanistic. Incidentally, his invention of a hostile conversation partner in response to 
whom he might articulate as much is itself a witnessing work. Within the reigning liturgy (Gk. 
leitourgia, work of the people) of image, symbol, and story being undertaken by the imagined 
communities of nation states, businesses, and other monied interests, the individual may avoid 
being absorbed (or negated) through the undertaking of counterliturgies, the deployment of 
disruptive intelligence that might open life, any life, to the possibility of change. 
What one cannot do without suffering the forfeiture of soul is to hold oneself aloof from 
this process (“This socalled world of ours”) and let the reigning, deluding forms go uninterrogated 
as if they’re inevitable. In this sense, I suspect Cummings fear of negation is in sync with Frantz 
Fanon’s famous prayer, “O my body, always make me a man who questions.”42
Our task should be that of exposing the specific metaphor, representation, or religious 
idea that causes or sanctions cruelty, not the more generalized—and ultimately 
impossible—task of trying to make a world in which metaphor, narrative, and religion 
cease to exist. Wittgenstein showed that we cannot live without pictures. We can and 
must, however, constantly monitor our pictures to see what they are doing and neglecting 
to do.
 There are means 
to flipping the given scripts, of changing or widening the narrative parameters that enclose us, of 
setting an echo going, but this requires a lively awareness of their presence, of the ways they’ve 
formed us religiously. The poet-philosopher William LaFleur describes this work of sacramental 
poetics thusly: 
43
In LaFleur’s view, the fact of binding and freeing artifice (religious imagery, we’re prone to 
call it, as if there’s an imagery that isn’t) occasions the work of making new and better sense 
while holding to a redemptive skepticism nicely captured in an aphorism of the singer-songwriter 
Beck: “Don’t believe everything that you breathe.” But the space for gaining the critical foothold to 
rightly give or withhold belief in an immersive environment of image and symbol is, perhaps 
 
                                                 
42 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Richard Philcox, (New York: Grove Press, 
2008), 206. 
43 William R. LaFleur “Body” in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), 51. 
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paradoxically, a hermeneutic work of believing that precedes understanding. A critical monitoring 
of what’s been thrown together in and as symbol (sym-bol Gk, to throw together) can’t be 
undertaken without belief in and within symbols themselves. We have to find ourselves knowingly 
enmeshed in religious discourse, perhaps more consciously inundated, before we can begin 
respond to and participate within it critically. The power to arrest our impressions and render 
discourse more coherent can’t be accessed outside of discourses themselves. Or as Paul 
Ricoeur puts it, humanity “remains language through and through” even as we “aim at a second 
naïveté in and through criticism. In short, is by interpreting that we can hear again.”44
As we will see in the witnessing work of James Joyce, Ralph Ellison, and Ursula Le Guin, 
poetic resistance to or critical deployment of available myths and symbols demands immersion 
and investment. You have to draw your life from them to resist them properly. As Ricoeur insists, 
we have to knowingly orient ourselves within the given mix of symbols to appropriate and 
transcend them effectively:  
   
The world of symbols is not a tranquil and reconciled world; every symbol is iconoclastic 
in comparison with some other symbol; just as every symbol, left to itself, tends to 
thicken, to become solidified in an idolatry. It is necessary, then, to participate in the 
struggle, in the dynamics, in which the symbolism itself becomes a prey to a spontaneous 
hermeneutics that seeks to transcend it. It is only by participating in this dynamics that 
comprehension can reach the strictly critical dimension of exegesis and become a 
hermeneutic; but then one must abandon the position—or rather, the exile—of the remote 
and disinterested spectator, in order to appropriate in each case a particular symbolism.45
Ricoeur’s account of “the world of symbols” implies a knowing relationality, an 
investedness, that will be required of anyone wishing to navigate this complex space of 
imaginative constructs that order our understanding of our worlds. It brings to mind Guy 
Davenport’s assertion that everything we dignify with the name of art is, in some sense, a 
dabbling in symbols, that “Art itself is a symbol,” and that if “a symbol is simply a drenched 
 
                                                 
44 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan, (New York, Harper & Row, 
1967), 350-351. 
45 Ibid. 354. 
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identity, a thing more than equal to itself,” then the work of drenching and re-drenching the 
placeholders we fashion, of attempting new ones in the symbolic form of another having-to-do-
with, is a fluid work, a work that is never done.46
It is within the complex spaces of unavoidably symbolic activity, of binding and freeing 
artifice, that one might discern what Hortense Spillers refers to as the “symbol-making task.” 
Accounts of the practice of “symbol-making” appear throughout her work as a space-making 
tactic, most notably in her discussion of the emergence of “the black woman as artist” who finds 
herself to be the bearer of a “cultural apprenticeship” consisting of a tradition which, apart from a 
few autobiographies from the nineteenth century, was “virtually suppressed until the period of the 
Harlem Renaissance and later.”
 As E.E. Cummings sketch attempts to 
demonstrate, the serious play of poetic resistance to dominant symbols (dominating because, in 
Ricoeur’s formulation, they’ve thickened and solidified into idolatrous forms) will often be met with 
the charge of frivolity and uselessness. But such creative engagements with the powers that be 
are the labors of critical consciousness itself. Whether in the form of a collage, a song, a breaking 
of bread, a joke, a drawing, a blog, or the placing of a flower in a rifle, this sacramental poetics 
takes myriad forms. How many forms for assuming and lifting a voice? As many as there are 
people.  
47 When the voice one hopes to designate has been denied public 
existence, how does one expand the sphere of possibility within the given “universe of symbol-
making?”48
                                                 
46 Guy Davenport interviewed by John Jeremiah Sullivan, “The Art of Fiction CLXXIV,” Paris 
Review 163, 76. 
 It won’t be done from scratch, as it were. All is already context. The already-long-ago-
underway universe of past and present symbol-making, the sometimes unwelcome designations 
of others, will have to serve as the field of action and innovation. Most famously in “Mama’s Baby, 
Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book,” Spillers gets right down to it: “Lets face it. I am a 
marked woman, but not everybody knows my name.” The markers that precede the possibility of 
an identity are “a sort of telegraphic coding.” They are “markers so loaded with mythical 
prepossession that there is no way for the agents buried beneath them to come clean.”  
47 Hortense Spillers, “A Hateful Passion, A Lost Love: Three Women’s Fiction” in Black, White, 
and in Color: Essays on American Literature and Culture, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003), 97. 
48 Spillers, “Interstices: a Small Drama of Words” in Black, White, and in Color, 167. 
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What to do with mythical prepossession? For starters, don’t believe everything that you’re 
breathing. And from there, to measure up to the task of inventive self-assertion, one “must strip 
down through layers of attenuated meanings.” Here, Spillers provides an inventory:  “Peaches,” 
“Brown Sugar,” “Sapphire,” “Earth Mother,” “Aunty,” “Granny,” “God’s ‘Holy Fool,’” “Miss Ebony 
First,” and “Black Woman at the Podium.” There are the given functions in the forest of symbols 
that meet the perceived needs of the popular imagination, but the one thing needful in the scene 
she describes, the witness of the black female artist, will defy these caricatures: “I describe a 
locus of confounded identities, a meeting ground of investments and privations in the national 
treasury of rhetorical wealth. My country needs me, and if I were not here, I would have to be 
invented.”49
This assertion of a have-to, the lifting of a voice required by a human commitment to 
lively thriving and the possibility of communion, cracks the pavement of the pre-conceived, 
refusing the assigned roles symbolically set before it and denying the concepts that resist the 
poetic thinking that insists this has to do with that, what I take to be the symbol-making task. This 
is the sacramental poetics of fresh iterations. When it comes to naming sacramental poetics as 
the creative labor that overcomes every conceivable boundariey (political, religious, economic, or 
entertainment interests, for instance), the best break-down I know of comes from the discussion 
of the poets Juliana Spahr and Joshua Clover concerning what they call “The 95¢ Skool.” Their 
proposal consists of people regularly sitting at a table, discussing and devising poetry, and, lest 
their community take a turn for the overly highfalutin, snobby, or inaccessible, it is agreed that 
operating costs, per person, shall not exceed 95¢. Most importantly, the moving target, the 
alleged content, and the animating concern of their poetic community is a world without borders. 
The community’s object of study, its abiding interest, is any and everything all of the time. Their 
poetic practice is a mode of endless engagement committed to redemptive problematizing at 
every turn:    
 
Say poetry is understood as a specific mode of engaging the same set of problems that 
everything else means to engage. And the desire of poetry is not to represent the world 
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but to change it and be changed by it; to be adequate to its time, of its time, part of the 
constellation. Say poetry is understood as being a way of grasping things that otherwise 
would escape, or grasping things in a way that understands them otherwise: a kind of 
counter-cognition.  
A counter-cognition adequate to its time is what I take to be the task of sacramental poetics 
defined. What is more, the project of the 95¢ Skool is “neither poetry or context but the potential 
relation of the two. This is the work of work. We take this to be fundamental of workshop: no 
separation of poetry as an independent or personal activity…We elect Heraclitus over 
Parmenides, political economy over money, sewing over sewn. We take all of this to be not 
utopian but the beginning of realism.”50
As I read Spahr and Clover, their proposed program entails the popular resistance and 
innovation that, instead of merely representing the world, hopes to somehow contribute to its 
transformation. Their concern is the pursuit of the possibility of a discourse that redeems and 
makes new; not a departure from reality, but a deeper engagement within it. This is what they 
deem “the work of work,” a communal effort that hopes to be meaningfully reality-based, and it 
allows for no strict separations between the personal, the political, the poetic, or the ostensibly 
religious. As is the case with this poetics I call sacramental, it refuses every dualism set before it. 
Relation is all.  
 
 
Seeing the Form 
 In my discussion concerning the witness of sacramental poetics, the phrase “Insert soul 
here” is intended to serve a wide variety of purposes. At the outset, it is a word of admonition 
concerning the offerings of commercial culture as strategic, habit-forming calls to worshipfulness. 
In this vein, it might prove helpful to inscribe the words “INSERT SOUL HERE” somewhere on or 
near our computer screens, televisions, and iPhones or to at least keep them somehow in mind 
when we listen to political commentators tell us what’s what and where precisely we’d do well to 
                                                 
50 Juliana Spahr and Joshua Clover, “The 95¢ Skool” in Poets on Teaching: A Sourcebook. Ed. 
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direct our rage to better ascertain the religious appeals being made. But I also offer the words 
more positively to indicate the summons to investment entailed in the sacramental poetic works, 
whether literary or in the direction of civil disobedience, my study considers. “Insert soul here” I 
take to be the operative, implicit invitation in the address of Ellison’s Invisible Man, for instance, 
and a given in the strain of poetic concern I trace as present in the program of 95¢ Skool, a spirit 
whose looks are everywhere, everywhere better and more redeeming efforts to exhibit reality to 
ourselves and others are performed.  
 But whether deployed negatively or positively, the call to “Insert soul here” is a direction to 
know—or to know that we already know intimately—the kind of dreams, those consensual 
fictions, in which the conned man and his like are immersed. In this sense, sacramental poetics 
doesn’t simply represent what we see but strives as well to make us see, to see the forms that 
bind us as well as the new, poetic forms that invite us to see our worlds and our place within them 
differently. As Audre Lorde reminds us, this is the everyday expression that gives voice to the 
otherwise inarticulated idea or feeling, the creative labor we honor with the name of poetry: “This 
is poetry as illumination, for it is through poetry that we give name to those ideas which are—until 
the poem—nameless and formless, about to be birthed, but already felt.”51
 Without poetry, in Lorde’s sense, status quo imaginative forms remain devoid of insight, 
conveniently and deliberately so for the dominating forces of vested interests who thrive and 
depend on namelessness. But for Lorde, the poetic is the vital avenue for the insertion of soul, 
specifically the souls of women: 
 By performing this 
illuminating, light-bringing function, sacramental poetics already achieves the work of apocalyptic 
(Gk. apokálypsis, unveiling or revelation). This is the reworking of experience under and with the 
light of critical consciousness. Lorde is especially helpful: “I speak here of poetry as a revelatory 
distillation of experience, not the sterile word play that, too often, the white fathers distorted the 
word poetry to mean—in order to cover a desperate wish for imagination without insight.”  
For women then, poetry is not a luxury. It is a vital necessity of our existence. It forms the 
quality of the light within which we predicate our hopes and dreams toward survival and 
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change, first made into language, then into idea, then into more tangible action. Poetry is 
the way we help give name to the nameless so it can be thought. The harvest horizons of 
our hopes and fears are cobbled by our poems. Carved from the rock experiences of our 
daily lives.52
 Here Lorde places poetry, which my discussion terms sacramental poetics, squarely 
within the complex space I refer to as the religious situation, our given space of meaning-making 
and the emerging spaces we have yet to spy, our illusions and our redemptive wrestling with and 
beyond them, false and critical, redeeming consciousness. As Lorde has it, “Poetry is not only a 
dream and vision; it is the skeleton architecture of our lives. It lays the foundations for a future of 
change, a bridge across our fears of what has never been before.”  
 
And we do well to expect, Lorde’s account of this critical-poetic inheritance is irretrievably 
political, a deepening of the possibilities of human identity, differently deploying them after her 
own image: 
The white fathers told us: I think therefore I am. The Black mother within each of us—the 
poet—whispers in our dreams: I feel therefore I can be free. Poetry coins the language to 
express and charter this revolutionary demand, the implementation of that freedom.53
 For my purposes, Lorde’s account highlights the social character of poetry and, more 
specifically, the notion of sacramental poetics as the activity that seeks to change current of 
discourse into more revolutionary currencies, dislocating present imaginings into awareness, an 
attempt to view ourselves and others properly, more holily and wholly. 
 
Its work begins when the available means of alleged communication seem to overwhelm the 
possibility of communion. These are the conditions in aid of which the artistry of sacramental 
poetics is called upon. I have in mind what Durs Grünbein refers to as “poetic thinking.” This is 
poetics as the available and vital way, as Lourde puts it, to be most meaningfully opposed to 
death-dealingly reductive word play. It is the practice that orchestrates the disclosure of insight 
and, by doing so, calls present understandings and allegiances into question. Grünbein describes 
the everyday practice of re-envisioning of the reigning discursive imaginings this way: 
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Imagine a thinking that could penetrate into certain otherwise hard-to-reach places, like 
dental floss between the wisdom teeth or an endoscope into the stomach. It will make 
certain places visible for the very first time—individual branches of the otherwise 
intractable psychic cave system that runs through the bodies of all humans and can be 
discovered only by a resourceful imagination audaciously pushing forward into still 
unsecured galleries. This thinking is poetic thinking, and it is not the exclusive domain of 
poets and literati; rather, it is a method used by many small search parties that have 
started out from several directions unbeknownst to one another, an army of 
phenomenologists working on expanding the confines of our shared imaginaries.54
Grünbein’s account of the communal work of mutual evocation, that which expands the 
confines of our shared imaginaries, moves across disciplines, professions, and vocations to name 
every particular instance of an audacious, resourceful imagination taking up of the work of 
redeeming analysis and social consciousness, every forming of a search party no matter how 
small, anywhere two or more are gathered for the purpose of being attentive to reality together. 
These are the occasions that mark the giving and receiving of artful witness that Hugh Kenner 
calls “feats of attentiveness,” and we can note that they are never without a certain investigative 
heft. “A work of art is someone’s act of attention, evoking ours” Kenner tells us.
 
55
Although he limits himself to the genre of the novel and is perhaps too myopically 
beholden to Lorde’s “white fathers” to see that what he’s describing is only an innovation to the 
self-described modern, T.S. Eliot appears to have a bead on the self-conscious myth-crafting of 
sacramental poetic forms when he praises James Joyce’s “mythical method” in Ulysses. To 
assert, as Eliot does, that Joyce uses myth is to miss the insight I’ve sought to convey concerning 
all discourse as inescapably mythical (or relentlessly narratival), but this early appreciation of 
Joyce’s witness illuminates my sketch of sacramental poetics: 
 And forms of 
attentiveness, deployed throughout history and even now, are legion. These sacramental poetic 
forms themselves evoke our attention, our response, and our continued cultivating witness. 
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Mr. Joyce’s parallel use of the Odyssey has a great importance. It has the importance of 
a scientific discovery. No one else has built a novel on such a foundation before: it has 
never before been necessary...In using the myth, in manipulating a continuous parallel 
between contemporaneity and antiquity, Mr. Joyce is pursuing a method which others 
must pursue after him...It is simply a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and 
a significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary 
history. It is a method already adumbrated by Mr. Yeats, and of the need for which I 
believe Mr. Yeats to have been the first contemporary to be conscious. It is a method for 
which the horoscope is auspicious...We may now use the mythical method. It is, I 
seriously believe, a step toward making the modern world possible for art.56
If we consider the ethical and explanatory power of folk tales, parables, ballads, and 
blues or the patchwork assembling of foraged wisdom and the necessarily mythic quality of 
prophetic iteration at work in all manner of sacred texts, we can add that the “mythical method” 
Eliot names here is a tactic in lively operation long before it was so named. The forward step he 
celebrates as an innovation is a movement that includes, first of all, many a backward step which 
brings back with it more ancient broadcasts, a redeployment of Homer’s song and dance, we 
might say, to print technology. Nevertheless, the attempted giving of shape and significance to an 
otherwise formless futility and anarchy he espies is an apt way of characterizing the sacramental 
poetics my study explores, that creative labor of which I take Joyce to be an exemplary 
practitioner. We now turn to Joyce’s lyrical witness which self-consciously traditions its way 
within, beyond, and, in an important sense, on behalf of the unfathomable density of the traditions 
that formed him. 
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CHAPTER II 
        LANGUAGE IS NEVER OWNED 
 “Her old thoughts were going to come in handy now, but new words would have to be made and 
said to fit them.”57
Zora Neale Hurston 
 
 
“What love has begun, humor has the power to continue.”58
Aimé Césaire 
 
 
“What I claim is to live to the full contradiction of my time, which may well make sarcasm the 
condition of truth.”59
Roland Barthes 
 
 
Story and Song 
The artist Carl Andre once observed that while “Culture is something that is done to us. Art is 
something we do to culture.”60
Roman Catholicism, British imperialism, and Irish nationalism, for instance--are the only games in 
town, liturgical practices somehow easily isolatable from one another. But Joyce had a more 
 And it is in this mode of art as a task undertaken amid the 
immersive cultural formations that bind and at least occasionally free--Read religions--that we 
might best discern and receive the creative witness of James Joyce. Moving between the work of 
disassembling and re-assembling available symbols in words and images with leaps of 
faithfulness from one form to another, Joyce’s lyrical labors can only be rightly deemed anti-
religious if the sites of his imaginative resistance--  
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complex understanding of the function and the not-yet-anticipated possibilities of liturgy and a 
grasp of language; too complex, in fact, to ever view a strictly anti-liturgical stance as desirable or 
even possible. Any one liturgy is helplessly—not to say hopelessly--interwoven with another. 
What is possible is the creation—or perhaps, more appropriately, the cobbling together, the 
conglomewriting61—of counter-liturgies. Having at it with his own purposes in mind, Joyce could 
tell reality differently in the hope of awakening his readers with experiments in “benefiction,”62
 In an articulation of this religious situation that seems to draw Joyce and his student 
Marshall McLuhan to the table in one fell swoop, Lewis Hyde offers the following description of 
the meaning-making scene: “Story and song: these are two of the hypnotics by which social 
orders maintain their self-enchantment, the radio playing all day in laundries and gas stations, a 
background hum of catchy ballads to keep an agreed-upon reality in place and seemingly alive.”
 a 
blessing of renewed awareness to the sweet old world we’re in. Liturgy, the creative, symbol-
making work of the people, is the way we get enthralled and disenthralled, abused and 
disabused; the socially wrought ways of putting things we lose, gain, and constantly redeploy. 
The work that is liturgy is a work of meaning-management we’re never entirely done with. 
Whether knowingly mythic, defensively optimistic, redemptively comedic, or a carefully calibrated 
form of realpolitick, our liturgies are as inescapably social and unavoidable as dreams. 
63
 As we will see, this is what one of Stephen Dedalus’ interlocutors will refer to as 
supersaturation.
 
Like every form of sacramental poetic, Joyce’s offerings aim to stir the pot of whatever “agreed-
upon reality” lately and momentarily holds sway, but the pot and its contents, the given and 
received liturgies of a given locale, are never exactly removable. Religious commitments as 
currently organized are, in this sense, crucial to the liturgical work to be done. It is what there is to 
work with, the game you have to be knowingly in to win. 
64
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Stephen’s imagination is as saturated as everyone else but perhaps in a more achingly self-
conscious fashion. “You behold in me,” he remarks at one point, “ a horrible example of free 
thought.”65 Joyce himself viewed saturation as an apt characterization of any and everyone’s 
thought processes and hoped to transmit this sense within his fiction. In an exchange with a 
French translator concerning Joyce’s preferred avoidance of quotation marks in Ulysses, he 
observed that Stephen’s situation should be evident to the reader who “will know early in the book 
that S.D.’s mind is full like everyone else’s of borrowed words.”66 This novel insight of mutual 
imbrication is self-evidently an unavoidable human condition for the generally agnostic but 
movingly open-minded Leopold Bloom, a rumored Freemason who was born to a Roman 
Catholic mother, raised as a Jew by his father, and given a Protestant baptism before converting 
back to his prenatal Catholicism. Bloom posits the inevitable communism of our imaginings and 
disavows a too-knowing knowingness concerning ones own thought processes with an aphorism: 
“Never know whose thoughts you’re chewing.”67
While a creative consciousness completely detached from and independent of warring 
and institutionalized religious forms does not appear to be a possibility for Joyce, liturgically 
piecing together a more radically comprehensive and human one is. Joyce will have to create it 
out of the myriad forms of his own singular, localized, tireless, inimitable faith. He offers a 
provocative self-assessment in an early letter to Lady Gregory Augusta, playwright and co-
founder of the Abbey Theater: “I know that there is no heresy or no philosophy which is so 
abhorrent to my church as a human being…Though I seem to have been driven out of my country 
here as a misbeliever I have found no man yet with a faith like mine.”
 
68
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else’s, will often seem like nothing more than a container chockablock full of the bad, death-
dealing ideas of others, but it might yet serve—and by force of will will serve—as the poetic fund 
of legend, lore, and image for an unmanacled imagination. 
66 Joyce, Letters of James Joyce, ed. Stuart Gilbert, (New York: Viking Press, 1957), 263. 
67 Joyce, Ulysses, 171. 
68 Joyce, Letters, 53.  
 34 
The most oft-cited characterization of this posture occurs in Ulysses when Stephen, 
having listened to the appeals to God, empire, and hard work made by his dim-witted, 
schoolmaster employer Garrett Deasy in his office, casually asserts that history is a nightmare 
from which he is currently trying to awake. The statement evokes a paradigmatic sensibility that 
runs throughout the novel, a sensibility the reader will have to adopt as the necessary mindset for 
receiving the various witnesses Joyce means to channel, house, and unleash for our approval. 
Ulysses itself gives voice to the bardic impulse, to worlds going on underground, to older forms of 
knowingness than the mercenarily knowing airs of Mr. Deasy can know or understand. “The ways 
of the Creator are not our ways, Mr Deasy said. All history moves toward one great goal, the 
manifestation of God.” 
“That is God.” Stephen posits, gesturing to the sound of “Hooray! Ay Whrrwhee!” 
impinging upon the window from outside, “A shout in the street.”69 The sacred will have to be 
firmly and democratically situated in the quotidian, by Stephen’s lights, not dictated by Deasy’s 
declarations of responsibility and claims to realism, civilization, and organization. “Those big 
words,” Stephen calls them, “which make us so unhappy.”70
What seems to be at stake in their exchange is the possibility of signification. Who gets to 
signify? Will Stephen’s attempt at signification be received as significant? Will the words be 
welcomed even as they defy, mock, and move outside the categories with which the bureaucrat 
hopes to effectively order the world? Ulysses responds to the mess of history with a mobile army 
of metaphors, a chain of signifiers which, unlike other forms of presumed power, doesn’t claim to 
make anything happen. It will just go on and on as a way of putting it, of happening, of 
proceeding, of proving almost nothing, in its unacknowledged legislations of reality. The words 
won’t claim to go beyond words. Freed from the burden (or the burden of the posture) of absolute 
knowingness, cognitive certainty, or religious orthodoxy, the Joycean mind is determined not to 
fall for transcendental pretensions or any reification (idolatry) of concepts, and it is perhaps all the 
more determined to listen for and receive that which eludes category and commodification. All the 
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more determined to be attentive to the revelatory moment, the everyday apocalypse, the not-yet-
acknowledged sacramental which butts up against the despotically reigning norms. 
 
The Possibility of Redemptive Meaning-Making 
For Joyce, there is no mere to the merely poetic, lyrical, or narratival and no metaphysical 
bedrock to which popes, priests, presidents, or princes might have access  beyond merely 
linguistic forms. The world as we know it, in this sense, is endlessly narratival, infinitely 
talkaboutable, and forever awaiting new recastings, the work of counter-liturgies, as it always has. 
Joyce would have us learn to stop worrying and love the wonder-working power of words. He 
appropriated this liberating way of understanding the liturgies that bind (his gospel truth of not-
quite-so-hard-hitting history as, more or less, the latest in consensual fiction) from the theories of 
Giambattista Vico which he said should be used “for all they are worth.”71
But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote from 
ourselves, there shines the eternal and never failing light of a truth beyond all question: 
that the world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its principles are 
therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind.
 If we’re awash in 
constructions, the religious situation might be more fluid than we thought. In his call to religiously 
awaken ourselves to the constructedness of the mind’s concretizing conceptions, Vico’s account 
of illuminating fabrication almost seems to parody the idea that the given form of things is divine 
and therefore forever binding: 
72
Vico insists upon the manufactured quality of our sense of reality—Wittgenstein avant la 
lettre--and, with this in mind, observes the factual givenness of the world-ordering power of 
words. In Isaiah Berlin’s estimation, Vico helps us to see (or remember) that the words we inherit 
and employ had and have “the force of original acts.” This has long been the case. ”Agamemnon 
and Jeptha (who belonged to the age of “the gods”) sacrificed their daughters because the very 
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action of uttering the oaths had the force of natural causality, and the words directly altered (and 
were recognized as acts which could not but alter) the status quo simply in virtue of having been 
spoken.” By Berlin’s lights, Vico was “the first to grasp the seminal and revolutionary truth that 
linguistic forms are one of the keys to the minds of those who use words, and indeed to the entire 
mental, social and cultural life of societies.”73
According to Stuart Hampshire,  “Joyce turned back across 200 years to Vico, in his own 
ricorso, for a new humanism independent of social history” in which “the universal family of man 
is constituted by language and not by social structures” and the mass of humanity is 
“reconstituted, not through controlled and fact-respecting history, but through a wild, far-ranging, 
and imaginative philology” whereby “fiction is rolled back to its prehistorical beginnings and prose 
to rituals of barbarism and to incantation, jingle, and pun.” The organic bonds between word, 
image, and reality as we see it are to be revered as, for better or worse, the liturgical forms on 
offer, the binding or freeing artifice in the air. If we’re attentive to them, there might be an 
epiphany around every corner, one apocalypse after another awaiting a witnessing recognition 
and a redemptive redeployment. Stephen, as we’ve seen, and Bloom less self-consciously, could 
hear one developing just outside any and every window. “In Joyce coincidences in language are 
to be treated like natural portents.”
 For the Joycean mind, this will render the cold, hard 
facts of nightmare history a little less cold and a little less hard. A literary/liturgical awakening 
might yet turn the whole thing around over time. The lyrical will go on having its say, a very 
different say, needless to say; a saying witness that will forge a better, more redeeming 
consciousness than those histories that crown themselves realistic and “official” and do collateral 
damage among the living, those histories that believe themselves to be, with the power and pride 
of the Garret Deasys of the world, a mission accomplished.  
74
In Joyce’s world, the lyrics, phrases, puns that populate our mental atmosphere “carry 
condensed messages to be slowly, speculatively unraveled.” The unraveling and re-raveling of 
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received liturgies is crucial to the possibility of awakening, of making meanings that redeem. In 
this sense, Ulysses aspires to function as an exemplary conduit to an international, inter-
generational, radically ecumenical arsenal of word and image from which we draw…”spiritual 
capital…whether in mandarin writing or in the crude patter and songs of streets and pubs.” 75 It’s 
own liturgical formulation could even occasion the kind of unity that might yet and even now rise 
above nightmare history, a common humanity, a common sense, a public commons that is more 
knowingly “the universal basis of human culture.”76
“Why don’t you play them as I do?” asks stately Buck Mulligan in his ongoing back and 
forth with Stephen on the subject of life and how to live it.
 According to Joyce’s strange, misbelieving 
faith, the spiritual capital is there already, shouting in the streets, with or without longish books 
and published poetry. It doesn’t depend upon our assent, our theorizing, or our witness. It’s going 
public anyway for anyone with an ear to hear and an eye to see. But how might one meaningfully 
witness to it, this fire-hose full of the epiphanic blasting every which way? 
77 He’s referring to the exploiting, 
enculturating British, but Mulligan’s question highlights the distinction between Mulligan’s 
detached and frivolous way with people and things and Stephen’s resistance to this way of 
responding to the peopled world. At the beginning of the novel, Stephen is gradually making his 
way from an enchanted sense of things to a discernment of somebodies in the bodies around 
him. Both sensibilities are crucial to his perceived vocation: “Signatures of all things I am here to 
read, seaspawn and seawrack, the nearing tide, that rusty boot. Snotgreen, bluesilver, rust: 
coloured signs. Limits of the diaphane. But he adds: in bodies.”78
In this turn to a more affectionate attentiveness that pays heed to the seemly and 
conventionally unseemly without fastidious discrimination, Ulysses models the sacramental 
poetics Stephen is beginning to learn. Contrary to the Mulligan aesthetic, it achieves epiphany not 
by belittling the British or Dublin urbanites but by rendering them beatific. Their buying and 
selling, daydreams, erotic fantasizing, their supposed profanities all undergo lyrical affirmation. 
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This way of affirmation, this habitual magnanimity, comes more easily to Leopold Bloom who 
Stephen will figuratively receive as father and mentor, but for Joyce, it comes in the most 
exemplary fashion--most naturally and unself-consciously--to Molly.  
 
Hurry Up and Matter! 
To do the work of sacramental poetic witness (a work that is never done) will require a 
renunciation of the self-serious, self-consciousness Stephen feels all too powerfully in Mulligan’s 
presence. He will have to let the pain that frets his heart (“pain, that was not yet the pain of 
love”79) be transformed in the direction of redemptive, other-centered usefulness. He will have to 
let his tightly-held pride of theory be one guess, one more interpretation, another heartfelt witness 
among others. The same goes for questions of belief and unbelief. Who can say when one stops 
and the other starts? Both will perform a creative function in Stephen’s poet-priestly functions as 
he thinks/prays: “I believe, O Lord, help my unbelief. That is, help me to believe or help me to 
unbelieve?”80 To worry over it at all whether in mockery, as Mulligan does, or in a forcible denial 
of ones own ability to put two and two together is to try to “weave the wind,”81 and to fail to hold 
ones constructions loosely, a breakdown of the very bardic receptivity upon which his priestly-
poetic practice depends. Open-handed, self-empying receptivity will have to somehow trump his 
all-too-easy knee-jerk judgmentalism if he’s to see his situation rightly, if his overly individualized 
sense of endless injury is to undergo a transformation into love. With the Zen-like calm Leopold 
Bloom achieves less frantically, Stephen will reach a point in which his mind can “cease to strive” 
and know that his life doesn’t depend upon his own sense of knowing. It is in such moments that 
he achieves, through renouncing a feverish sense of achievement, the “peace of the Druid priests 
of Cymbeline.”82
                                                 
79 Ibid. 5. 
 For Joyce, the hierophantic—the showing of the holy--is only accessed through 
self-effacing hilarity. In this sense, the work of sacramental poetics cannot be envisaged or even 
meaningfully glimpsed by the proud of heart. 
80 Ibid. 214. See Mark 9:24. 
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Preceding this moment is the exchange in which Stephen’s laughter begins to “free his 
mind from his mind’s bondage.“83 In the library scene of “Scylla and Charybdis,” Stephen 
powerfully feels and simultaneously resents the need to weigh in heavily with his 
Shakespeare/Hamlet/Fatherhood theory as he’s surrounded by professional literary figures upon 
whom a successful career in letters might depend. He wants to make an impression which can’t 
be dismissed. He feels compelled to hurry up and matter. This bondage, as René Girard would 
have it, is “the mimetic pressure”84
“Jest on. Know thyself,”
 that makes the world, in the worst, most reductive sense of the 
word, go round. But to give in to it, Joyce understands is to give in to the same dire, death-dealing 
seriousness that makes of history a nightmare. To play at the serious game of mimetic rivalry is to 
insist that there’s more to his big idea than others. It is to play at the self-importance of being 
earnest. Will Stephen hold his creative witness together by not trying to hold it to together? Will 
he understand his words’ worth in the sense that Vico commends? Can he resist the postures of 
ideology, the last temptation of unpoetic coherence?   
85 Stephen thinks or says to himself. And it is of a piece with the 
disavowal of his own theory (followed incidentally, by the inner, mental assertion that he does 
believe it, at least every so often).86
                                                 
83 Ibid. 212. 
 If insight and understanding are to flow freely, unwoven and 
unknotted-up, he mustn’t bear the false witness of fixed belief or unbelief. Belief comes and goes, 
and it can’t be worn as a credential. It’s the deeply human fact-of-the-matter whether we know 
we’re only seeing through a glass darkly or not. The jest is the ultimate hermeneutic (Richard 
Kearney calls Stephen’s realization “a send-up of Socratic self-knowledge”). It’s how one gets 
hold  (or loses the navel-gazing hold) of oneself, losing your life to find a more lively one. In 
Stephen’s case, it is a turn toward the Vico-informed ethic of the novel: “Not only does Stephen 
revoke his own theory of triangles supplanted by trinities, but he goes on to confront the radical 
consequences of this disavowal. First, he undermines the metaphysical model of self-thinking 
84 René Girard, “Do You Believe Your Own Theory?: French Triangles in the Shakespeare of 
James Joyce,” in A Theater of Envy, (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2004),  263. 
85 Joyce, 216. 
86 Ibid. 214. 
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thought as the ultimate guarantor of truth.”87 He never knows whose thoughts and beliefs he’s 
chewing and he knows it. We note that Joyce himself holds to the same catch-as-catch-can ethic 
when the question of attribution arises in an exchange with the avant-garde composer, George 
Antheil. As is the case with whatever we call our own, when it comes to poetic creation out of the 
materials at hand, we are people ineluctably born of sound, sensation, and image. Self-thinking 
thought, strictly speaking, is a pretension Joyce is content to abdicate: “I am quite content to go 
down to posterity as a scissors and paste man for that seems to me a harsh but not unjust 
description.”88 What lies before the artist are the possibilities of appropriation and depropriation, 
love and theft. But it is only in seeing, saying, and showing without grasping—without, in harried 
fashion, calling attention to his showing business--that Stephen or Joyce or anyone might make 
of the “wide earth an altar.”89
 
 
Every Telling Has a Taling  
It is here that Stephen recalls (or prognosticates) Leopold Bloom’s  proffered wedge of 
melon, and Leopold Bloom is liturgically accorded the poetic-prophetic powers of Coleridge’s 
Ancient Mariner. The memory comes with its own subtitle “A creamfruit melon he held to me. In. 
You will see.”90 [my italics] With many a page to go this moment offers the trajectory of the novel 
in apocalyptic nutshell form. As Kearney describes it, “June 16, 1904? One epiphanic time in one 
epiphanic space? A day in the life of three Dubliners, retrieved, rewritten, and resurrected as 
literature? Not a triumphal literature of closure to be sure, but a textuality of endless openness to 
the event of life as serendipity, surprise, accident, grace.”91
Like the novel itself, the meeting between Stephen and Leopold redemptively unsettles, 
for both parties, whatever seemed most obvious. Their aliveness to one another will bear witness 
to a creative intelligence beyond their own given, taken-for-granted stations. Stephen, the artist-
 
                                                 
87 Richard Kearney, “Traversals and Epiphanies in Joyce and Proust,” in Traversing the 
Imaginary: Richard Kearney and the Postmodern Challenge, eds. Peter Gratton and John 
Panteleimon Manoussakis, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 190-191. 
88 Joyce, Letters, 297. 
89 Joyce, Ulysses, 218. 
90 Joyce, Ulysses, 217. 
91 Kearney, 196. 
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as-young-man, will be confronted by the unending, makeshift artistry of the elder Bloom’s comic 
and compassionate visions as their interface takes up the witnessing work of the novel, leaving 
no detail of human existence unsacramentalized. Under Joyce’s gaze, experience refuses to 
divide itself up the way we often feel we need it to, and dominating divisions are defied by the free 
associations of any and everyone’s taking in of their own everyday lives. 
It is here that Joyce joins his contemporaries in the Dadaist and emerging Surrealist 
movements who also sought to bring into more dramatic relief the observable fact of free 
association--Look harder, everyone, at your own thought processes--in the hope that the soul-
crushingly bad stories that dictated the brutal behavior of their era would be somehow 
destabilized and undermined. If we find ourselves to be, as everyone in Joyce’s world is, what 
Spillers terms “a locus of confounded identities,”92 perhaps we can adopt a creatively 
opportunistic view toward the words and images that come unbidden to mind and expose and 
subvert the role playing games of status quo normalcy. The fields of perception—our shared 
imaginaries—can be expanded. As Hugo Ball observes concerning the redemptive 
problematizing of reality among the Dadaists, their site of activity is “the questionable nature of art 
itself, its complete anarchy, its relationship with the public, race, and contemporary culture. It can 
probably be said that for us art is not an end in itself…but it is an opportunity for true perception 
and criticism of the times we live in.”93
 Or rather, any voice that hopes to assert itself in the direction of swaying the will of 
another can only do so as one inescapably storied interest among others (“Every telling has a 
taling and that’s the he and the she of it”).
 Religiously attentive to the untapped powers of 
happenstance, Joyce partakes of, navigates, and alternately casually and painstakingly seeks to 
map, within one locale, that complex space Moosa calls dihlīz, a space anarchic in the sense that 
no one archy can hold sole legitimized sway.  
94
                                                 
92 Spillers, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book” 203. 
 One image or lyric or symbol is as available and 
readymade for reworking as another in a space of oscillation where no one interest--whether 
93 Hugo Ball, “Romanticism: The Word and the Image” (1916) in Flight Out of Time: A Dada 
Diary. trans. Ann Raimes, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 58. 
94 Joyce, Finnegan’s Wake, 213. 
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understood to be ethnic, nationalistic, religious, or economic—has definitive hold. Aimé Césaire 
describes engagement with and by this space as “a process of disalienation,” in the case of the 
surrealist movement. Not as novelty, as in Eliot’s championing of the “mythic method,” but as a 
rediscovery, among high moderns, of what lyrical free association--Joyce calls it 
“myriadmindedness”95--never forgot in the first place: ”Surrealism provided me with what I had 
been confusedly searching for. I have accepted it joyfully because in it I have found more of a 
confirmation than a revelation….It shook up absolutely everything. This was important because 
the traditional forms—burdensome, overused forms—were crushing me.”96
In this channeling of counter-liturgies, Joyce’s sacramental poetics seek to subvert every 
form of unredeeming history personal, religious, political, and international. This is Joyce’s 
political, poetical aesthetic. As Richard Ellman observes, “Joyce’s politics and aesthetics were 
one.” 
 In sync with 
surrealism, Joyce hopes to restore long-forgotten solidarities often forcibly denied and, for the 
not-yet-initiated, perhaps assert them for the first time. 
97
The classical concept of competence supposes that one can rigorously dissociate 
knowledge (in its act or in its positing) from the event that one is dealing with, and 
especially from the ambiguity of written or oral marks—let’s call them gramophonies. 
Competence implies that a metadiscourse is possible, neutral and univocal with regard to 
a field of objectivity, whether or not it possesses the structure of a text. Performances 
ruled by this competence must in principle lend themselves to a translation with nothing 
left over on the subject of the corpus that is itself translatable. Above all, they should 
essentially not be of a narrative type. In principle, one doesn’t relate stories in a 
 The text and the intertextual relations inscribed within his text dutifully call into question 
the non-Vico-illuminated understanding of competence, success, destiny, progress and every 
nightmarish meta-discourse such understanding underwrites. Or as Derrida has it in his 
consideration of Joyce’s witness against and among institutionalized and institutionalizing forms 
of knowing in “Ulysses Gramophone”: 
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university; one does history, one recounts in order to know and to explain; one speaks 
about narrations or epic poems, but events and stories must not be produced in the name 
of institutionalizable knowledge.98
Derrida’s concern here, it seems to me, is the same worry that haunts Stephen 
concerning life laid down at the altar of the ideological (“I fear those big words, Stephen said, 
which make us so unhappy”), the reified verbal, the words that presume they’re really getting 
down to business in their presumed, bottom-line, more-realistic-than-thou definitiveness. It also 
resonates with Bloom’s casual observation concerning the tactlessness of proprietary claims, a 
distaste for which informs his ruminations over how to respond to the “historical fact” of adultery 
even then, he imagines, yet-again-in-the-making between Molly and Blazes Boylan. In what 
sense is she his to have and to hold? Can people be rightly gotten hold of? Can we claim 
competence in the speech acts with which we hope to order or rearrange the flux, managing the 
meaning of others? Bloom’s ruminations remind the reader that it doesn’t work that way with life 
and other words. These thoughts interface with Bloom’s contemplation of the Liffey: “How can 
you own water really? It’s always flowing in a stream, never the same, which in the stream of life 
we trace. Because life is a stream.”
  
99
 
 The event of life is moving, under our noses, within our 
minds, just outside the window, in the street, and in the schoolyard. Alive to the flow and against 
all-too-solid sound of institutionalizing claims, Joyce challenges his audience to look harder at—
and stop denying--their own motion sickness, to see, hear, and discover their lives and their 
language to be unstable and not at all unitary. In this way, Ulysses portrays what power-brokers 
and alleged policy-makers carefully commenting upon popular grassroots challenges to autocratic 
regimes in Northern Africa might call a fluid situation. As Joyce shows us, our situations are 
always fluid. And if we bring his witness to bear upon our interpretation of any and all perceived 
facts on the ground as we study the situation, we’re prone to see more in the way of liturgical 
possibilities. What is a policy, after all, except liturgy writ large? 
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Literature, the Press, the Turf, the Gentle Art of Advertisement  
Within this sacramental poetic sensibility, there are ample possibilities for story, song, 
analogy, and sketch, but there is no getting hold of life, no shrink-wrapping of reality even in 
words. Emmanuel Levinas is especially evocative here: “Language refers to the positions of the 
listener and the speaker, that is to the contingency of their story. To seize by inventory all the 
contexts of language and all possible positions of interlocutors is a senseless task. Every verbal 
signification lies at the confluence of countless semantic rivers.”100
With Ulysses, Derrida believes Joyce expands the space of literature, the space of the 
talkaboutable which, by its performative witness interrogates the bad language (whether termed 
religious, political, or economic ) of the done deal, the totalizing characterization, those words that 
make us so unhappy. Literature, in this sense, carries its authority unauthoritatively, open-
handedly, defying the boundaries of the institutionally fixed. Literature itself is, according to 
Derrida, “this strange contradiction, this institutionless institution.”
 One can imagine universal 
inventories of word and image, in the vein of Borges, for instance, and it can make for evocative 
fiction. But there is no successful seizure, no means to liturgical mastery on offer, just more words 
work and making (or trying to make) words work well. No professionals, exactly, in such big 
words as religion, history, language and literature. But just witness (or more just than not, witness 
that does justice) might be possible by way of non-mastery (a method of non-mastery which 
Derrida appears determined to keep outside or at least on the margins of officialdom). If all history 
is fabled history and history that believes itself to be somehow above confabulation proves itself 
deadly again and again, how do we give meaningful accounts? How might speech acts be 
undertaken well? How might we do good things with words? 
101
“I want you to write something for me,” Myles Crawford, editor of the Freeman’s Journal, 
tells Stephen as he places a nervous hand on his shoulder. “Something with a bite in it…You can 
 For my purposes, literature 
is, in this sense, one manifestation of the reordering witness of sacramental poetics. 
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do it. I see it in your face...All balls! Bulldozing the public!” While what Crawford seems to have 
mostly in mind here appear to be in some sense mere mercantile concerns (“He wants you for the 
pressgang,” J.J. O’Molloy explains), the phrases and headlines thtat Joyce places on the pages 
featuring this exchange tell a larger story, anticipating a space involving liturgical broadcasts and 
the administration of evangelion as well as one of Bloom’s constant preoccupations, the 
discernment of possibilities for advertising space: “Literature, the press…the turf…OMNIUM 
GATHERUM…The gentle art of advertisement…We’ll paralyze Europe.” These associations 
come to Stephen (and to the reader) as something akin to an accidental assigning of a priestly 
vocation with Crawford imposing the laying on of hands as he fixes upon him a “bold unheeding 
stare.” In some sense conjuring the space, the work, the feat of attentiveness we have in Ulysses, 
Crawford instructs him to compose a work of mass mediation bursting with cosmic proportions of 
bold catholicity: “Put us all into it, damn its soul. Father Son and Holy Ghost and Jake 
M’Carthy.”102
But Stephen’s vocation will not be more fully discerned until Bloom gets through to him. 
Interestingly, the telephone whirrs during this scene of recognition, and it’s Bloom on the line. 
Crawford doesn’t get the picture: “Tell him to go to hell.”
 [my italics] 
103 The summons to imaginative 
sympathy, so robustly exemplified in Bloom, will have to wait a few hours. The reader will note 
that this isn’t the first of many reminders, peppered throughout the novel, that Elijah (“a new 
apostle to the gentiles”104
What Bloom, “the famous Bloom…the world’s greatest reformer,”
) is calling. 
105 “the Messiah ben 
Joseph or ben David,”106
                                                 
102 Joyce, 135. 
 will bring to bear upon Stephen’s imagination and, in a larger sense, the 
witness that is the novel is an ear for sacramental poetics, a redemptive and redeeming imagery 
of not-to-be-mastered confluences. To the extent that religion, as understood by Stephen, has 
been a debilitatingly binding influence not only within his own mind but as a corrupting presence 
in the life of his family and community, the question of belief (to serve or not to serve) has been 
103 Ibid. 137. 
104 Ibid. 333. 
105 Ibid. 481. 
106 Ibid. 495. 
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ineluctably tied to Roman Catholic Church. Even his rebellion is articulated in the borrowed 
language of faith. What was observed in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man remains the 
case: “It is a curious thing, do you know, Cranly said dispassionately, how your mind is 
supersaturated with the religion in which you say you disbelieve.”107
Bloom’s mind is certainly supersaturated as well, but the question of what he believes 
never arises. Whatever it is he believes, he might say, is what he does. He entertains certain 
notions and finds them deeply entertaining. He wonders over the pain of childbirth and imagines 
what it might be like if everyone changed places (“If we were all suddenly somebody else”).
 
108 He 
tries to live justly and walk humbly, attentive to the more open-ended, incoming transmission of 
the epiphanies of the everyday (“Wireless intercontinental and interplanetary transmitters are set 
for reception of message”109
 Bloom certainly registers Stephen’s resistance to the liturgies that anesthetize and delude 
the popular imagination into submission, but he has sympathy for the theatrics that give joy 
without doing any discernible harm. Upon observing a priest performing the eucharist, he thinks, 
“Look at them. Now I bet it makes them feel happy. Lollipop. It does…There’s a big idea behind it, 
kind of kingdom of God is within you feel. Then feel like one family party, same in the theatre, all 
in the same swim. They do. I’m sure of that. Not so lonely.”
). He speculates and questions the world unfurling before him and 
loves mercy without crediting the notion that some fervent credo, other than having a go at loving 
people, is required of him. Like Stephen, he rebels against the idea of a divinely ordained church 
(or nation) that wields the power to damage and destroy without the will to save or redeem, but 
the given liturgies, popular deemed religious or otherwise, is entirely up for grabs (as it always 
was). It can and does bind, but it can also loose. It can be made to loose. 
110
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occasions a means of honoring, of exercising due reverence to, relationships between people, 
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Bloom’s assessment of the scene is informed by--but not limited to—his skills as an 
advertising salesman. He takes the measure of the artifice on offer, weighing out its effectiveness 
in the work of behavioral instruction, but he also feels approval for that which lifts human spirits, 
according them dignity instead of degrading them, and form of humane and human commitment. 
And here, he serves as a model participant within what Richard Rorty envisions as “a poeticized 
culture,” one that deems the artifice of a tradition—and in this sense any tradition in itself--as one 
more vocabulary, one more way of describing things” among others. This is no scandal for Bloom 
at all, in fact it’s an irretrievable given that  
Tradition turns out to be a painted backdrop, one more work of man, one more bit of 
cultural stage-setting. A poeticized culture would be one which would not insist we find 
the real wall behind the painted ones, the real touchstones of truth as opposed to 
touchstones which are merely cultural artifacts. It would be a culture which, precisely by 
appreciating that all touchstones are such artifacts, would take as its goal the creation of 
ever more various and multicolored artifacts.111
As Joyce’s exemplary practitioner of creative attentiveness, Bloom revels in the 
contingency of every binding or freeing liturgy and daydreams of ways they might be better and 
more humanely arranged. If the ritual theaters of empire, commercial enterprise, or Roman 
Catholic tradition seem to have left any fellow citizens worse for having worn them, he hopes they 
might survive their degradation long enough to try them on differently or create new ones out of 
the old. Either way, the liturgical artifacts on offer can be made to resonate in a fashion that 
makes (or might make) all things new. Paying critical and even affectionate heed to them as 
meaning-making forms restores unto language its community-forming powers, summoning the 
hearer, Rorty hopes, toward better economies of meaning. For Joyce, it’s these economies, the 
better and the worse ones, that are liberatingly and hilariously up for grabs. “I have discovered I 
can do anything with language I want,” he once remarked to Beckett.
 
112
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for just one more arrogant assertion of his genius, we might think again of Bloom (“How can you 
own water really?”) and Joyce’s self-assessment as an artist as one whose primary genius 
consists in his proficiency at cutting and pasting. 
 
The Word Is Always Half Someone Else’s 
"Poetry is never a personal possession,” Susan Howe insists. “The poem was a vision and 
gesture before it became sign and coded exchange in a political economy of value."113 Never 
knowing whose thoughts he’s thinking exactly, Bloom employs poeticizing means with unself-
consciousness of free association all day long. “Peace and war depend on some fellow’s 
digestion. Religions. Christmas turkeys and geese. Slaughter of Innocents. Eat, drink, and be 
merry,”114 thinks Bloom to himself, and, as is the case with most of his noteworthy phrasemaking, 
he doesn’t make a note of it. This thought comes to him on the heels of a Hobbesian vision of 
human nature red in tooth and claw (“Every fellow for his own, tooth and nail. Gulp. Grub. Gulp. 
Gobstuff…Eat or be eaten. Kill! Kill!”) followed by a quick consideration of the practical 
implications of a house of hospitality facility in Dublin which provides food for all comers all day 
(“Suppose that communal kitchen years to come perhaps. All trotting down with porringers and 
tommycans to be filled. Devour contents in the street…Then who’d wash up all the plates and 
forks?”).115 Like Stephen he considers those big, unhappy-making words like peace, war, God, 
and religion, but he doesn’t fear them. He collates, contemplates and redeploys them within a 
bardic economy. And to his everlasting credit, Bloom does as much without letting his right hand 
know what his left hand is doing (“Plenty to hear and see and feel yet”).116
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 What Stephen 
agonizes over, Bloom humorously and imaginatively manages, in word and in deed, without 
giving his liturgical practices much self-conscious thought. As I understand the situation, it is 
Bloom’s effortless poetics that Stephen will learn to emulate and which Joyce champions in this, 
his recasting of the epic heroic. 
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 And in this way, the unprecedented candor of description of Joyce’s sacramental poetic 
witness, especially in the “Circe” episode of Ulysses, is inseparable from the posture of non-
judgment (Bloom holds unwaveringly to “the sacred benefit of doubt”117 my italics) and the 
generosity of spirit Bloom brings to his reception of the world: “My beloved subjects, a new era is 
about to dawn. I, Bloom, tell you verily it is even now at hand. Yea, on the word of a Bloom, ye 
shall ere long enter into the golden city which is to be, the new Bloomusalem in the Nova Hibernia 
of the future.”118
Judgment prevents the emergence of any new mode of existence…Herein, perhaps lies 
the secret: to bring into existence and not to judge. If it is so disgusting to judge, it is not 
because everything is of equal value, but on the contrary because what has value can be 
made or distinguished only by defying judgment.
 To my mind, this is Joyce’s exaltation of the force that drives the flower, the 
mode of non-coercion, of letting be, and the bracing spirit of delayed judgment, an eye and an ear 
for transpartisan interests, that make life, peace, and social innovation possible. Gilles Deleuze 
characterizes the posture this way:  
119
Against the totalizing impulses of isolated, warring parties who view the public commons of 
creation as a zero sum game of winner-take-all, Bloom issues a call for a more revolutionary and 
radical reformation: “I stand for the reform of municipal morals and the plain ten commandments. 
New worlds for old. Union of all, jew, moslem and gentile. Three acres and a cow for all children 
of nature. Saloon motor hearses. Compulsory manual labour for all. All parks open to the public 
day and night. Electric dishscrubbers.” This is Joyce/Bloom’s liturgical re-rendering of “Let him 
who is thirsty come” (Revelation 22:17), an infinite hospitality (“You call it a festivity. I call it 
sacrament.”) without borders:   
  
Tuberculosis, lunacy, war and mendicancy must now cease. General amnesty, weekly 
carnival, with masked licence, bonuses for all, esperanto the universal brotherhood. No 
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more patriotism of barspongers and dropsical impostors. Free money, free love and a 
free lay church in a free lay state. 
One Father Farley on the phantasmic scene offers an assessment of this Bloomian evangelion: 
“He is an Episcopalian, an agnostic, an anythingarian seeking to overthrow our holy faith.” 120 But 
we know him to be anything but an anythingarian. The cigar-wielding Bloom of an earlier, non-
phantasmic scene in the “Cyclops” episode has given us a similar stand-off in his positing of bar-
room, prophetic: “Force, hatred, history, all that. That’s not life for men and women, insult and 
hatred. And everybody knows that it’s the very opposite of that that is really life…Love, says 
Bloom. I mean the opposite of hatred.” It is with this assertion that Bloom is mockingly decreed by 
his hearers a “new apostle to the gentiles.”121 It appears that Joyce would assert, uninstitutionally 
speaking, that he is exactly that and more. Or as Bloom observes to Bella Cohen concerning his 
function as a bearer of earnest and necessarily comedic good news: “I am exhausted, abandoned 
and no more young. I stand, so to speak, with an unposted letter bearing the extra regulation fee 
before the too late box of the general post office of human life.”122
 Bloom’s daydreamt determination to counter the dehumanizing, dividing-up powers of 
Dublin’s everyday hegemonies, whether leveled in the name of commercial, political, or ecclesial 
interests, resonates with Michel de Certeau’s observation concerning the not-to-mastered, pre-
Enlightenment datum of polyphonic discourse among human beings: “Pluralism, before becoming 
at Vatican II a doctrine or a programme, was a fact.”
 
123
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  Within Ulysses, not only are proprietary 
claims in a forest of symbols that knows no borders unseemly and unfitting, but its summons to 
lively consciousness concerning the scandalous relationality of all things is such that, by Joyce’s 
lights there’s simply no such thing as a strictly foreign influence. Bloom’s homeland is his hat. And 
in his case, the fact of pluralism is cause for celebratory mindfulness and humanizing solidarity. 
Here again, Joyce’s poetic cause addresses Rorty’s hopes: 
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Human solidarity…is to be achieved not by inquiry but by imagination, the imaginative 
ability to see strange people as fellow sufferers. Solidarity is not discovered by reflection 
but created. It is created by increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain 
and humiliation of other, unfamiliar sorts of people. Such increased sensitivity makes it 
more difficult to marginalize people different from ourselves by thinking “They do not feel 
it as we would,” or “There must always be suffering, so why not let them suffer?”124
In its liturgical function, Ulysses issues an invitation to imaginative magnanimity, to see 
ourselves in strangers, to see ourselves within them instead of holding them at a critical, self-
protective distance. “Perhaps there is someone,” thinks Stephen to himself having just placed a 
bit of dried snot on a rock ledge. He’s wondering if someone might possibly discover what he’s 
left there (“Let look who will”).
 
125 As Declan Kiberd reads it, this dim registering of the possibility of 
the existence of other people making their way across his presumed threshold (recall Moosa’s 
dihlīz) signals “the beginning of wisdom” within the text. For all his intellectual powers and self-
justifying eloquence, it is in this saving instance that “Stephen starts to open a relationship with 
the world.”126
This developing receptivity prepares him for that happenstance encounter with Bloom 
where Stephen is confronted by what Certeau speaks of as “the aberrant” which is “the first signal 
of another world.” Out of our tendency to read reality according to our own isolated, illusively 
autonomous imaginings, the aberrant “stimulates a curiosity eager to escape from [or be relieved 
of] its own problematic.” Reverberating beyond the Bloom/Dedalus interface, I believe Joyce 
means for Ulysses to function as one such manifestation –and a chronicling--of the redeeming 
instance of the aberrant. In Certeau’s account, the delusion of autonomy, by way of the aberrant, 
begins to give way to an emerging sense of heteronomy, “a wound in rationalism.” Paradoxically, 
heteronomy of the sort Bloom prescribes in his phantasmic proclamations is the stimulus to 
imagination and the very thing that strikes us as inadmissible. Heteronomy bears witness to the 
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fact of other not-yet-familiar people as it shakes the ground of our lonely certainties.127 It is in this 
encounter with the unfamiliar other that we discover that, as Levinas asserts, “heteronomy is 
somehow stronger than autonomy.”128
 Stronger, we might add, because no longer bearing the burden of delusional, personal 
sovereignty be they drawn from Dublin-based resources of individualistic virtue in business, 
church, Irish nationalism, British empire, or literary fame beyond the emerald isle. Stephen will 
open up, as Bloom is always already opened up, to the ceaselessly communal, inescapably 
social flow of myriad-minded language, his own and others never exactly distinguishable. As 
Bakhtin instructs, “language, for the individual consciousness, lies on the borderline between 
oneself and the other. The word in language is half someone else’s.”
  
129 And just as a space is 
cleared--arranged by authorial stage direction—so that Stephen might recognizes an affinity with 
Bloom and, as the myriad-minded story goes, lose his sense of self-possession by becoming 
Bloom, Ulysses itself aspires to function as a scene of recognition concerning the inescapable 
contingency of every human identity. The two-become-one are entirely submerged within and 
dependent upon Molly’s stream of consciousness before it’s done. If every telling has a tale, this 
one owes its life to her yeses. And humane ordering of human interests, liturgically speaking, 
always depends on a yes to the stranger without and within. In Ulysses (your yeses), Joyce would 
have the reader look harder at the affirmations that make for life and more life, the boundaries of 
yours and mine and ours and theirs that boundary up political-poetic possibilities, and the 
possibility of a “counter-mythology,”130
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 as Spillers puts it, in which heroes and heroines lose their 
lives to find them, alive again, in one another. Kiberd characterizes the proffered apocalyptic 
thusly: “Joyce was following Paul of Tarsus in the attempt to imagine a world without foreigners, a 
world made possible once men and women accept the foreigner within the self and the 
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necessarily fictive nature of all nationalisms.”131 The necessary poeticizing, that creative symbol-
making task involved in such showing business, is an imaginative work that Joyce would have his 
readers never stop doing. As we will see in our next chapter, Joyce’s desire to summon his 
readership toward the political-poetic possibilities of imaginative magnanimity is a concern he 
shares with W.E.B. Du Bois and Ralph Ellison who understood literary fiction to be nothing less 
than “the brightest instrument for recording sociological fact, physical action, the nuance of 
speech, yet achieved.”132
 
 
On Being Able to Say Everything 
In this way, sacramental poetics serves to reinstate a sense of heteronomy, the lyrical that 
precedes the analytical and the deludedly detached critical, the poetic that is, we understand, the 
older, more lively and knowingly relational form. Sacramental poetics coincides with “the saying” 
which Levinas distinguishes from the definitively said. “Saying bears witness to the other of the 
Infinite which rends me, which in the saying awakens me,” instructs Levinas. ”Saying as 
testimony precedes all the said”133 It is with this sensibility in mind that I believe Joyce self-
consciously strives to render human life as lyrically as possible lest it lose, or never discover to 
begin with, it’s saying power. Like Finnegans Wake, Ulysses is an attempt at the lyrical wit of a 
folk song, because it’s primarily the sung and recited that can hope for a living, imaginative, full-
bodied reception, not argument or analysis as such. It’s the songs that say and live and ring truly. 
Or as George Russell puts it in the “Scylla and Charybdis” scene: “People do not know how 
dangerous lovesongs can be…The movements which work revolutions in the world are born out 
of the dreams and visions in a peasant’s heart on the hillside. For them, the earth is not an 
exploitable ground but the living mother.”134
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Joyce’s prioritizing of the lyrical as what the witnessing work at hand demands brings to 
mind Walter Benjamin’s account concerning the possibility of truth in the task of creative 
representation: “Truth is not a process of exposure which destroys the secret, but a revelation 
which does justice to it.”135
The intrusion of this consciousness is perhaps the most radical, the most disconcerting 
innovation in all of Ulysses. It is something new in fiction. It is not the voice of the 
storyteller: not a voice at all, since it does not address us, does not even speak. We do 
not hear its accents, we observe its actions, which are performed with a certain 
indifference to our presence…Like an author’s ideal reader, this Arranger keeps 
remembering, savoring.
 As we’ve noted, doing justice to the revelation--the apocalypse--that is 
everyday life is both the priestly-poetic vocation Stephen proclaims for himself and the mental 
hobby Bloom undertakes without letting his right hand know what his left hand is doing. But it is 
also the groundbreaking testament of Ulysses, the Bloomsday chronicle, itself within which, as 
Hugh Kenner observes, “Some mind, it is clear, keeps track of the details of this printed cosmos, 
and lets escape from its scrutiny the fall of no sparrow.” Even as much as Stephen, Leopold, and 
Molly are the fruits of Joyce’s painstakingly undertaken transubstantiation of his own life and 
observation, this mind, affectionately looking after, directing, and describing persons and things, 
is also an artful figuring of a justice-rendering spirit which, should it ever prove to no longer exist 
among people, should probably be invented anyway as often as possible: 
136
While Kenner’s Arranger might prove too much the anythingarian for some sensibilities, its 
determination to hold to poetic justice with one hand and the candor of realism with the other 
house a form of witness within which both might abide. This brings to mind an opening for such a 
poetic possibility (albeit involving a more Bloom-like deity than most officially religious traditions 
endorse) Stephen expresssd within Portrait: “I tried to love God, he said at length. It seems now I 
failed. It is very difficult. I tried to unite my will with the will of God instant by instant. In that I did 
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not always fail. I could perhaps do that still.”137 Like Bloom, Joyce will affectionately chronicle 
what he sees and counts as sacred even if it surpasses the sanctioned-as-sacred spaces of the 
given conventional liturgics of his day in their war-making, mercenary, sanctimonious, life-denying 
practices. By doing so, he will of course leave no sacred cow untipped, but his sacramental 
poetics extends the notion of due reverence beyond the perverse liturgics fof his contemporaries. 
Ulysses reveres life more comprehensively. If Ulysses isn't fit to read, Joyce once observed, life 
isn’t fit to live.138 And it is in view of his long-term success in expanding his growing public’s sense 
of what’s to be rightly counted as sacred, beyond creed, country, and ethnicity, that Guy 
Davenport, for one, conjectures that prophetic tradition might eventually catch up to him: “I think 
the day will come when Joyce will be canonized as a saint in the Catholic Church.”139
 And with this we might begin to consider the animating concern of sacramental poetic 
witness as a circle whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere. We return 
to Derrida’s account of Ulysses as a series of affirmations which upholds itself with yeses, most 
importantly its final one. Molly Bloom’s “Yes,” generates the life of the novel’s ongoing witness, 
inaugurating and re-inaugurating the welcome that bears the possibility of a loving future. “Yes 
would be transcendental adverbiality, the ineffaceable supplement to any verb: in the beginning 
was the adverb, yes, but as an interjection, still very close to the inarticulate cry, a preconceptual 
vocalization, the perfume of discourse”
  
140 As Derrida says of the yes, it is “pre-ontological” in that 
“it holds open the circle that it institutes,”141
 This sense in which a commonsensical heterononomy trumps, precedes, and even funds 
the seemingly self-sufficient sacrosanct is especially evident the moment Bloom looks after a 
drunken Stephen, as he has, in some sense, been doing for as many people as he can 
throughout the novel. Joyce describes his alive and signaling hospitality to one in need as being 
 occasioning the heteronomy within which delusions of 
autonomy are made possible. 
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carried out “in orthodox Samaritan fashion.”142
And again, Derrida’s witness is especially helpful here. He characterizes the poetic as 
never anything less than “that which you desire to learn, but from and of the other, thanks to the 
other and under dictation, by heart.”
 In the context of the parable (Luke 10:25-37) to 
which Joyce alludes, the only possibility of sustainable orthodoxy (right belief) is orthopraxy (right 
doing), both because Samaritans aren’t Jewish and, as the parable seems to indicate, doing is 
believing. Bloom does the truth in love and Stephen will hear and learn. The proselytizing powers 
of the New Bloomusalem, in this sense, overcome the prerogatives of avowed belief, unbelief, 
and misbelief, making believers of us all. 
143
Being Jewish and a victim of anti-semitism [as a child in Algeria] didn’t spare one the anti-
Arab racism I felt everywhere around me, in manifest or latent form. Literature, or a 
certain promise of “being able to say everything,” was in any case the outline of what was 
calling me or signaling to me in the situation I was living in at that time, familial and 
social…At the same time, I believe that very rapidly literature was also the experience of 
a dissatisfaction or a lack, an impatience.
 The poetic is only that which is received, taken in, and 
learned as poetic, as the figuring of experience that makes articulate that which, without this 
expression, wasn’t. The poetic, in this sense, only lives between people, a giving and receiving of 
spirited newness. While Ulysses is never deficient or restrained in its desire to explain and 
describe the events of Bloomsday, what it aspires to convey and cultivate primarily is a 
consciousness, a way of looking at and being in the world. A sacramental poetic instruction is in 
play here. Note the way, Derrida describes his reception of a poetic signal which appealed to him 
religiously, calling out to him as a vocation and articulating an otherwise unarticulated discontent, 
the vocation and the articulation that is literature: 
144
As Derrida testifies, literature--or, for our purposes, the sacramental poetic expression—
performed a denormalizing function when it came to the reigning social norms of his situation, 
changing the tune and expanding, rather than narrowing, the space for candor, for saying what he 
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could see and now notice as problematic. If you can only see what you’ve learned to say, 
sacramental poetic expression won’t just mirror what we see, it makes us see and therefore say, 
or tell, our own stories, the stories that have us, differently. It offers itself as a transparent lure, a 
confidence, a gift, what W.E.B Du Bois will call a “gift of Spirit,”145
 
 that will have to be learned--if 
its witness is to be received--by heart. It cannot have its meaning alone. 
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CHAPTER III 
            POETICS OF INSINUATION  
 
“How shall we put ourselves in touch with reality?”146
James Baldwin 
 
 
“Poetic knowledge is characterized by humankind splattering the object with all its mobilized 
riches.”147
Aimé Césaire,  
 
 
Apocalyptic for the People 
In his magisterial volume Black Reconstruction in America: 1860-1880a (1935), W.E. B. Du Bois 
begins his account with a sober recognition of the stakes confronting his complex rhetorical task, 
“In fine, I am going to tell this story as though Negroes were ordinary human beings, realizing that 
this attitude will from the first seriously curtail my audience.”148
 With his witness, Du Bois means to bring the difficult past to the rescue of his ongoingly 
problematic present, and this work can’t begin without undoing the strategic deceptions of “the 
fairy tale of a beautiful Southern slave civilization.”
 Despite his dutiful and painstaking 
use of primary sources, he knows that those most invested in popular misconceptions of his 
subject will distort his narrative witness the better to reside comfortably within their preferred 
abstractions of no-fault American history. And even those who emerge from the reigning willed 
myopia to pay him heed will have to pay unaccustomed attention to his account.  
149
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and deploy them differently. And to my mind, he does so most beautifully with a bit of apocalyptic 
supposition concerning the formal conclusion of the Civil War, the day “freedom came to 
America.”150
Suppose on some gray day, as you plod down Wall Street, you should see God sitting on 
the Treasury steps, in His Glory, with the thunders curved about him? Suppose on 
Michigan Avenue, between the lakes and hills of stone, and in the midst of hastening 
automobiles and jostling crowds, suddenly you see living and walking toward you, the 
Christ, with sorrow and sunshine in his face?  
 For all their self-satisfied and often death-dealing talk of manifest destiny, do 
Americans actually believe in God? Du Bois submits a picture for our approval: 
Foolish talk, all of this you say, of course; and that is because no American now believes 
in his religion. Its facts are mere symbolism; its revelation vague generalities; its ethics a 
matter of carefully balanced gain. But to most of the four million black folk emancipated 
by civil war, God was real. They knew him. They had met him personally…in the black 
stillness of the night. His plan for them was clear; they were to suffer and be degraded, 
and then afterwards by divine edict, raised to manhood and power; and so on January 1, 
1863, He made them free. 
There is so much here. By out-theologizing the God-talkers, Du Bois calls their very 
witness into question, making clear that the avowedly religious among his audience—presuming 
hey mean to be at all serious in their assertions--will have to adjust their imaginations and play to 
a different calculus. And his lyrical hermeneutic isn’t done. The biblical witness will be made to 
resonate further and more deeply and more comprehensively than any conveniently de-politicized 
or spiritualized reading of Scripture will allow:  
It was all foolish, bizarre, and tawdry. Gangs of dirty Negroes howling and dancing; 
poverty-stricken ignorant laborers mistaking war, destruction, and revolution for the 
mystery of the free human soul; and yet to these Black folk it was the Apocalypse. The 
magnificent trumpet tones of Hebrew Scripture, transmuted and oddly changed, became 
a brand new Gospel. All that was Beauty, all that was Love, all that was Truth, stood on 
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top of those mad mornings and sang with the stars. A great human sob shrieked in the 
wind, and tossed its tears upon the sea -- free, free, free. 
And in the event that we have yet to receive his drift, Du Bois will have us understand 
that the coherence of Christianity and the redemptive meaning of America itself are at stake in 
our reception—or refusal—of the great human sob turned song he discerns: 
A great song arose…It was a new song…They sneered at it—those white Southerners 
who heard it and never understood. They raped and defiled it—those white Northerners 
who listened without ears. Yet it lived and grew; always it grew and swelled and lived, 
and it sits today at the right hand of God, as America’s one real gift to beauty; as 
slavery’s one redemption, distilled from the dross of its dung.151
 Like Joyce a misbeliever at best, Du Bois nevertheless throws down a metaphysical 
gauntlet. What meaning is there in the ascension of Jesus of Nazareth to the right hand of the 
Almighty (Dextera Domini, Mark 16:19, Acts 2:34) if this song-prayer (Psalm 63:8) ever ancient 
and ever new isn’t squarely situated within this eternal elevation asserted by Christian tradition? 
Is the Christian hope to be understood as a meaningfully human commitment or not? If it is, then 
Du Bois offers his provocative account on conventionally religious grounds in the hope that it will 
be received as  actionable intelligence, a revelation that might serve to overcome the willful 
amnesia of white supremacist history. In this sense, what I view as the lively apocalyptic of Du 
Bois’ sacramental poetic witness George Shulman calls prophecy: “Prophecy raises the issue of 
authority with unrivaled profundity and intensity. Prophetic voices ask not whether we are ruled by 
authority, but which authority rules in and through us.” Probing the contradiction between our 
alleged or advertised commitments, our self-image as it were and the publicly visible facts on the 
ground, ”Prophecy asks, What gods do you already serve? What is your animating faith?...Here is 
my table of values, what is yours?”
 
152
 The table Du Bois sets before us as his animating faith is the global mission not-yet-
accomplished—then or now—of “abolition-democracy.” The question driving his account of the 
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Reconstruction era (“What were to be the limits of democratic control in the United States?”) is 
also, according to his story, “the great and primary question which was in the minds of the men 
who wrote the Constitution of the United States and continued in the minds of thinkers down 
through the slavery controversy.” And for Dubois, the question--the living hope--of abolition-
democracy is alive and signaling: “It still remains with the world as the problem of democracy 
expands all races and all nations.”153
 Like Dorothy Day, Ho Chi Minh, Martin Luther King Jr., Allen Ginsberg and countless 
others, Du Bois spies in the working mythologies of the God-blessed, Christ-haunted United 
States, imagery a-plenty for making the globe safer for abolition-democracy. The availability of 
the tools of brand machinery and the question of truth in advertising need not get in the way of 
one another when it comes to the symbol-making task of sacramental poetics. You have to take 
what’s there. You can’t start over. You have to play the ball where it’s dropped. Luc Sante 
describes the situation: “The trick is that you can’t deliberately fabricate a myth; all you can do is 
spot one lurking among preexisting elements and then pump it full of air.”
 
154
If appeals to the fixed authorities of God and country, in whatever locale, obstruct the 
movement of abolition-democracy, Du Bois will creatively unfix with counter-appeals to the same 
authorities in what Shulman calls a “return to [perceived] origins.” In line with a tactic of poetic-
prophetic insinuation, Du Bois refuses to conceive authority as an all-too-definitive noun and 
instead seeks to “renew it as a verb.” In this way, “God or justice are not substances to define 
rightly as grounds of justification but commitments to risk and remake in action.”
 
155
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 The meaning 
of the words will have to remain, as it were, in play. Everything depends upon it. This is Dubois 
giving us an apocalyptic of, by, and for the people. Liturgically speaking, anything less lively in the 
way of response is a failure to live up to the words’ worth, the good work to be done with these 
soundings, And in the case of God’s name, the failure to renew, risk, and remake is to deploy the 
name of the Lord in vain. 
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You Have Heard It Said, But I Say Unto You  
“It is between the lines of Scripture that the narratives of insurgence are delivered,” 
Hortense Spillers asserts concerning the African-American church’s “special relationship of 
attentiveness to the literal Word that liberates.” And this relationship of call and response and of 
counter-evocation even takes the form of “a radically alternative program”156 when the question of 
liberation is placed to the side, or worse, denied by our reading of Scripture. Hear the good news 
of God’s Word, we are told. But if the proffered good news fails to resonate in a redemptive 
fashion, failing to put on flesh or stopping short of speaking emancipation the embodied situation, 
“the actual mess of human being,”157 the time has come for the unfixing of alleged authority. Here, 
Spillers turns our attention to J.W.C. Pennington’s pulpit of the Fifth congregational Church of 
Hartford, Connecticut on November 2, 1845: “If the word of God does sanction slavery, I want 
another book, another repentance, another faith, another hope!”158
 In Pennington’s insistence that the word of God according to Scripture be made flesh as 
good news to those enslaved, he joins Du Bois in staring down the white supremacist 
interpretation that underwrites the perverse, proprietary gaze of the slave-owner. Drawing on the 
pivot point popularized by Jesus, he compels his audience to choose this day which interpretation 
they shall serve: You have heard this said, he seems to say, but I say unto you. Where the old 
dispensation decreed a fate, Pennington demands a decision. Life and living and the possibility of 
a meaningful Christian witness, more than a work of vanity, are at stake. The gaze of his 
community’s experiential witness against the reigning reductionist mythology of life-denying, 
biblical interpretation signals the possibility of the “brand new Gospel” Du Bois poetically posits. 
As Spillers will argue concerning the posture of Ellison’s Invisible Man, “It is this return of the 
gaze that negotiates at every point a space for living,” which “ we must willingly name the 
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counter-power, the counter-mythology.”159
 And with this recognition of the sacramental poetic work to be done, we note that the 
winning of hearts and minds occurs, as Joyce understands, amid “the mythological fortunes 
(words and images),” the binding and freeing artifice, of the powers that be. As Spillers has it "We 
are, after all, talking about words, as we realize that by their efficacy we are damned or saved.”
  
160 
The moving target of sacramental poetic consciousness, in this sense, is the colonizing impulse 
Césaire calls “thingification,”161 the habit of mind that would reduce living humans here, there, and 
yon to their perceived use value. And the overcoming of thingification in the dream of abolition-
democracy is a struggle powerfully exemplified in Du Bois’ tactics as well as those of democratic 
agitators, whether in Bahrain, Yemen, or Sudan, who hope to be seen and heard as individuals 
with hopes and commitments more complex and dignified than those associated with the 
caricature of the radical Islamist. Those on the far side of abolition-democracy long for a more 
redemptive problematic than the assessing gaze that looks at the image of beleaguered human 
life and, in Ellison’s phrase, “sees not a human being but an abstract embodiment of living 
hell.”162
“Being a problem is a strange experience,”
 Amid the received liturgies that thingify, how might one hope to flip the script? 
163
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 Du Bois observes in the opening strains of 
The Souls of Black Folk, and in no time at all, we find ourselves invited into a relentlessly 
narratival sphere of a scandalized, but nevertheless alive and signaling pluralistic counter-
mythology. Do you find me—this register I’ve presumed and the witness I bring— problematic? 
Du Bois seems to ask. Are you a problem too? What shall we make of this situation? What have 
we here? Du Bois’ names this space of redemptive problematization further: “All in all, we black 
men seem the sole oasis of simple faith and reverence in a dusty desert of dollars and 
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smartness.”164 Are we awake to the table of values Du Bois has in mind? Who or what do we find 
problematic now? And if we receive the drift of a statement like “The problem of the twentieth 
century is the problem of the color-line,”165 the problem of color and culture (or the sense of the 
problem, the sense we’re receiving/producing) is now internationalized and ineluctably 
contemporary. Just in case we remain confused concerning the significance and the location of 
this problematized and problematizing voice to which we’re an audience or if we’re in any way 
tempted to make of his voice one more clamoring of someone’s special interest-driven issue, Du 
Bois strikes a note concerning other comprehensive souls to which we’d perhaps do well to 
remain repeatedly and repentantly attuned. Voices, let the record show, that are with him (or shall 
be made to be with him) on the subject of this problem: “I sit with Shakespeare and he winces 
not. Across the color line I move arm in arm with Balzac and Dumas, where smiling men and 
women glide in gilded halls…I summon Aristotle and Aurelius and what soul I will, and they come 
all graciously with no scorn or condescension.”166
 Du Bois understands that his presence, a commanding and inviting presence, within this 
assemblage will strike many as unseemly (not that such folks will have read this far), but such 
judgments are now their problem. And in keeping with this critique of thingification, the presumed 
autonomy of hegemonic economies of meaning which presume to circumscribe difference within 
self-described civilization, we might return to Certeau’s characterization the aberrant which 
signals the alluring fact of another world spinning within whatever we heretofore thought  of as 
exclusive to our own. What we’ve long heard said and presumed and believed about the other is 
the problem now as we spy an entry into the renewed and renewing space of the talkaboutable, a 
widening of the sphere of ethical priority. As these things go, Certeau’s signaling heteronomy 
serves as that stimulus to imagination, that “problem” of a human noting aloud in an address to us 
that it’s a funny thing being “a problem,” that very voice that initially—it is implied-- strikes us as 
somehow inadmissible. Heteronomy bears witness to heretofore disallowed presences, shaking 
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the grounds of our assurances and our certainties.167
 While Du Bois doesn’t employ the language explicitly, the rhetorical strategies he 
employs are in keeping with the standard operating procedures of what I take to be the 
sacramental poetic tradition, leaving it to the reader to receive or resist the sensibility proffered by 
way of a poetic of insinuation, addressing and drawing out the audience that is anyone with an 
ear to hear and eye to see. In this way, Du Bois eschews what Houston Baker refers to as the 
aspiration toward “a mastery of form” and deploys “the deformation of mastery ”
  
168
 
 or what I take 
to be the lyrical imperative of non-mastery as a method. Like the prayer-song of African-American 
experience which he takes to American’s “one real gift to beauty” to global culture and “slavery’s 
one redemption,” Du Bois issues the call whose continued existence and ultimate significance will 
depend entirely upon the lived and lively response of its hearers. 
The Way We Look To A Song 
 It with this open-handed ethic in mind that Du Bois speaks of the work of the Fisk Jubilee 
Singers whose performances around the world both funded the establishment of Fisk University 
and exemplified the ongoing lyrical and prophetic heft of what Du Bois refers to as the Sorrow 
Songs. ”So their songs conquered,” he insists. And while it is clear that the songs didn’t (and 
haven’t) fully transformed the hearts and minds of all who’ve entertained them, for Du Bois, the 
songs remain the same: “The true Negro folk-song still lives in the hearts of those who have 
heard them truly sung and in the hearts of the Negro people…The songs are indeed the siftings 
of centuries; the music is far more ancient than words,” 169
Positioning The Souls of Black Folk as an attempt to give voice in sync with these songs, 
Du Bois describes the hope that breathes within them, a hope upon which the songs and Du Bois’ 
own work, in no small way, bank: “The meaning is always clear: that sometime, somewhere, men 
will judge men by their souls and not by their skins. Is such a hope justified? Do the sorrow songs 
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ring true?” Eschatologically speaking, these are fearsomely open questions which Du Bois feels 
compelled to leave unanswered, except by way of throwing them back upon the reader 
accompanied, we understand, by the expenditure of his own hopes, by his own intellectual 
efforts, and by the challenge to no longer “stand meekly dumb before such questions.” Du Bois 
demands that the fact of the songs (the sacramental poetic witness that is their content) demands 
a reckoning, an according of freedom of opportunity to those “who brought the Sorrow Songs,” 
this genre of actionable intelligence, “to the seats of the Mighty.”  
Having already drawn Shakespeare, Balzac, and Aristotle into his great cloud of 
witnesses, he broadens his testimony concerning the pluralistic facts-on-the-ground to include the 
indigenous peoples of the Americas: “Your Country? How came it yours? Before the Pilgrims 
landed we were here.” But lest this particular gauntlet be misunderstood, he again recasts his 
account to insist that the songs are themselves a manifestation of “our gift of the Spirit.” And here 
we rightly recall the image of African—American culture (a category now deeply broadened) as 
what seems to Du Bois to be, at least for now, “the sole oasis of simple faith and reverence in a 
dusty desert of dollars and smartness” which he now situates both as “our gift,” awaiting 
reception, and “the hope [not unrelated to the hoped-for reception] that sang in the song of my 
fathers”170
Having launched his open-ended query concerning the fate of the songs (Will they sing 
true?), the specific hope that the songs--among which now resides his song--might be received 
as an ethical summons, that the call would be met with response, is pronounced as a prayer-
appeal in Du Bois’ conclusion, “The After-Thought”: 
 
Hear my cry, O God the Reader; vouchsafe that this book fall not still-born into 
the world-wilderness…Let the ears of a guilty people tingle with truth, and 
seventy millions sigh for the righteousness which exalteth nations, in this drear 
day when human brotherhood is a mockery and a snare. Thus in Thy good time 
may infinite reason turn the tangle straight, and these crooked marks on a fragile 
leaf be not indeed  
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THE END171
Into our hands he commits the gift of Spirit and the sign of our reception will be solely verified (or 
not) in a posture/practice of universal enfranchisement (“the righteousness which exalteth 
nations”) which seeks to overturn the material conditions which “in this drear day [our day]” give 
the lie to “human brotherhood.” 
 
“The call,” Certeau reminds us, “cannot be known outside of the response which it 
receives. It has no expression of its own.”172 Here the fragility of the call, the voice, that which 
might yet ring true (or in Du Bois’ parlance “sing true”) is especially evident. While Du Bois might 
differ over the starkness, the extreme thinning out of the possibility of the call even bearing the 
power of expression apart from the response, Du Bois here anticipates Certeau’s understanding 
of belief, ideas, and all manner of professed religiosity having nowhere else to happen but 
practice. At first blush, this might appear to be bad news, in Certeau’s account, for a poetics of 
insinuation, as if practice will have to be be radically distinguished from words, images, and 
mythologies. But on the contrary, Certeau hones down motivations, desires, and beliefs so 
closely that the metaphorical, for instance, is never a separate issue. To speak of story or song 
as an addendum won’t do. And to speak of religious discourse would be a redundancy. 
Discourse, in the thickest sense, is what there is: “The story does not express a practice. It does 
not limit itself to telling about a movement. It makes it. One understands it, then, if one enters into 
this movement oneself.”173
In light of this analysis, Du Bois estimation of the power of song (“The true Negro folk-
song still lives in the hearts of those who have heard them truly sung” [my italics]) might appear a 
little less romanticized. And in a Certeauian key, the myths (or dreams) with which the songs are 
fraught will weave their way into unforeseen, perhaps unanticipatedly redeeming manifestations. 
Either way, the practices we discern will only be rightly analyzed by way of our receptive tracing 
of the stories/songs that spawned them: “A theory of narration is indissociable from a theory of 
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practice, as its condition as well as its production.”174 Or as Certeau enigmatically states the 
situation elsewhere: “Everything assumes a dream.”175
 
 
Fiction Is the Language Without Force 
Lest we wrongly register a note of frivolity here, we should note that, within  Certeau’s 
economy, there’s no such thing as a mere dream. The dream is, in fact, the thing. It is that with 
which we have to do. In an especially provocative passage in the essay, “The Weakness of 
Believing: From the Body to Writing, a Christian Transit,” he offers a consideration of how the 
biblical witness gives rise (or is made to give rise) to movement, a making-believe that can’t 
exactly be called making, marked by a lightness that can feel unbearable. In our day, “the Bible 
passes by like a convoy of representations [my italics],” and copies of this bestselling collection, 
“these processions of dreams,” are, to some degree, recognizable to us even as the dreams are 
expressed in a language foreign to “the languages of the sites where our knowledge is held.” The 
foreign language is that “manner,” procedure, and style which still offers “the possibility of an 
echo—a response of gratitude—which precedes the production of what one can call sense (this 
echo resounding in the receptive region).” Consider Du Bois’ gift of the Spirit and the register of 
sensing and receiving it. 
Because sense is produced in response to what Certeau views as a kind of dream 
procedure, “fiction [itself] does not have a sense. It [rather] generates a movement.” And it is in 
this sense that “fiction is the language without force.” As Auden says of poetry, it makes nothing 
happen, we understand, because it “is deprived equally of the privilege of stating being and of the 
power to organize practices (including the practice of its own reading).” And it is only received to 
the extent that we abandon--or hold loosely to--the forms of make-believe native to “the sites 
where our knowledge is held,” giving space to “a strength of weakness,” forgetting oneself  “in 
order to reply to it, relinquish, as in sleep, the concern to secure a site or a truth.” It is in this 
surrender, this non-mastery, this giving up, this holding loosely absolutely essential to the faintest 
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possibility of reception, that “a movement starts up,” “a whole activity develops,” and “an 
interpretation is made.” Interpretation, as Certeau construes it, is “constructed as a function of a 
depropriation,” an acceptance of distance, a letting go that is, in a necessarily weak sense, a 
holding on.176
This theory of religious reception can be helpfully illumined by taking into account 
Certeau’s description of “the myth of the Reformation” in “The Scriptural Economy.” Here he 
offers a counter-witness—by way of a biblical hermeneutic--to the idea that “the Scriptures 
provide…a model one can use to re-form both society and the Church.” As Certeau sees it, “the 
variants of this myth [even today] are found everywhere,” underwriting the notion “that Reason 
must be able to establish or restore a world, and that it is no longer a matter of deciphering the 
secrets of an order or a hidden Author, but of producing an order so that it can be written on the 
body of an uncivilized or depraved society.” In an assessment that speaks to questions of 
colonialism, alleged fields of study, ethnography, and target markets, Certeau’s moving target--
which we can interestingly place alongside Du Bois’ project--becomes evident: “Writing becomes 
science and politics…It becomes violence, cutting its way through the irrationality of superstitious 
peoples or regions still under the spell of sorcery.” 
         
177
 In its discerning of the gifts of spirit, Certeau’s theory of religious reception registers the 
insinuating witness of sacramental poetics, a sending and a receiving that is an ethical summons, 
a witness that is never a done deal, a boasting right, or, properly understood, a position that could 
occasion a totalizing gaze; a call that depends upon a response, claiming (in the proprietary 
sense) nothing at all, a testifying posture that is, perhaps paradoxically, stronger than argument. 
 But what of fiction, the knowing fiction of 
complex spaces in which, as Joyce shows, “Every telling has a taling” and the fluidity of our 
religious situation is understood as a given. Might Certeau be clearing a field for study, for the 
imagined data of myths with footnotes? 
 This is also the open-handed posture, the language without force, at work in Du Bois’s 
“After-Thought,” the prayer-plea (to us) that his witness will not prove to have been mere 
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paperwork. He lets it all go, in a gesture of creative depropriation, leaving everything to the 
possibility of what we might characterize as the life-giving, memory-restoring forms of a public 
scrutiny to come. And if we recall the sorrow songs within which Du Bois means to fall in sync, we 
can also note that the posture is marked by what Cornel West calls the “against-the-evidence 
hope”178
 
 taken up and performed repeatedly by the beleaguered and oppressed, a hope that 
refuses, with the sensibility I term apocalyptic, all manner of widely broadcast, alleged 
inevitabilities in the name of what might yet be.  
Jiujitsu of the Spirit 
 It is within the sacramental poetic economy operative in the dialectic of mythological 
appeals that Ralph Ellison sees possibilities for what Certeau will call a space-making enterprise, 
the complexifying of a place which renders the possibility of a space. With his masterpiece, The 
Invisible Man, he creates and posits an unnamed figure whose versifying wit seizes upon the 
subversive possibilities of the mythic mode. As Ellison notes in an interview, “I learned very early 
that in the realm of the imagination all people and their ambitions and their interests could 
meet.”179 Citing Joyce and Eliot as among his chosen ancestors, Ellison operates self-consciously 
as “an heir of the human experience which is literature,”180
 In an exceedingly well-lit, forgotten basement section of an apartment building restricted to 
people of color, the Invisible Man narrates his past in his present, recounting a series of episodes 
in which his trust was broken by one party after another across the ideological spectrum. “All my 
life,” he tells us, “I had been looking for something, and everywhere I turned someone tried to tell 
me what it was.”
 and his creation of the Invisible Man 
draws the institutionless institution into our sketch of the sacramental poetic.  
181
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take after him”). From his deathbed, the man spoke in terms he is told no one saw coming: 
Son, after I’m gone I want you to keep up the good fight. I never told you, but our life is a 
war and I have been a traitor all my born days, a spy in the enemy's country ever since I 
give up my gun back in the Reconstruction. Live with your head in the lion's mouth. I want 
you to overcome 'em with yeses, undermine 'em with grins, agree 'em to death and 
destruction, let 'em swoller you till they vomit or bust wide open. 
And from here, the Invisible Man reports a consensus among his survivors: “They thought the old 
man had gone out of his mind. He had been the meekest of men.” Even as he is rushed out of the 
room, the shades are drawn, and the flame of the bedside lamp is turned low, the grandfather 
manages an addendum to this legacy delivered in a fierce whisper: “Learn it to the younguns.”182
Ellison notes elsewhere that what the grandfather “advises is a kind of jiujitsu of the spirit, 
a denial and rejection through agreement.” Submission to one coded meaning, he understands, 
can pave a means to effectively decoding another, making a way where there wasn’t one. “Thus 
his mask of meekness conceals the wisdom of one who has learned the secret of saying the 
“yes” which accomplishes the expressive “no.” Here, too, is a rejection of a current code and a 
denial become metaphysical.”
 
While his elders promptly instructed him to wipe these words from his memory, words confined till 
now within “the family circle,” the Invisible Man takes them to heart as a tactic that might 
overcome the stratagems of unfriendly forces that would transmogrify him, as the novel 
demonstrates, for their own purposes. 
183
As we will especially see in the novel’s jarringly evocative conclusion, this is the way The 
Invisible Man offers—or better, gives rise to—its mythic witness. Drawing on Northrop Frye’s 
definition of myth as the communication that unites dream and ritual in verbal form and Barthes’ 
gesture toward deessentializing the concept, Spillers suggests that, for Ellison, “myth becomes a 
tactic for explanation” and that “the novel may be considered a discourse on the biographical 
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uses of history,” specifically, a mythic plundering of available word, caricature, tale, image which 
he can draw from as a “usable past.”184
 Traumatized “to the point of invisibility,” the Invisible Man takes up the burden—and the 
release—of a no-holds-barred, tell-all.
 
185 In the mode of Dostoevsky’s Underground Man, he 
resists every temptation to self-edit and commits himself solely to the discipline of free-flowing 
candor. As Ellison characterizes it, the text is “is one long, loud rant, howl and laugh. Confession, 
not concealment, is his mode.”186
Invisible Man must assume all, must take upon himself the haunted, questioning, 
troubled, even self-subversive, stance of one who insists on telling others. This telling 
fulfills a bardic task, an oracular chore, and one would do well to refuse either, but pain 
compels Invisible Man to talk. He calls it “nightmare” and essentially speaks to us out of 
his own sustained bardic trance, while as ignorant youth, he spoke from the nightmare of 
others.
 His only business is showing business. Spillers spells out his 
compulsion which relates inextricably to his perceived vocation:  
187
He will let fly with the voices within and without, in Joycean fashion, eloquently eschewing any 
voice—whether echoing from his past or projected upon the reader--that would tell him he’d do 
better to know his place and keep it all to himself. And yet he will know his place, in the sense 
that he will make more of the mythologies placed upon him than his enemies have yet known or 
understood. If a place is contained, in Certeau’s account, by the rules of the allegedly proper, the 
given pattern of his reader’s certainties, he will seize upon “proliferating metaphors” that have 
thus far organized a place and deploy them in “an ensemble of movements” that actuate instead 
a space. Despite the reigning metaphors of the received proper place, they can’t “describe” a 
space anymore than “a mobile point ‘describes’ a curve.” They are ripe for re-composition through 
the illuminating of intersections, through the refusal of the given area as designated. Certeau 
describes this jujitsu of spirit, this redeeming redesign thusly: “Space is a practiced place.” If it’s 
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the mythological labor of stories that transform places into space (and vice-versa), the Invisible 
Man’s self-conscious mythologizing will transform, for his reader, the settled givens of a place into 
the foreignness of a space rendered revolutionary, rich, and strange.188 His address is 
peremptory: “Thus, having tried to give pattern to the chaos which lives within the pattern of your 
certainties, I must come out. I must emerge.”189
 In this way, the Invisible Man takes the available instances of binding artifice and, through 
acts of religious creativity, proffers what Spillers calls a myth of conscience: “Invisible Man, 
seeking the why of his acts, cuts loose from prevailing myth in a sequence of subversive moves 
that conjoin him with other myths of conscience—the countermythologies.”
 
190 With what Joyce 
might call “his monomyth,”191
 
 he fulfills his bardic task by forging an irretrievably relational space, 
what the novel’s conclusion will offer as zone of largely forbidden mutuality. Like Joyce and Du 
Bois, Ellison generates a genuinely novel and therefore redemptively subversive offering within 
the human experience, the freeing artifice, that is literature, an experience of which he knows 
himself to be an heir. 
Meanwhile On the Lower Frequencies 
“What else could I do? What else but try to tell you what was really happening when your 
eyes were looking through?” asks the Invisible Man. And here he strikes a note of casual 
inevitability concerning the only tactic available—tell it true-- to one whose existence within the 
reigning economies of meaning is one of practical invisibility “without substance, a disembodied 
voice, as it were.” 192
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 To tell (or try to tell) what’s really happening, to hazard a little cosmic 
plainspeak, to cobble together your own witness box out of thin air, is one way of giving voice, of 
making believe, of being social. This too is a space-making enterprise. Hoping in spite of the 
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exit,” Paolo Freire describes, he mythically renames “the limiting situation” in the hope of 
transforming it.193 In sacramental poetic terms, Ellison names the tension between reality and 
invention and thus fulfills what Freire deems the fundamental means to a fully human existence, 
to name and thereby problematize toward naming and narrating (mythologizing) again.194
“I’ll verse you but I won’t curse you,” observes one self-proclaimed bearer of “shit, grit, 
and mother-wit,” 
 With a 
cultivation of creative verse, one can make a vineyard of the heretofore cursed. 
195 who crosses the Invisible Man’s path, a figure who refers to himself as Blue in 
one breath and Peter Wheatstraw in the next. By the end of Ellison’s novel, we see how this 
mode of artful communication, this proffering of a verse, this method of taking care, has been 
inherited by the Invisible Man himself. A lively, wide-awake orality, a gift of Spirit, has successfully 
insinuated itself. The redeeming dialectic of critical consciousness has been passed down and 
received. And from here on out, plurality isn’t an issue, but a fact, a fact to be met with receptivity 
and wit: “Life is to be lived, not controlled; and humanity is won by continuing to play in face of 
certain defeat. Our fate is to become one, and yet many—This is not prophecy, but 
description.”196
Lest we think of his witness as mere words or mere verse, we’re reminded that his 
account bears the critical heft of observational candor, and if we won’t see and get in on the drift 
of his problematic, we’re pulling the wool over our own eyes. But it could be that the reader 
begins to credit his narrative with explanatory power. Maybe we do see.  Perhaps the call is being 
successfully transmitted: “Who knows but that, on the lower frequencies, I speak for you?”
  
197
With this question (by my reckoning, the best last sentence of any novel I know), a table 
is set and a site (or what Certeau might prefer to call “a non-site”) is made ready and available for 
all takers. A space is cleared which, to my mind, evokes Du Bois’ (“After-Thought”) as well as the 
concluding section of Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks (“At the end of this book, we would like 
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the reader to feel with us the open dimension of every consciousness.”198
In this light, critical consciousness, the modus operandi of sacramental poetics, always 
was and ever will be a team sport. The legacy is recast, because no one has their meaning alone. 
Critical consciousness is a public commons, a mobile mother-wit, a moveable feast that’s long 
underwritten whatever powers of redemptive skepticism we’ve felt at work within ourselves. Or as 
Spillers has it: 
). The singular has all 
along hoped for and now posits, with a gesture of non-mastery, an offering really, the first-person 
plural. In some sense, the reader is invited to assume the status of former audience and make 
voice with the invisible man’s voice in response to an appeal to common human experience we 
now understand—if we hadn’t already—to have been in play all along. 
Ellison harnessed “blackness” to a symbolic program of philosophical “disobedience” (a 
systematic skepticism and refusal) that would make the former available to anyone, or 
more pointedly, any posture, that was willing to take on the formidable task of thinking as 
a willful act of imagination and invention. In other words, Invisible Man made ‘blackness’ 
a process, a strategy, of culture critique, rather than a condition of physiognomy and/or 
the embodiment of the auto-bios-graphe…Under the ‘laws’ of this novel, the game of 
“blackness” was no longer captive to the auspices of dominance, somewhere “out there” 
beyond the veil [Du Bois’ counter-mythological trope], but came home, as it were, right 
between the ears, as the glittering weapon of an “invisible” field of choice. With the 
“world” in his head now, invisible man quite literally and figuratively “contained” the wealth 
that white philanthropy had alienated in the first place as its own to proffer.199
“The formidable task” of thinking, imagining, and inventing again is the work now assigned the 
reader. This critical consciousness  (ever ancient and ever new) begins (or re-emerges) with an 
awareness of what appears to be contradiction, often enough derived from unconsciously 
ideological necessity; unconscious, we might say, until a counter-witness gets through (whether 
in story, song, or any disruptively truthful description) defying our standard operating procedures. 
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Having gained access through insinuation, it announces its presences now “right between the 
years,” interrogating the ideological given. If the “ideological” is, William Pietz defines it, “how you 
have to think in order to feel morally good about yourself, given what you actually do.”200 Critical 
consciousness begins with a sense of the dawning of a painful tension between reality and 
invention, a pain that can only be relieved by conceiving your world differently, by imagining it 
anew. For Ellison this is the gift (a gift of Spirit?) at work in the insight he shares with Joyce and 
Vico, the gift of “an ironic awareness of the joke that always lies between appearance and reality, 
between the discontinuity of social tradition and that past which clings to the mind. And perhaps 
even an awareness of the joke that society is man’s creation, not God’s.” 201
 
 I take this to be a 
mark of the sacramental poetic awareness that glows within and, in spite of the institutionalizing 
darkness, on the lower frequencies. Given its unavowably religious pretensions, the darkness 
generally finds it cannot afford to understand or even entertain such an awareness.  
Everything Presumes a Dream 
In the counter-ideological fashion of sacramental poetic expression, critical 
consciousness compels us to change our minds by way of voices we discover strangely aligned 
with what we begin to take to be our own. The redirection of our accreditation ensues. Certeau 
describes the process aptly: “The credibility of a discourse is what first makes believers act in 
accord with it. It produces practitioners. To make people believe is to make them act. But by a 
curious circularity, the ability to make people act—to write and to machine bodies—is precisely 
what makes people believe.”202
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done (what Howard Thurman calls “God’s working paper”203). Spillers again: “The materiality of 
discourse is as solid an aspect of political economy as the Gross Domestic Product, and it’s far-
flung subtleties and evasions, its coded displacements and well-choreographed insinuations, 
decidedly more pernicious as the missile that hides its hand. To spot it by preventing, or warding 
off, its closures, on its own terrain, with its own weapons, defines the “war,” as I have understood 
it.”204
As we return to Du Bois, we see such revolutionary re-appropriations of available 
material emerge, drawing upon other myths and re-mythologizing (or re-mixing) the given that 
once seemed soul-crushingly inevitable in his account of the  “growth of a class of free Negroes” 
preceding (and persisting beyond) the Civil War era. Du Bois describes “the ethical and social 
leader” that was “the freedman” and offers an interpretation of what Certeau might call a 
revolution (or a mutation) of the believable: 
 
Freedom became to him a real thing and not a dream. His religion became darker and 
more intense, and into his ethics crept a note of revenge, into his songs a day of 
reckoning close at hand. The “Coming of the Lord” swept this side of Death, and came to 
be a thing to be hoped for in this day…Negro religion thus transformed itself and 
identified itself with the dream of abolition, until that which was a radical fad in the white 
North and an anarchistic plot in the white South had become a religion to the black 
world.205
It’s especially interesting to note how Du Bois reserves the word “religion” for the “real thing” at 
work within the heart, mind, and body of this emerging class. For Du Bois, true religion (the belief 
that is practice as opposed to wishful thinking confused with conviction) is not to be ascribed to 
the fads and plots of those parties whose existence was less directly beleaguered. There are 
lived dreams, and then there are fads: “No American now believes in his religion.”
 
206
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Something of what Du Bois is extolling, alongside the critique the true religion of “the 
freedman” implies, is present in Certeau’s account of the tactics employed by “indigenous Indian 
cultures” in their response to Spanish colonization: “They metaphorized the dominant order: they 
made it function in another register [my italics].”207  If we bring to Du Bois’ account Certeau’s 
description of “the murmuring of everyday practices,” we can consider how the “darker, more 
intense religion” of “the freedman” appropriated many of the words and images which, under the 
auspices of white oppression, had been made available or, at least, accidentally accessible to 
redemptive use. As Certeau has it, ”It is through them [everyday practices] that an uncodeable 
difference insinuates itself into the happy relation the system would like to have with the 
operations it claims to administer.”208
This account of practices implied in Du Bois and Certeau is its own summons to feats of 
attentiveness which I take to be the task of the critical theorist, the prophet, and the poet. To my 
mind Du Bois employs just such a tactic, poaching upon the reigning dreamscape, when he 
coined the term “abolition-democracy” and rearranged an American myth or two, re-deploying 
them to more globally enfranchising ends, and recasting two powerful words, conflates them in a 
re-visioning of American mission: 
 
With questions of “true significance, “social development,” and “the problem of democracy,” 
powerfully set forth, certain openings are made into a scene bewilderingly different from popular 
accounts (even today) of the meaning of the United States’ perceived self-interest.209
 The same scene is signaled by Howard Thurman in words spoken on the air over radio 
station KSFO in San Francisco on the evening of Martin Luther King’s assassination. Refusing 
the designations of the dominant, prevailing mythologies of America, King’s movement redirected 
them to function in a new, largely unanticipated register. “In him the informed conscience of the 
country became articulate. And tonight what many of us are feeling is that we all must be that 
conscience wherever we are living, functioning, and behaving.” A demonstrably living conscience, 
we understand, is an informed conscience that awaits articulation and which necessarily achieves 
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it with and through others. Thurman is describing the practice of sacramental poetic witness. “He 
was able to put at the center of his personal religious experience a searching ethical awareness. 
Thus organized religion as we know it in our society found itself with its back against the wall. To 
condemn him, to reject him, was to reject the ethical insight of the faith it proclaimed. And this 
was new.”210
 Like every instance of sacramental poetic, the innovation—the ongoing innovation—
Thurman describes both confronts, challenges, and seeks to redeem the stock inventory of word 
and image that passes for the common decency (“organized religion”) by questioning the 
discernible content and the on-the-ground verifiability of its claims. It’s as if the movement King 
represented and represents is performed (and might yet perform) acts of ethical alchemy upon 
and out of the materiality of any available discourse.  
 
 The poetic practice of critical consciousness, in this sense, will involve the tact that 
necessarily precedes a meaningful tactic. I have in mind here Julia Kristeva’s definition which, to 
mu mind, describes the intense attentiveness characteristic of the sacramental poetic sensibility 
my study considers. What is tact? Kristeva: “To hear true, along with forgiveness. Forgiveness: 
giving in addition, banking on what is there in order to revive, to give the depressed patient (that 
stranger withdrawing into his wound) a new start, and give him the possibility of a new 
encounter.”211
 
 
Never Know Who You’re Talking To 
Before I bring Joyce back into the proceedings, I’d like to observe how Kristeva’s word on 
tact—on hearing true—can be helpfully teased out by the enigmatic ending of Du Bois’ 
autobiography. Just as he concludes The Souls of Black Folk with a consideration of written 
words as almost inevitably subjected to futility (“crooked marks on a fragile leaf”) save for the 
hope of being somehow salvaged by an animating reception among the living, he commits the 
meaning of his own existence--his work, his voice, his spirit—to the work of future remembering, 
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a work he commissions within the redeeming dialectic of dreams and deeds: “Let then the 
Dreams of the Dead rebuke the Blind who Think that what is will be forever and teach them that 
what was worth living must live again...Teach us, Forever Dead, there is no Dream but Deed, 
there is no Deed but Memory.”212
Against the prevailing mythologies that project the defeat of abolition-democracy unto 
eternity, he again casts his own labor beyond his own beleaguered present and into ours. 
Perhaps he speaks for us. Like Ellison’s Invisible Man, he gives his witness over to the possibility 
of new encounters, weighing out his own death and the death of all living and carrying on in the 
hope of a revival committed to others. This is the move of extradition upon which a witnessing 
tradition will have to bank, a saying that will live again through, and, in spite of, the said. The 
given gesture depends upon an economy--a household--of gift. It is here that Du Bois’ words 
resonate with Levinas’ account of the giving of witness: “It is sincerity, effusion of oneself, 
‘extraditing’ of the self to the neighbor. Witness is humility and admission; it is made before all 
theology; it is kerygma and prayer, glorification and recognition.”
  
213
 In his calling upon a witness to his witness and that of the “Forever Dead” he 
addresses, Du Bois extends to his audience the invitation to be shaped by what’s been 
recognized, seen, and heard in his work and in this way to have paid his sorrow song meaningful 
heed, making it sing true. And as I hear it, this hope for new, perhaps unanticipated encounters 
means to extend what seems to be that “sole oasis of simple faith and reverence in a dusty 
desert of dollars and smartness” beyond what Du Bois regretfully but provocatively counted as its 
present boundaries. This refusal to count these boundaries as definitive is characteristic of the 
cultural consciousness Ellison treats in his essay, “The World and the Jug”:  
 As we will see in the next 
chapter, it is only in this effusion of self, some form of it, that a sacramental poetic practice can be 
undertaken. 
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Negro American consciousness is not a product (as so often seems true of so many 
American groups) of a will to historical forgetfulness. It is a product of our memory, 
sustained and constantly reinforced by events, by our watchful waiting, and by our 
hopeful suspension of final judgment as to the meaning of our grievances.214
 Here, Ellison describes a creative determination to attend to what are often only dimly 
perceived redemptive possibilities, that same “hopeful suspension of final judgment” (Joyce calls 
it the sacred benefit of doubt) which his Invisible Man articulates so movingly when he considers 
his own proneness toward pulling the wool over his own eyes: “I knew that my forgetfulness 
wasn’t real, as one knows that the forgotten details of certain dreams are not truly forgotten but 
evaded.”
 
215 What I take to be the most significant material token in the novel, an object that 
challenges the narrator—and the reader—to resist the temptation to ever foreclose meanings in 
our attempts to make sense of ourselves comes to him in his time among the communists in the 
Brotherhood. It is there that he receives the confidence of a Brother Tarp, a fellow southerner, 
who explains his persistent limp as an unshakeable body memory from the nineteen years he 
spent dragging a chain in a prison yard until his escape. Unable to explain to his own satisfaction 
his compulsion to do so, he gives him a thick, oily piece of filed steel (“It’s the one I filed to get 
away”) and trusts him to make of it what he will and should: “Funny thing to give somebody, but I 
think it’s got a heap of signifying wrapped up in it and it might help you remember what we’re 
really fighting against. I don’t think of it in terms of but two words, yes and no; but it signifies a 
heap more…”216
                                                 
214 Ellison, “The World and the Jug,” in Shadow and Act, 124. 
 I read this gesture as a call to reside in the meaning—the significance—of the 
struggle they have in common in such a way as to remain alive to the possibility of further, richer 
meanings than whatever he’s tempted to settle for as progress or success, that he not take such 
possibilities for granted. Perhaps he speaks for more people than his tale has thus far had in 
mind. 
215 Ellison, The Invisible Man, 537. 
216 Ibid. 388. 
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And if historical consciousness, as Jan Patočka maintained, is life that never takes itself 
for granted,217 it seems to me that critical consciousness (I employ the terms almost 
synonymously) is generated by a such interfaces with the materiality of a call, a ringing true 
which, perhaps tragically, can’t achieve meaning all by its lonesome. In this sense, critical 
consciousness is the confronting/confronted consciousness, searching out insinuations and 
perhaps performing a few, the open mind one can feel descending, emerging, or growing as if out 
of the pavement. In this way, our refusal to imagine beyond the present status quo begin to feel 
like a sort of ethical negligence, criminal in its way, and our stock inventory of memory begins to 
insinuate, somehow ineluctably, a demand for re-appraisal or a fresh narrativizing. Or as Spillers 
puts the matter in what I take to be a kind of critical-poetic demand: “We never surpass some 
things, or get over them, insofar as their opaqueness bears down on the imagination with a clarity 
of refusal that must be confronted.”218
“Never know who you’re talking to,” thinks Leopold Bloom to himself.
 In this way, the sacramental poetic task requires both 
seeking out the experience of being redemptively unsettled and persisting in wakefulness to the 
reverberations of our liturgies beyond the scope of our intentions. 
219 And here we 
have the apocalyptic receptivity—applying both to input and output—of which Joyce makes of 
Bloom a kind of accidental hero. As an ad man alive to the unintended consequences and the 
serendipitous occurrences that follow his own words and actions and everyone else’s, he 
exemplifies the poetic power of knowing that you don’t know, that you can only receive the 
fullness of another person to the extent you know you aren’t successfully fathoming their depths 
anymore than you can fully or authoritatively fathom your own. Or as Stephen has it, beginning to 
receive, in some sense, Bloom’s drift: “Every life is many days, day after day. We walk through 
ourselves, meeting robbers, ghosts, giants, old men, young men, wives, widows, brothers-in-love. 
But always meeting ourselves.”220
                                                 
217 Erazim Kohák, Jan Patočka: Philosophy and Selected Writings, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989), 5. 
 
218 Spillers, “Peter’s Pans: Eating in the Diaspora” 3. 
219 Joyce, Ulysses, 163.  
220 Joyce, Ulysses, 213. 
 83 
When the Invisible Man urges us to live life, in view of the reciprocity to come (“Our fate is 
to become one, and yet many.”), instead of seeking to control it, he signals a call to the knowing 
relationality his final question facilitates. In the flow of self-conscious and unself-conscious, 
meaning-making discourse, the strange, difficult, and poetic work of being alive to our own is a 
work that is never done. Bakhtin puts it nicely: “One’s own discourse is gradually and slowly 
wrought out of others’ words that have been acknowledged and assimilated, and the boundaries 
between the two are at first scarcely visible.”221
 And in their insistence upon the social fact of mutual imbrication, that complex, 
ineluctably religious space I wish to stress, all three authors (Du Bois, Joyce, and Ellison) jettison 
the myth of critical detachment and invite their readers to an envisioning of human society as one 
of meaningful, gracious, and playful reciprocity (“Don’t kid yourself,” the Invisible Man remarks, 
“The only scientific objectivity is a machine.”
 
222
They’re engaged in what might be fruitfully understood to be a spirit work of call and response. 
While Du Bois and Ellison’s invocations are most evident in the conclusions of the works we’ve 
examined (Epiklesis Gk. for invocation, calling upon, making an appeal), Joyce understood his 
writing to perform a liturgical function from his earliest self-understanding onward. As he noted in 
a letter to his brother Stanislaus, “I am writing a series of epicleti—ten—for a paper. I have written 
one. I call the series Dubliners.”
). 
223
“Who ever anywhere will read these written words?” Stephen asks himself in Ulysses.
 Within his poetic-priestly vocation, everything depends upon 
the possibility of co-celebrants. 
224
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listening to it.”225 In his attempt to bring a credible consciousness of the world to the world, the 
sacramental poetic transmission depends upon reception. Critical consciousness, in this sense, is 
a poetics in search of a living constituency ("His producers are they not his consumers?").226
 In this way, the redeeming dialectic of call and response conjures the space of sacramental 
poetic consciousness to which all comers are invited. And concerning the product of memory 
Ellison calls “Negro American consciousness,” we have an expansion of the subject in Spillers’ 
meditation upon the concept of black culture. “It would be more accurate to say black diasporic 
culture,” she observes.
 
227 Whereas Ellison viewed African-American concern as a “concord of 
sensibilities”228
In a sense, if there is no black culture, or no longer black culture (because it has 
“succeeded”), then we need it now; and if that is true, then perhaps black culture—as the 
reclamation of the critical edge, as one of those vantages from which it might be spied, 
and no longer predicated on “race”—has yet to come.
 which might yet be brought to bear upon an infinite variety of human concerns, 
Spillers critiques what’s become of it and laments the ways in which the brand-version of black 
culture “in its current avatar” has been made to “bolster the dangerous regnancy of corporate 
media and supreme commercial value,” and thus been enlisted to the purposes of global dis-
order in contemporary history. The distinction--between brand and lived, historical hope--is 
essential in a global scene where “the imagined moral credibility of black now translates into an 
enablement of the most repressive practices among the world democracies today.” And yet, the 
concord Spillers forecasts fixes its sites on an ever widening field: 
229
Here, Spillers draws the “myths of conscience” we’ve discussed toward what Grace Lee Boggs 
calls “the humanity-stretching movements.”
 
230
                                                 
225 Richard Ellman, James Joyce, New and Revised Edition, 702. 
 And it is their sponsorship of the possibilities of 
reclamation--the critical edge of sacramental poetics--to which we now turn. 
226 Joyce, Finnegans Wake, 497. 
227 Spillers, “The Idea of Black Culture” in CR: The New Centennial Review 6.3 (2007), 21. 
228 Ellison, “The World and the Jug” 131. 
229 Spillers, “The Idea of Black Culture” 26. 
230 Grace Lee Boggs, Living for Change: An Autobiography, (Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press, 1998), xi. 
 85 
CHAPTER IV 
       A SLIGHT EDGE OF LIFE OVER DEATH  
 
“I don’t know, it’s just what the song says. Isn’t it what we’re doing here? Bringing leaves out of 
the stones!” 
“Sounds like religion.” 
“You and your fancy book-words. It’s just a song.”231
Ursula K. Le Guin, The Dispossessed 
 
 
“If you don’t use your own imagination, somebody else is going to use it for you.” 
Ronald Sukenick232
 
 
“Worship is a matter of profound intent. I tried to invite everybody. It’s very easy to 
misunderstand.”  
Duke Ellington233
 
 
It Would Be the Real World 
To begin with the interplanetary, I give you a scene from the imagination of the novelist, 
essayist,and  translator, Ursula K. Le Guin. It’s a scene of wisdom getting through in an instance 
of what it might be appropriate to call, in the positive sense, religious reading (call it apocalypse, 
call it a breakthrough). Her landscapes feature all manner of traditions, economies, and senses of 
religiosity coming into contact with one another, and any number of sacred cows (patriotism, 
gender, race, and religion) getting casually tipped over again and again. The characters in her 
                                                 
231 Ursula K. Le Guin, The Dispossessed, (New York: Avon, 1974), 38. 
232 Quoted in John Madera, “O For a Muse of Fire: An Interview with Lance Olsen,” Rain Taxi, 
Online Edition: Summer 2010 
http://www.raintaxi.com/online/2010summer/olsen.shtml 
233 Quoted in Geoffrey O’Brien, “The Grandest Duke,” New York Review of Books, October 28, 
2010. 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/oct/28/grandest-duke/?page=3  
 86 
fiction—and, I would argue, her readers—are constantly made to encounter themselves through 
strange worlds and the scandalously familiar characters that inhabit them. It’s as if her science 
fiction landscapes serve as thought experiments which powerfully speak to the cross-cultural 
spaces of our own time. Shallow worldviews are redemptively undone by the blessedly 
undeniable fact of other lives, the cultures underway on other planets. As these worlds prove to 
be not just possible, but factual, they critically engage all that’s been taken to be inevitable, the 
binding “Just the way things are,” in the lives of Le Guin’s protagonists. As we ourselves often 
experience a shift when we take in a story, a lyric, or a poem, the unexamined passions that 
underwrite the perceived inevitabilities, the have-to’s, what Aimé Césaire calls “the blue steel 
rigidities” that cut “through the mysteries of the flesh”234
In Four Ways to Forgiveness, Yoss, a middle-aged woman in a dilapidated house in a 
war-torn village, is reading a publication of the Ekumen, a cosmic communion of eighty-three 
habitable planets and three thousand nations whose mere existence has a provocative way of 
relativizing (without necessarily negating) one’s sense of sovereignty, people-hood, and place. 
The publication, we understand, broadens any sense anyone might have of the public. The 
reports of whatever once passed as a National Geographic equivalent, if you like, have begun to 
give way to the tales, stories, and songs of an Intergalactic Cosmographic. But this is all new to 
Yoss whose planet of sojourn has only recently made contact with the Ekumen. She lives alone 
with her pet, Tikuli, and she’s giving herself a moment of pause. She knows that what she’s 
reading is fair and balanced, and whatever comfort she might think to derive by suggesting that 
what’s coming to her is somehow biased is a luxury she’s recently come to understand she can 
no longer afford. Given the military violence and environmental devastation that all-too-obviously 
 now undergo (must undergo) a lively 
interrogation. This is what overtly religious traditions often refer to as repentance, allowing a re-
arranging of ones mental furniture, turning the mind around. When we have a script for what 
seemed realistic and right, and the script gets suddenly, strangely flipped, we can be assured 
we’re in a place now transformed into a space of sacramental poetic activity. 
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pervades her world, she’s a reader who’s lost her taste for tales that primarily serve to flatter her 
own life and surrounding culture. In this sense, she is eager to be disillusioned. "On the planet O 
there has not been a war for five thousand years,” she reads to herself. "And on Gethen there 
has never been a war."  
She stopped reading, to rest her eyes and because she was trying to train herself to read 
slowly, not gobble words down in chunks the way Tikuli gulped his food. "There has 
never been a war:” in her mind the words stood clear and bright, surrounded by and 
sinking into an infinite, dark, soft incredulity. What would that world be, a world without 
war? It would be the real world. Peace was the true life, the life of working and learning 
and bringing up children to work and learn. War, which devoured work, learning, and 
children, was the denial of reality. But my people, she thought, know only how to deny. 
Born in the dark shadow of power misused, we set peace outside our world, a guiding 
and unattainable light. All we know to do is fight. Any peace one of us can make in our 
life is only a denial that the war is going on, a shadow of the shadow, a doubled 
unbelief…So as the cloud-shadows swept over the marshes and the page of the book 
open on her lap, she sighed and closed her eyes, thinking, "I am a liar." Then she opened 
her eyes and read more about the other worlds, the far realities.235
With this remarkably rich passage, Le Guin gives us an anatomy of an emerging mind, 
the kind of imaginative conversion I imagine Du Bois and Ellison would discover at work in their 
ideal readers. It’s the sight of someone deciding to stop living inside the surrounding lies they’ve 
only just begun to discover. It isn’t that Yoss will, from here on out, find her native culture 
irredeemably contemptible—she’s opening herself up to risk, the risk that lets in the realities, the 
lives, that might make her own passions, her own decisions, feel devastatingly foolish, a problem. 
She is going to see and hear; come what may. She will look rightly and let the chips fall. She’s 
committed, in a certain sense, to a life of refusal, a refusal in which she won’t let her own anxiety 
out-shout the whisper of revelation. She will give sustained attentiveness to that itch that can only 
be scratched by thinking, by imagining the world anew. 
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This description of words that must be made to stand clear and bright again and again 
even as they fade into an infinite, dark, soft incredulity brings to mind the subtlety evoked by 
Howard Thurman’s description of the task of critical discernment, an occasion that is never a 
mission accomplished, a work that is never exactly done: “The margin of self-deception is ever in 
flux. We are not quite sure that things are, in truth, as they seem to be in fact. We are therefore 
threatened by each new situation because it may reveal the awful magnitude of our previous self-
deception.”236
For Yoss, the initial sense of threat has somehow inaugurated an opening (though we 
feel the crisis could easily have yielded a different, harder turn which could reject the Ekumen’s 
witness as too good to be true), and her doubled unbelief, what Pierre Bourdieu refers to as “the 
self-legitimating imagination,”
 
237
 
 has been, for the moment, overcome, even as it is ever in flux. 
This inaugural of an opening is a location that generates a promising dialectic which serves to 
expand a space of the talkaboutable, hosting all manner of redemptive problematizing. Le Guin’s 
Ekumen is especially evocative in this regard as its representatives (they enter civilizations as 
Investigators followed over time by Envoys) knowingly immerse themselves in a complex cultural 
interface which defies, as the learned Envoy knows to, the conventional cordoning off of politics, 
religion, business, and art from one another. Strictly speaking, they are neither missionaries nor 
anthropologists, but the mere fact of their existence, their attempt to explain it, and their offering 
of communion into their order makes of their witness a disruptive imagination within sometimes 
hostile worlds. While the subversive quality of Le Guin’s creation certainly resonates with our 
consideration of Du Bois, Ellison, and Joyce thus far, our primary focus will be the way an 
examination of the Ekumen might enter into a space of mutual illumination with the critical 
liturgical work, in word and deed, of Daniel and Philip Berrigan. 
Human from Earth 
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In The Left Hand of Darkness, Genly Ai, an Envoy of color who hales from Terra (Earth), 
brings good tidings to the planet Gethen on behalf of the Ekumen. And lest we presume a 
missionary position in which the complications of cultural exchange are allegedly one-sided, with 
the  Envoys vouchsafing enlightenment upon the natives, we’ll note that the schooling goes both 
ways. The Gethenians, we come to understand, are androgynous. And apart from the monthly 
stage of kemmering, the days of the month when they develop male or female features and 
copulate with a partner, they are without gender. Because the average Gethenian is neither male 
nor female, rarely monogamous, and has usually borne children and fathered them, the gender 
roles to which Ai’s imagination is prone to defer are nowhere to be found. As Ong Tot Oppong, an 
early Observer of the first Ekumenical landing wrote down in his field notes: 
What is very hard for us to understand is that, four-fifths of the time, these people are not 
sexually motivated at all…Our entire pattern of socio-sexual interaction is nonexistent 
here. They do not see one another as men or women. This is almost impossible for our 
imagination to accept. What is the first question we ask about a newborn baby?…One is 
respected and judged only as a human being. It is an appalling experience.238
Even with an abundance of admonitory field notes, Ai will come to see tragically and self-
effacingly his failure to view those among whom he lives as both male and female, as opposed to 
habitually viewing them as one or the other. Such tragic misunderstandings and hard-won 
illuminations are among the vocational pitfalls of being an Ekumenical Envoy: 
 
My job here was a one-man job. There is only one First Mobile. The first news from the 
Ekumen on any world is spoken by one voice, one man present in the flesh, present, and 
alone. He may be killed…or locked up with madmen…one after the other; yet the practice 
is kept, because it works. One voice speaking truth is a greater force than fleets and 
armies, given time; plenty of time; but time is the thing the Ekumen has plenty of.239
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 And with this in mind, he persists in his nation-by-nation engagement with Gethen, 
mindful of the fears his aloneness is meant to at least partially quell, “The first Envoy to a world 
always comes alone. One alien is a curiosity, two are an invasion.”240
But even with this precaution among nations that have never gone to war, there’s the matter of 
the religious commitment of national identity. And for those possessed by it, as we might guess, 
the health of other nations, as a global unity (to say nothing of a distant interplanetary communion 
with its lone, unarmed representative) isn’t necessarily a top priority for the people who esteem 
themselves to be in power over others. Drawing from the Investigator’s research, Ai has placed 
his primary hopes in the nation of Karhide. As he observes to its prime minister, Estraven, he 
comes without signs, wonders, or definitive proofs, only his “ansible [communication device], my 
box of pictures, the indubitable peculiarity of my body, and the unprovable singularity of my 
mind”
 
241
 Estraven has tried to prepare the King, Argaven, for an audience with Ai, but despite 
the care and skill of his presentation, the slightest allusion to the scope of the Envoy’s society 
strikes him as an intolerable threat to all the King holds dear. As Estraven explains, “All I’ve told 
him means to him simply that his power is threatened, his kingdom is a dust mote in space, his 
kingdom is a joke to men who rule a hundred worlds.” 
 to extend the shared hope of communion, exchange, alliance, and interaction. 
“But the Ekumen doesn’t rule,” Ai protests. “It co-ordinates.”242
“Mr. Ai: do you know, by your own experience, what patriotism is?” 
 We will come to 
understand that Estraven follows him completely. 
“I don’t think I do. If by patriotism you don’t mean the love of one’s homeland, for that I do 
know.” 
“No, I don’t mean love, when I say patriotism. I mean fear. The fear of the other. And its 
expressions are political, not poetical: hate, rivalry, aggression.”243
Poetic expression, in this sense, is the never-not-redeeming expression which, counter to 
the merely political, will disturb, rather than sustain or buttress, the given status quo. And the 
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poetic, we discover, does not go over well when the Envoy secures a moment in the King’s 
company. Alone with Ai, we realize that Estraven has tried to confront the conscience of the King 
with the novel idea of patriotism as a lived practice. Might it lurk in the King’s heart? Might it move 
past vain imaginings and perhaps put on flesh? To have even posed such questions will lead to 
Estraven’s exile. In autocratic form, he is incapable of entertaining the question, he is Karhide, 
and he mistakens his own sense of power for love of country. And the alleged patriotism with 
which King Argaven congratulates himself (as landed gentry often will) is, in practice, merely the 
costly, fidgeting fear of a cornered animal. 
 The truth of the matter, that Ai isn’t trying to challenge him, but merely communicate, is 
an incommunicable fact. He offers space-travel and cosmic community to the king and his 
people, but Argaven can only think in terms of his own power. He only speaks the language of 
career ambition and survival strategy, and he’s genuinely befuddled over why anyone with any 
power would ever want to share their resources? When he asks why the Ekumen wants an 
alliance (“this kingdom out in nowhere, this Ekumen”), Ai responds: “Material profit. Increase of 
knowledge. The augmentation of the complexity and intensity of the field of intelligent life. The 
enrichment of harmony and the greater glory of God. Curiosity. Adventure. Delight.”244
The Ekumen is not a kingdom, but a co-ordinator, a clearinghouse for trade and 
knowledge; without it communication between the worlds of men would be haphazard, 
and trade very risky, as you can see. Men’s lives are too short to cope with the time-
jumps between worlds, if there's no network and centrality, no control, no continuity to 
work through; therefore they become members of the Ekumen. 
 But these 
phrases have absolutely no appeal to the King and his sense of conservative self-possession. Ai 
persists: 
Are they all as black as Genly Ai? He asks. 
“Some are blacker…we come in all colors.245
 Still wincing from his conversation with Estraven and wrestling with an all-too-lucid, 
emerging recognition that comes to so many of Le Guin’s characters, an insight increasingly 
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difficult to suppress, King Agraven wonders how the Ekumen would define the word “traitor.” Ai 
produces his ansible and sends the question to a Stabile of the Ekumen via interstellar 
transmission. The answer will only madden Agraven further: “To King Argaven of Karhide on 
Gethen, greetings. I do not know what makes a man a traitor. No man considers himself a traitor: 
this makes it hard to find out.”246
 When we bring this logic to bear upon the preferred abstractions of pundits and 
politicians, we begin to see that Le Guin has some rather large fish to fry, collapsing, as the 
sacramental poetic inheritance will, our habitual distinctions between the political, the pietistic, 
and the poetic. As we might expect, King Agraven angrily dismisses the Ekumen’s wisdom as the 
kind of thing he could have procured from his own religious crackpots.  
 
 Having made a poetic demand of the King by way of his costly questions, Estraven 
barely escapes Karhide with his life, but, perhaps fearing repercussions from the “Kingdom out in 
nowhere,” he allows the Envoy the liberty of leaving and finding his way to other nations. 
Nevertheless, he issues a press release that sounds like it could have come from a propped-up 
Middle Eastern dictator under revolutionary threat ranting about foreign influences, something of 
an impossibility, we understand, from the ineluctable relationality that underwrites an Ekumenical 
(or sacramental poetic) point of view. Estraven, he insists, has proven traitorous and has 
authored a plot to render Karhide a “subject nation in a certain Union of Peoples…let all men 
know that no such Union does exist, being a device and a baseless fiction of certain conspiring 
traitors who seek to weaken the Authority of Karhide in the king”247
 
 
A Body Mystic 
With King Argraven’s frantic assertion that this rumored communion, the alive but non-
coercively signaling fact of this Ekumen of Known Worlds is a baseless fiction of treacherous 
agents, we begin to see the skewering liveliness of Le Guin’s sacramental poetic concerns. What 
do planets and aliens have to with the contemporary scene? Le Guin places her work among the 
myths of conscience: “They are metaphorical ways of coming at our present reality which is, after 
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all, all we can really write about.”248
            Because Le Guin divides The Left Hand of Darkness into sections of Ekumenical 
ethnography, Gethenian creation myths, and narration traded between Genly Ai and Estraven, 
we’re creatively deprived of a clear analytical foothold from which to assess the various players. 
Just as we’ve begun to presume Genly Ai to be our hero, we discover Estraven, stripped of his 
political power, risking his life at every turn to protect the Envoy and serve his mission. His 
entreaties to Karhide’s neighbor, Orgoreyn, are scarcely more successful than Ai’s, and his 
witness to him within the corridors of power are viewed as lunacy at best and the opportunism of 
an unemployed political operative at worst. Of Ai, he attests: “In his presence, lines drawn on the 
earth make no boundaries, and no defense…He is not to be feared, I think. Yet he brings the end 
of Kingdom and Commensalities with him in his empty hands.” 
 Le Guin’s worlds are scenes of liturgies and counterliturgies 
and their devastating, inevitable interplay. We can note too that while the Envoy customarily 
hopes to win hearts and minds by way of deploying a larger affirmation of life than their potential 
converts have yet known or understood, it is often the Envoys themselves who get converted. 
249
 Over the course of the novel, the two are reduced to the plight of refugees whose 
survival will depend on one  another. Ai questions the ease with which Estraven, expelled from 
Karhide, would urge the Envoy’s proposed alliance upon foreigners. Estraven is nonplussed, 
“What does it matter which country wakens first, so long as we waken?”
 But such pronouncements only 
make Estraven politically useless to the governments that might otherwise capitalize upon his 
skills. 
250
I lack the trick of it. I know people, I know towns, farms, hills and rivers and rocks, I know 
how the sun at sunset in autumn falls on the side of a certain plowland in the hills; but 
what is the sense of giving a boundary to all that, of giving it a name and ceasing to love 
where the name ceases to apply? What is love of one’s country; is it hate of one’s 
uncountry? Then it’s not a good thing…Insofar as I love life, I love the hills of the Domain 
 Does he not hold 
Orgoreyn in contempt like the average Karhider? 
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of Estre, but that sort of love does not have a boundary-line of hate. And beyond that, I 
am ignorant, I hope.251
 And here, it is especially evident that the Envoy is not involved in a missionary 
endeavor. Having presumed to be, as the Envoy, one upon whom nothing, generally speaking, is 
lost, Ai begins to understand that his poetic task is one of mutual enrichment, and perhaps, when 
it comes to an adept like Estraven, he is compelled to discover that his status is one of 
apprenticeship. If the Ekumen is, as Ai’s been taught, “an experiment in the superorganic,”
 
252
It’s the Ekumen’s custom, and there are reasons for it. Though in fact I begin to wonder if 
I've ever understood the reasons. I thought it was for your sake that I came alone, so 
obviously alone, so vulnerable, that I could in myself pose no threat, change no balance: 
not an invasion, but a mere messenger-boy. But there's more to it than that. Alone, I 
cannot change your world. But I can be changed by it. Alone, I must listen, as well as 
speak. Alone, the relationship I finally make, if I make one, is not impersonal and not only 
political: it is individual, it is personal, it is both more and less than political. Not We and 
They; not I and It; but I and Thou. Not political, not pragmatic, but mystical. In a certain 
sense the Ekumen is not a body politic, but a body mystic. It considers beginnings to be 
extremely important. Beginnings, and means. Its doctrine is just the reverse of the 
doctrine that the end justifies the means. It proceeds, therefore, by subtle ways, and slow 
ones, and queer, risky ones; rather as evolution does, which is in certain senses its 
model… So I was sent alone, for your sake? Or for my own? I don't know.
 it’s 
outreach is not a work of charity, a vouchsafing of its riches from on high, but an essential 
function of its own dynamism. When Estraven wonders aloud concerning the Ekumenical method 
of sending one Envoy at a time, Ai offers a conjecture that’s only begun to dawn on him by way of 
their relationship: 
253
If we’re to make the most of Le Guin’s Ekumen as a trope, it is at this point that we do 
well to recall Derrida’s riff on the poetic as that which can’t be properly undertaken alone, that 
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which we desire to learn, but always from and of the other, thanks to the other and under the 
dictation of the other, by heart. The hopes at work within—or rather witnessed to by—the Ekumen 
are inescapably relational. In this way, it serves as a sort of rubric for sacramental poetic practice, 
never a handing down of wisdom, but a commitment to redeeming dialectic in sync, in its way, 
with the stated objectives of the 95¢ Skool which involves the exchange and the cobbling 
together of poetic intelligence. Within the Ekumen, all along encompassing though not yet 
formally extended to Estraven and his people, Genly Ai discovers himself to be a perpetual 
student whose education is, among other things, a thinning out of his sense of self-possession 
over against others and a transformation of his alleged accumulation of knowledge into the 
relational knowledge that is only accessed through acknowledgment of the other as in no way 
ultimately estranged, only known—or experienced--where two or more are gathered. Or as 
William Franke puts in what I take to be a kind sacramental poetic aphorism: “Knowledge, 
humanly considered, is valuable in proportion to the intensity and richness of the relationships it 
enables.”254
And in language I take to be evocative of Joyce’s vision of a New Bloomusalem, a 
catholicity whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere, Genly Ai portrays 
the Ekumen as a mission never-quite-accomplished: 
 Le Guin’s “body mystic” which is both more and less than political seeks to overcome 
the false dichotomy of yours and mine and move toward, in Estraven’s terms, the sort of love that 
does not have—or any way give credence to--a boundary-line of hate. 
Ekumen is our Terran word; in the common tongue it’s called the Household; in Karhidish 
it would be the Hearth…It is an attempt to reunify the mystical with the political, and as 
such is of course mostly a failure; but its failure has done more good for humanity so far 
than the successes of its predecessors. It is a society and it has, at least potentially, a 
culture.  It is a form of education; in one aspect, it's a sort of very large school--very large 
indeed.255
Where he once viewed Estraven as a potential convert to this very large school, Ai comes to see 
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that it is primarily Estraven’s witness that renders the economic/Ekumenic vision of reality publicly 
visible and, by the end of the novel, Gethen’s formal entry into the Ekumen possible. In this way 
the novel’s portrayal of the exchange of poetic intelligence is made—or brought--to blossom. 
 
To Make a Space of a Place 
“Notional knowledge is the assimilation of facts leading nowhere; whereas real 
knowledge is some mysterious alchemy whereby the truth of existence, including the facts, leads 
one to moral development or simple action on behalf of people, on behalf of actual needs.”256
They viewed their actions as redemptive raids on the sacrosanct. And in a manner 
provocatively reminiscent of Joyce, Daniel Berrigan speaks of the moral bankruptcy of so much of 
his tradition as an opportunity to give it a more lively—and therefore faithful—interpretation. He 
viewed it as “a reshuffling of the Catholic Cards, that holy tarot deck, stacked to the elbows with 
assured salvation and no losers. Did not every one of us hold a winning hand?” And in this way, 
their transparent liturgy would serve to disrupt and destabilize, even if only in one local instance, 
the unacknowledged liturgy of the draft: “Those draft files! They were, of course, more than they 
 
While this distinction between the knowledge that accumulates without occasioning newness of 
life and the poetic knowledge that makes new resonates with the Ekumenic vision we’ve drawn 
into our discussion of the sacramental poetic, it isn’t science fiction. It’s a clarifying word from the 
Jesuit poet-activist, Daniel Berrigan, concerning his own hopes for liturgical possibilities, the kind 
which, in this case, have landed him in jail following his involvement in the prayerful burning of 
draft files in Catonsville, Maryland on May 17, 1968. With his brother, Philip (also a Catholic 
priest) who had also performed a similar action in Baltimore in 1967, they were concerned with 
the debased currency of the liturgical forms with which their tradition had been entrusted when it 
came to the war-making liturgies, the paper-work, for instance, of the United States government 
whose enlisting of young men to the violence and devastation of Vietnam constituted, according 
to their sacramental poetic witness, a demonic stronghold. 
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purported to be. They had an aura, they were secular-sacred documents of the highest 
import.”257
 With an eye on the meaning—or potential meaning--of Roman Catholicism in America, 
the Berrigans fulfilled Walter Benjamin’s dictum concerning the redemption of tradition: “In every 
era the attempt must be made anew to wrest tradition away from a conformism that is about to 
overpower it.”
 
258
Who owned the tradition, anyway; and who was worthy to speak on its behalf?...Indeed, 
the issue was not simply that a tradition was traduced daily by those responsible for its 
purity and truth. The issue was a far more serious one…The tradition was a precious 
voice, a presence, a Person. The war had silenced the voice, outlawed the Person. 
Church and state had agreed, as they inevitably did in time of war, that the Person was 
out of fashion, “for the duration.” He had nothing to offer in the face of guns…He was a 
prisoner of war this Jesus. He was in a species of protective custody.
 As we have seen among our practitioners of sacramental poetic, a tradition has 
to take verb form in order to credit itself, to be credible, to make believe. The Berrigans would 
practice their place into a space and keep alive the possibility of a tradition that might continue to 
be, if even for the first time in this mad context, inherited:  
259
 Through what is, in this event, the direct action of sacramental poetic witness, the 
Berrigans expose the liturgies of murderous abstraction in an exercise which, in Daniel Berrigans 
terms, means to concretize, “The great sinfulness/of modern war is/that it renders concrete things 
abstract.” Berrigan describes the action as an act of responsibility before the divinity that 
demands incarnate witness: "I was trying to be concrete/ about death because death is a 
concrete fact/ as I have throughout my life/ tried to be concrete about the existence of God/ Who 
is not an abstraction/ but is someone before me/ for Whom I am responsible."
  
260
             By confronting and dramatizing American liturgy at home and abroad, the action sought 
to provoke a meaning crisis for the American public, positing a sacred sense of reality counter to 
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reigning dis-order, making plain the arbitrariness of “the way things are,” creating scenes of 
recognition in which the habitual de-valuing of life is no longer deemed inevitable, necessary, or 
even realistic.  
I tried, in response, to put matters biblically. That there was a history for acts such as 
ours. In such biblical acts, results, outcome, benefits, are unknown, totally obscure. The 
acts are at variance with good manners and behavior. Worse, they are plainly illegal. 
More yet: everything of prudence and good sense points to the uselessness and 
ineffectiveness of such acts…And yet, and yet, it is also said: The poor mortal is to go 
ahead; in spite of all. To go ahead, in faith; which is to say, because so 
commanded…One had very little to go on; and went ahead nonetheless. Still, the “little,” I 
reflected ruefully, had at least one advantage. One was free to concentrate on the act 
itself, without regard to its reception in the world. Free also to concentrate on moral 
preparation, consistency, conscience. Looked at in this light, the “little” appeared 
irreducible, a treasure…So, despite all, a history of sorts was launched on a May morning 
in 1968. Also, a tradition was vindicated, at least to a degree. Or so I believe to this 
day.261
In Berrigan’s invoking of the “very little to go on,” we have a description reminiscent of Auden’s 
take on the poetic that makes nothing happen but merely survives somehow in the valley of 
having been said however ineffectively, a way of happening. In this case, the seemingly weak 
gesture is, for Berrigan, nothing less than the vindication, the public coherence outside one 
federal building in 1968, of the Christian tradition itself as he understands it. The verification 
comes from an FBI agent who, upon seeing Daniel’s brother Phillip exclaims, “Him again! Good 
God, I’m changing my religion!” The liturgical clarification has gotten through. “I could think of no 
greater tribute to my brother.”
 
262
Whether in literature, song, prayer, or ritual, sacramental poetics channels a growing 
pressure through the dramatizing of dialogic tension, the tension between a well-heeled power 
with it’s self-proclaimed status as the maintainer of commonweal and good order and another 
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power which calls this status into question, making moves that might sober, demystify, or 
disenchant a public which remains in the former power’s thrall, under hypnosis as it were. By 
dramatizing this tension as it grows, it becomes more possible for more people to see that the 
reigning mythology’s claims of justice, progress, good order, and consensus are not unambivalent 
indices.  
Such determined and radical mindfulness is robust, improvisational, and marked by an 
ever-renewed and robust commitment to the wellbeing of others, even when it takes the unself-
conscious, decidedly non-activist stance of a daydreaming Leopold Bloom who conjures a 
redeeming space without his left hand knowing what his right hand is doing. In the case of the 
Berrigans’ sacramental poetic witness, like that of Du Bois, ostensible Christians on the American 
scene are made to doubt their own status as believers if they can’t sustain a higher estimation of 
human life. Their witnessing work exposes the bad politics and the bad religion involved in the 
habitual devaluing of human life that informs our societal status quo and challenges us to keep 
our God talk inescapably social. And in every instance, sacramental poetics unmasks the 
religious character of those forces that claim to be free of religious influence and impervious to it. 
The witnessing work of sacramental poetic accomplishes this unmasking through 
creatively problematizing unexamined liturgies. As Hugh Kenner observes of the forms we honor 
with the name of art, it “lifts the saying out of the zone of things said.”263
 
 Where there are 
forgotten assertions within the given liturgies (whether of advertising, the workplace, or political 
rhetoric) the sacramental poetic overturns our divisions and makes them plain through feats of 
attentiveness. 
The Actual World Is Our Only World 
Daniel Berrigan’s work is often criticized for its ineffectiveness on the structural level. 
Homeless people get fed, draft files get burned, weapons of mass destruction get destroyed, and 
people get arrested, but what really changes? This is where his longer, downright Ekumenical 
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view of history comes in. And Berrigan, to my mind, often seems to be its most eloquent 
spokesperson:  
The good is to be done because it is good, not because it goes somewhere. I believe if it 
is done in that spirit it will go somewhere, but I don't know where. I don't think the Bible 
grants us to know where goodness goes, what direction, what force. I have never been 
seriously interested in the outcome. I was interested in trying to do it humanly and 
carefully and nonviolently and let it go.264
When Berrigan reads the scriptures, he is moved to note that “We are unready for God; we are 
hardly more ready for one another.”
 
265
 Against an allegedly Christian witness that concerns itself primarily with otherworldly 
consolation, Berrigan posits “The actual world is our only world,”
 And scripture that doesn’t in some way dislocate our 
imaginings of success, victory, terror, goodness, and beauty is scripture that has yet to be 
meaningfully received, made to live, or even read properly. Berrigan’s scripture calls the reader 
out of Egypt and every form of enslaving culture. But if the demanding word of liberation is 
reduced to manageable, idolatrous terms, its summons to creative freedom can’t be discerned. 
266
Humankind, it seems, has always been overdue to see God’s Word as subversive of a 
human dis-order largely disobedient, rebellious, and perverted—one close to self-
destruction from toxic fouling of our nest, or from weapons designed to protect our 
mammon, the money of exploitation. The word of God revolutionizes this social chaos 
nonviolently, replacing the politics of greed, blood lust, and violence with politics designed 
for children.
 and insists that divinity be 
understood as operative in the this-worldly, reality-based realm. Berrigan’s biblical thinking insists 
that now is the new then. In Berrigan’s economy, it’s what God, even as a most redemptive idea, 
is for: 
267
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And with this appeal to A.J. Muste’s demand for a foreign policy that’s good for children, we move 
toward the broader witness associated with the Berrigans and Elizabeth McCalister and their 
charge that the United State’s military budget, especially when it comes to nuclear proliferation, 
reflects a cultural commitment that is most helpfully understood as a form of religion. Their 
actions, which involve lifelong commitments to the attempted destruction of nuclear warheads, led 
to Philip Berrigan spending eleven years of his life in prison. While the sincerity of their position is 
too profound to be understood as a mere tactic, their appeal to the Constitution is powerfully in 
line with Lewis Hyde’s dictum: “The eternals are vulnerable at their joints. To kill a god or an ideal, 
go for the joints.”268
 As McAlister argues, the United States government’s commitment to nuclear 
proliferation constitutes the establishment of a national religion which violates the non-
establishment clause in the First Amendment. “Its existence, its pre-eminence, its rituals, gods, 
priests, and high priests make serious encroachments on all of us….violating our freedom of 
religion.” This “state religion compels a quality of loyalty focused on our acceptance” of nuclear 
weapons “as a necessity. Weapons we are expected to pay for, adulate…become sacred objects 
of worship.”
 
269
As the Berrigan’s have it, such drastic times call for drastic measures which, in Philip’s 
view is nothing less than the task of securing space for coherent witness: “In more civilized times, 
symbols tend to belong to everyone. In times like ours, driven and captivated as they are, people 
misunderstand symbols and fear them. Restoring symbols and purifying them through suffering 
and public exposure is part of the renewal of a community of sanity; in fact a definition of the 
Church.”
 
270 And in language very reminiscent of Le Guin’s Ekumen, Daniel Berrigan characterizes 
this work of restoration and clarification of witness “as a way of seeding something into history.”271
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Alive, in this way, to the social fact of religion, Daniel Berrigan is especially eloquent in 
his diagnosis of inherited religious forms that enslave all the more deviously for going 
unscrutinized. Here, he seems to have in mind suburbs, churches, and courtrooms and their 
subtle--but not so subtle--bindings. His sense of the loss of critical consciousness in these 
environments is devastating: 
It is necessary above all to be concrete when we speak of these things. Men, even good 
men, are commonly disposed to submit to the slavery of the actual; they literally cannot 
imagine themselves in any life situation other than the one in which they live. They inherit 
a style, a culture, a religion—and they prolong such forms—because they are there; 
useful, comfortable, logical, venerable. Their minds wear the costumes of their ancestors, 
a clothing that was once befitting, literally, but is now simply a folklore or a fakeout. So 
they call folklore a religion and a fakeout in adult life. And, alas, who shall disenchant 
them? But let it at least be said, as the Lord implies from His Roman courtroom, such 
lives as these must not make large claims to the truth.272
In his allusion to Jesus’ conversation before before Pontius Pilate (John 18:33-38), he 
equates the hapless donning of the costumes of received religious tradition, fearfully unexamined, 
with the mercenary cynicism of Pilate. The poetic demand Berrigan makes of us is, for starters, to 
find our mythological presumptions presumptuous by awaking ourselves to them. For Berrigan, 
this connecting of dots in the face of prevailing mythologies whose caretakers busy themselves in 
(and derive their status from) making sure such connections aren’t made is the name of the 
human game in the worlds we’re in. 
  
 
Poets Are the Most Specific People On Earth 
Of Daniel Berrigan, Kurt Vonnegut remarked, “For me Father Berrigan is Jesus as a poet. 
If this be heresy, make the most of it.”273
                                                 
272 Berrigan, No Bars to Manhood, (Garden City, Doubleday, 1970), 55. 
 And one senses that this is his highest possible 
compliment. The vocation Vonnegut spies is the one Berrigan sees in Jesus as the figure of the 
273 Quoted on Cover, Berrigan, Prayer for the Morning Headlines: On the Sanctity of Life and 
Death, (Baltimore: Apprentice House, 2007). 
 103 
divine in the most realistic human we have: “Jesus, by a method that was breathtakingly realistic 
and right, sought to break the universal dominion of Death over [women and] men.”274 A poetic 
mind like the one we find in the figure of Jesus is, in this sense, a demythologizing force at work 
upon the prevailing, death-dealing mythologies working their ways upon the world. The poetic 
Berrigan has in mind, which my study terms the sacramental poetic, operates in that “broadest 
sense” of the term which, in Jonathan Lear’s definition of the poet, names the activity of the 
“creative maker of meaningful space. The possibility for such a poet is precisely the possibility for 
the creation of a new field of possibilities. No one is in a position to rule out that possibility.”275
In these terms, the seriousness of poetry is the human seriousness, the work of creating 
a space for the possibility of redemptive culture. It is in view of this understanding that Anthony 
Towne, who, with William Stringfellow, had harbored a fugitive Daniel Berrigan following 
Catonsville, remarked, “It is my considered opinion that any society that locks up priests is sick, 
and any society that imprisons poets is doomed,”
 
276 and spoke of the poetic tasks that create, in 
the most life-giving sense  “normal living,” which, “if there is any love in it, is one long gorgeous 
and, no doubt, subversive conspiracy.”277 Poet practitioners are the caretakers of words, of what 
we do with words. In this sense, theirs is the work of religious mindfulness, “Poets…are the most 
specific people on earth. That is what poetry is all about.”278
And as we have seen, the perceived threat of sacramental poetic witness is met by the 
threat to it by interests that prefer to keep accounts of people, events, and doings liturgically 
unrelated and boundaried up. Berrigan’s poem “Prophecy” traces the tension to the pressure to 
not say what he sees: 
 
 
The way I see the world is strictly illegal 
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To wit, through my eyes 
 
Is illegal, yes; 
to wit, I live 
 
like a pickpocket, like the sun 
like the hand that writes this, by  
my wits 
 
This is not permitted 
that I look on the world 
and worse, insist that I see 
 
what I see 
--a conundrum, a fury, a burning bush279
 
  
With his direct allusion to the prophetic imagination of Moses, we’re reminded of the 
provocative conflation—within the Berrigan witness—of religious freedom with poetic freedom 
and therefore human freedom. In these matters, there is neither separation nor the possibility of 
critical detachment. In societal doings, there is no question that is not a question of religious 
formation, no proper compartmentalizing possible. And for Berrigan, this is a delightful state of 
affairs in which all are invited “to allow the Word of God full play in our lives and in our minds,” 
and, when called for, to see and think the world illegally.280
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 Most importantly, he wouldn’t have 
anyone operate under that delusion of folklore and fakeouts which leads people to think they’ve 
successfully separated themselves from religion (or poetry), just because they’re describing it (or 
280 Daniel Berrigan “A Homily by a Fugitive Priest,” 3. 
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think they are). With such pitfalls in mind, we return to Le Guin’s universe, this time to a world 
which, in view of the threat it is to progress, has outlawed poetic intelligence. 
 
To Sing a Song Without the Tune 
In The Telling, our protagonist, Sutty Das, is a Terran Observer for the Ekumen, hoping 
for Envoy status at some juncture. We discover that the Ekumen homeworld, Hain, which she 
longs to visit, is where Envoys are trained. When she recalls a friend who received training as an 
Envoy, we catch a glimpse of the popular perception of the place: “Lucky man…He got away, he 
went to Hain…he’s been where everything isn’t God and hatred, where they’ve lived a million 
years of history, where they understand it all.”281
In no time, she realizes that the research from the Ekumen’s first landing appears to be 
obsolete. Akan culture has gone corporate, and the rich cultural heritage, that of the Dovzan, 
which they all once called themselves (They’re all “Akans” now), seems to have melted into thin 
air: 
 She arrives on Aka, which the Ekumen visited 
before 150 years ago, and whose most vocal inhabitants appear to long for the intergalactic 
inclusion that might result from a visit from the Envoy.  
The government of this world, to gain technological power and intellectual freedom, had 
outlawed the past. She did not underestimate the enmity of the Akan Corporation State 
toward the “old declarations” and what they meant. To this government who had declared 
they would be freed of tradition, custom, and history, all old habits, ways, modes, 
manners, ideas, pieties, were sources of pestilence, rotten corpses to be burned or 
buried. The writing that had preserved them was to be erased.282
 Having seen first-hand forms of collective mania called religion on Earth, Sutty is 
sympathetic to the desire of many Akans to break free of certain paradigms, but when she begins 
to become more deeply acquainted with resisting Dovzans, she isn’t prepared for the knee-jerk 
intensity of a man called the Monitor who’s been sent to keep an eye on her interaction with them: 
“They seek to drag us back into that paralysis, that mindless barbarism. They may treat you 
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kindly, but I tell you they are ruthless… Their so-called knowledge is rant, superstition, poetry. Do 
not put my people into the painful position of finding a scientist of the Ekumen in possession of 
illegal materials..” He had begun to stammer, groping for words.  
“I am not a scientist.” Sutty responds. “I read poetry.”283
 Among the Dovzan, she adopts the posture of a student, a yoz, who seeks the counsel 
of many a maz. There are parallels with her own past, but she finds it increasingly unseemly to 
refer to their commitments as a religion, as she understands the term. “It seemed not incorrect, 
but not wholly adequate. The term philosophy was even less adequate…Later she called it the 
Forest,” since it had been referred to as the way through one. It was similarly associated with the 
image of a mountain, but in time, “she ended up calling it the Telling.”  
 
 Were there words to “mean sacred or holy? There were words she translated as power, 
mystery, not-controlled-by-people, part-of-harmony,” but “it appeared that in the old Akan way of 
thinking any place, any act, if properly perceived, was actually mysterious and powerful, 
potentially sacred.” (my italics) And proper perception always depended  on proper “description--
telling about the place, or the act, or the event, or the person. Talking about it, making it into a 
story.”284 We note again that the Ekumen enriches itself as its representatives themselves get 
schooled, and that discernment of the holy has nowhere else to happen but in the giving and 
receiving of story, a sacramental poetic economy of meaning. It won’t be reduced or explained 
away; we can only bear witness to it with an awareness that its significance does not begin (or 
end) with our witness. As Levinas puts it: “Signification cannot be directly understood in a flash of 
light that illuminates and chases the night from which it arises, that it unravels. It needs all the 
density of the story…Signification is not separate from the access leading to it. Access is part of 
signification itself. The scaffoldings are never dismantled.”285
 Sutty is actually in possession of a Hainish proverb that gives this sacramental poetic 
sense: “To learn a belief without belief is to sing a song without the tune.” This names a relational 
 Only the story--the Telling--harbors 
the hope of complexifying wholesomely. Story and song. 
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commitment, and a parting with undue critical detachment: “A yielding, an obedience, a 
willingness to accept these notes as the right notes, this pattern as the true pattern, is the 
essential gesture of performance, translation, and understanding.” It “need not be permanent, a 
lasting posture of the mind or heart; yet it is not false. It is more than the suspension of disbelief 
needed to watch a play, yet less than a conversion. It is a position, a posture in the dance.”286
 To bring this sensibility to our discussion of poetic witness as apocalyptic, it seems to 
me that the determined receptivity required of one who means to listen, watch, or read, in Le 
Guin’s economy, resonates with what Franke terms an “openness 
 
to the radical alterity of apocalypse” without which “we cannot be open to dialogue in an 
unrestricted sense.” Revelation, in this sense, “and particularly texts purporting to deliver 
apocalyptic revelations, must be understood essentially as forms of communication.”287 Such 
apocalyptic receptivity understands that “apocalypse, as the advent of the end, is nothing that we 
can do, though we can be aware of and perhaps cooperate with its happening to us. Indeed, from 
a certain point of view, this is already what tradition itself” or the traducing that is tradition, ”is all 
about. Apocalyptic…rather than being taken as an aberration, symptomatic of a pathology of 
Western civilization that could be cured [as it seems corporate-minded Akans would have us do] 
should be accepted as part of the whole and as standing for the possibility of renewal inherent 
within this tradition. From this type of imagination, new and different proposals unceasingly draw 
their inspiration…Every imagination of the end in apocalyptic style is the occasion for new 
orientation toward the open space we call the future.”288
 
 
It’s the Way We Have the World. 
But as Sutty begins to discover more fully, the Akan Corporation’s attempted undoing of the 
Telling is essentially a foreclosure of the apocalyptic imagination, a renunciation of relationality 
and its poetic and political possibilities. And it seems to have been the technological dream of a 
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global “March to the Stars,” developing after the Ekumen’s first landing, that set them off in the 
direction. They traded their living tradition “for a great hierarchy in which each individual served 
the indefinite growth of the society’s material wealth and complexity. From an active homeostatic 
balance they had turned it to an active forward-thrusting imbalance.” The image that arises in 
Sutty’s mind as she tries to distinguish between the sacramental poetic inheritance that is their 
past and the psycho-covenant that is their hoped for future is that of a person “sitting thinking 
after a good meal and somebody running furiously to catch the bus.”289
In the meantime, one maz after another urges Sutty to record and recite and to gather the 
things that remain in view of the mad cleansing that threatens the possibility of human meaning. 
The Telling, after all, is what there is. As Maz Elyed puts the matter:  
 
It’s all we have. You see? It’s the way we have the world. Without the telling, we don’t 
have anything at all. The moment goes by like the water of the river. We’d tumble and 
spin and be helpless if we tried to live in the moment. We’d be like a baby. A baby can do 
it, but we’d drown. Our minds need to tell, need the telling. To hold. The past has passed 
and there is nothing in the future to catch hold of. The future is nothing yet. How could 
anybody live there? So what we have is the words that tell what happened and what 
happens. What was and is. 
Is it memory Maz Elyed means to say? History? “Elyed nodded, dubious, not satisfied by these 
terms.” The presumed detachment from the Telling is the problem. “We’re not outside the world, 
yoz. You know? We are the world. We're its language. So we live and it lives. You see? If we 
don't say the words, what is there in our world?"290
And here again, we’re into the sacramental specifics of a life-giving unity asserted (and 
perhaps only asserted) through ceremony, story, lyric, and embodiment, and it is the self-
emptying power of witness alone that would educate, illuminate, and feelingly persuade. We’re 
reminded of Aimé Césaire’s assertion that “The unconscious that all true poetry calls upon is the 
receptacle of original relationship that binds us to nature.”
  
291
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In the meantime, Sutty returns to an old, discarded category and notes, for the record, 
that, in her opinion, it’s the Akan Corporation State that can rightly be called a religion.292
But for our purposes the Telling, the Ekumen, and the Akan Corporation are all 
ineluctably religious forms. Religion is the way we have our worlds. And there are so many ways 
sacramental poetics rejoins our sense of the sacred to the everyday, affording us one religious 
realization after another. How might we be more alive to its witness, less religiously opposed to 
it? “Ut implerentur scripturae. Strike up a ballad,” cries Stephen Dedalus.
 How to 
go about urging Aka to decriminalize the Telling becomes Sutty’s primary mission. 
293
As Daniel Berrigan understands the witness of Jesus, it demands that we live in search of 
“the larger yes,” the wider human affirmation in any given circumstance, “and live according to the 
slight edge over death.”
 That the scriptures 
might be fulfilled, sing a song, and we’ll make of it what we will. There are liturgies yet to be 
resisted, embraced, and differently deployed.  
294
 
 How might tellings (every tale has one), conventionally dismissed as 
religious or at least thereby deprived of their socio-critical heft, be better viewed in all their 
sacramental poetic power. We will address this question in our final chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
       EXPERIMENTING WITH AN AMEN  
 
“No one survives without being addressed.”295
Judith Butler 
 
 
“How we imagine property is how we imagine ourselves.”296
Lewis Hyde 
 
 
How much did she scallop, harness and weights? Here 
she is, Amnisty Ann! Call her calamity electrifies man… 
No electress at all but old Moppa Necessity, angin mother of  
injons. I'll tell you a test. But you must sit still. Will you hold your peace and listen well to what I 
am going to say now?297
James Joyce 
  
 
Step Back from Religion 
In April of 2003, a sitting U.S. president who claimed Jesus of Nazareth as his biggest influence 
was asked about his life as a man of prayer and how his religious commitments lined up with his 
decision to take the country into war, George W. Bush responded with the following:  
I don't bring God into my life to be a political person; I ask God for strength and guidance; 
I ask God to help me be a better decision. The decision about war and peace is a 
decision I made based upon what I thought were the best interests of the American 
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people. I was able to step back from religion, because I have a job to do. And I, on 
bended knee to the good Lord, asked Him to help me to do my job in a way that's wise.298
 As a testimonial, this is a powerful portrait of what is perhaps the classic neoliberal 
understanding of the concept of religion, and it should be very familiar to all of us. There is a 
pathos at work, and it’s reflected in the way one can balance life at work and life in the spaces 
designated as places of worship, the way business is done, the way we often feel obliged to put 
what we take to be a specifically religious faith to the side when we’re buying and selling, the way 
we go about being allegedly realistic. Bush attempts to tell the tale of the struggle of vocation, of 
faithfulness to a job with certain demands that might not coincide with the language usually 
associated with religion, a human heart in conflict with itself. This view of a divinity who is 
essentially a non-political being that we can bring in for wisdom and comfort and keep respectfully 
separate from our business, our job to do, is a view held by many Westerners across party lines, 
and it will often be hard to remember that it bears no resemblance to anything most any religious 
tradition, popularly conceived, has ever deemed orthodox. Nevertheless, it’s standard operating 
procedure. And in a faithful reflection of these values, elected officials, managers of “public 
relations,” and contracted apologists for “shareholders” are generally expected to “step back from 
religion” in their doings and tellings of doings while simultaneously giving lip service to the 
integrity and sacrosanct status of everybody’s private, personal faith, including their own.  
 
Needless to say, this study asserts that one can step back from religion no more easily 
than one remove oneself from the power of story, promises, dreams, symbolism, or human 
relationality. Claiming aloofness to these processes or to dismiss someone else’s commitment as 
merely religious as opposed to one’s own commitment to the demands of getting down to 
business is to ignore the inescapability of our own liturgical actions and those of others. It is to 
disavow the fact of our own religious witness while carrying it out, the witness that is nothing more 
nor less than what we do with ourselves, our energies, our resources. Or, to put it provocatively, 
show me a transcript of the words you’ve spoken, typed, or texted in the course of a day, a strict 
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account of your undertakings, and a record of your financial transactions (gas mileage, receipts), 
and I’ll show you your religion. 
As we’ve considered the resistance to the Berrigan witness and the popular ease with 
which religion is spoken of as a presence that can be somehow isolated as a monolithic 
influence, unproblematically held at a distance for the purpose of critically assessing its value, 
content, and claims to which the individual is free to grant or withhold personal assent, what might 
it mean to deploy religion as a way of naming our animating concerns and their accompanying 
liturgies across the board? What if we held, for instance, to Smith’s provocation concerning 
imagined data and Certeau’s privileging of story? Might it serve our tracing of sacramental poetic 
witness among religious forms? 
 
To Redeem and To Humanize 
As an anthropologist determined to push at the supposed boundaries of his discipline by calling 
many of its most sacredly held assumptions up to constant questioning, Talal Asad brings a 
critical contribution to the determinedly self-conscious study of religions. In his work, it’s as if he 
leaves no presumption unproblematized as he flips the script, for starters, on religious/secular 
distinctions. While he stops short of declaring the liberal modernity that presumes to hold religious 
forces at bay as itself one more religious form in disguise, he nevertheless clears a path whereby 
ostensibly religious traditions (normalized by the anthropological gaze) are allowed to function as 
forms of sacramental poetic witness over against modernity’s universalizing claims. 
“If one believes oneself to be the source of salvation, the wish to make others reflect 
oneself is not unbenign, however terrible the practices by which this desire is put into effect.” 
Here we have a typically effective overturning of categories in Asad’s tale. He isn’t referring to 
religious fundamentalists whose evangelical zeal justifies a coercive conversion of infidels. He’s 
talking about “the European wish to make the world in its own image” and asking, concerning this 
anthropological encounter, “whose history is being made?”299
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 Which agents seek to remake the 
world into their own image? Whose fundamentalism? Which salvation? Throughout his work, 
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Asad exposes an unacknowledged soteriology at work within discourses (secularism, the nation-
state, globalism) and the rhetorical strategies that would reduce the living, local, functioning 
traditions of witness to one more instance of “religion” now rendered “a transhistorical and 
transcultural phenomenon,”300
 Asad concerns himself with “the authorizing process by which ‘religion’ is created,”
 traditions conveniently deprived of their socio-critical and poetic 
authority.  
301 and it 
is in this sense that he is engaged in the work of genealogy, which he defines as “a way of 
working back from our present to the contingencies that have come together to give us our 
certainties.”302 The ongoing cultural production of certain certainties is the heritage of “the 
Enlightenment project” which “consists not simply of looking and recording but of recording and 
remaking.”303 By Asad’s lights, the Enlightenment project generates discourses which constantly 
absolutize a sense of the secularized universal, inscribing its own sense of unity on all that it 
beholds. This is the subtle, moving target of Asad’s criticism, “the domain of secular history.” By 
his account, “as history became substantialized and singularized, it assumed the form of a 
universal force that pushes mankind along the path of progress, punishing error and 
inadequacy—very much as the God of the Old Testament did.”304
 The trouble with this secularizing impulse seems to be an inability (or a refusal) to 
recognize itself, self-consciously, as an always, already underway discourse. In their 
characterizations of religious behavior, anthropologists habitually import “a theological 
preoccupation into an avowedly secular intellectual task”
  
305 by knowingly and authoritatively 
supplying what they’ve found deficient in religious practitioners self-descriptions (namely a 
discussion of symbols, rituals, and meanings divorced from religion as instrumental, formative, 
and as “constituting activity in the world”306
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approach, popularly exemplified by Clifford Geertz, which makes it hard to discern whether (or 
how) “religious experience relates to something in the real world that believers inhabit. This is 
partly because religious symbols are treated, in circular fashion, as the precondition for religious 
experience (which, like any experience, must, by definition, be genuine), rather than as one 
condition for engaging with life.”307
 While Asad appears to be arguing that symbols are non-optional for the avowedly secular 
and avowedly religious alike in their engagement with life, he isn’t insisting that everything is 
religious or that nothing is secular (“I assume, on the contrary, that there is nothing essentially 
religious, nor any universal essence that defines ‘sacred language’ or ‘sacred experience.’”
  
308). 
His focus is instead on discernible practices, disciplines and programs that serve forms of 
communal living (“Searching for symbolic meanings is not the name of my game.”309). But even 
after thoroughly examining an aspect of religious practice (pain in medieval Christian ritual, in this 
instance), he adds a qualifier which serves both to undermine any sense of having attempted a 
definitive account of religion and to sound an enigmatic note concerning what Asad has in mind 
when he thinks of religion: “In my opinion, the story I have tried to tell…produces grounds for 
understanding partly what ‘religion’ was, not for identifying what part of it is ‘true religion.’”310
 Without making an appeal to a universal essence of religion (and perhaps keeping open 
the question of what might constitute, in some context, “true religion”) Asad nevertheless strikes a 
universal tone concerning a kind of ideological captivity: “We are all already-constituted subjects, 
placed in networks of power, and in reproducing ourselves it is also the latter we reproduce. To 
do otherwise is to risk confronting the powers that give us the sense of who we are, and to 
embark on the dangerous task of reconstructing ourselves along unfamiliar lines.”
 
311
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of this assessment of human behavior is a discussion of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses, 
its composition, its reception, and the bad faith at work in the spirit of self-congratulation among 
those (Rushdie included) whose editorializing around the phenomenon somehow assumes that 
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the novel “has dared to challenge taboos set up by the forces of inhumanity.”312 Asad maintains 
that in their representation of Islam and their championing of the novel, Rushdie and his 
enthusiasts are blissfully entrenched within the powers of a self-congratulatory complacency: “It 
is, understandably, easier to use our readings to confirm those powers.”313
 Against characterizations of Rushdie as “an anti-imperialist who celebrates hybridity and 
rejects the certainties of an orderly world,” Asad argues that the novel “assumes the categories of 
an imperialized world” presenting “the possibility of salvation through literature” and “urges upon 
(Muslim/immigrant) Indians a more progressive morality” seeking to “subvert their traditions in the 
hope that they will translate themselves into identities appropriate to the modern (i.e., civilized) 
world.”
 
314 Looking hard at the subtle strategies of this kind of “imperializing orthodoxy”315 is 
Asad’s concern as he tries to outline and understand “the sacred geography of modern secular 
culture” and describe “the imaginative spaces of power it [the novel] expresses and inhabits.”316
 Here again, Asad stops short of describing secularism (in spite of its orthodoxies and its 
sense of the sacred) as religious. As a student of religion with a similar interest in examining and 
publicizing “the ambiguous legacy of the Enlightenment,”
   
317 I think it more effective to let religion, 
as a descriptive term, be applied more broadly to all narratives and networks that seek to bind 
hearts and minds. At the very least, employing Dubuisson’s terminology of “cosmographic 
formations”318
 But perhaps Asad’s strategy is formed around his sense that questioning too 
presumptuously “the self-evident character” of the secular and the ways it informs our thinking is 
as treacherous as believing one has a hold on religion. “It is not easy to grasp it [the secular] 
 to better illuminate the religious function of secular discourse might serve the study 
well. While Asad certainly approaches this mode of naming unacknowledged religious forms in 
his accounts of the global market and consumer capitalism, his reluctance to carry it that little bit 
further remains puzzling. 
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directly,” Asad observes. “It is best pursued through its shadows, as it were.”319 Nevertheless, he 
describes his project (in Formations of the Secular) as “an exploration of the epistemological 
assumptions of the secular.”320
 Tracing the secular in a genealogical fashion, Asad notes that reading religious 
scriptures through the grid of myth (while exempting the secular from mythological status) “has 
helped to constitute the secular as the epistemological domain in which history exists as history—
and as anthropology.”
  
321 Such selective mythologization is especially problematic when an 
allegedly unmythological secularism comes to be viewed by its adherents as a redeeming power. 
This is what Asad calls “secular redemptive politics” which often involves “ a readiness to cause 
pain to those who are to be saved by being humanized.” As he observes,   “The thought that the 
world needs to be redeemed [by liberal modernity] is more than merely an idea. Since the 
eighteenth century, it has animated a variety of intellectual and social projects within Christendom 
and beyond, in European global empires.”322
 For Asad, this only rarely directly articulated idea is at work in the unprecedented 
prominence and global application of “American secular language of redemption” drawing on the 
notion (religious?) “that ‘freedom’ and ‘America’ are virtually interchangeable” and that “the 
universalizing moral project of the American nation-state” is “the project of redeeming and 
humanizing the world.”
 
323
 In Asad’s latest free-standing work, On Suicide Bombing, this line of criticism, an 
elaboration on the concept of imperial orthodoxy, is especially effective. The secular version of 
 While believing (and advertising) itself to be above the fray of religious 
hysteria (against which the Enlightenment sets itself), liberal society, Asad argues, is a political 
formation within which lethal force is integral and rendered legitimate by its presumed project of 
secular redemption. As I read him, it is here that Asad’s critique is very much in line with Le 
Guin’s tale of the Akan corporate state’s resistance to its own indigenous culture and Berrigans 
witness against the violence of the avowedly irreligious nation-state. 
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redemption is able to define itself against the motives attributed to “religious terrorism.” “That 
appellation,” Asad explains, “defines the bomber [the terrorist suspect or the insurgent] as morally 
underdeveloped—and therefore premodern—when compared with peoples whose civilized status 
is partly indicated by their secular politics and their private religion and whose violence is 
therefore in principle disciplined, reasonable, and just.”324
 While the actions of the United States government  (once branded the “War on Terror”) 
are often associated with all manner of biblical imagery appropriated for a wide variety of ends, 
this aspect of popular religiosity is not Asad’s concern. His focus is the ideology of liberalism at 
work in American foreign policy which he refers to as “a project of universal redemption” that 
informs the mostly unstated conviction “that some humans have to be treated violently in order 
that humanity can be redeemed.” Having articulated this principle, Asad traces how it might lead 
to the conclusion that “the suicide bomber belongs in an important sense to a modern Western 
tradition of armed conflict for the defense of a free political community: To save the nation (or to 
found its state) in confronting a dangerous enemy, it may be necessary to act without being 
bound by ordinary moral constraints.”
 
325 Asad puts these thoughts on redemptive possibilities in 
the form of a question: “If modern war seeks to found or to defend a free political community with 
its own law, can one say that suicide terrorism (like a suicidal nuclear strike) belongs in this sense 
to liberalism?” He proposes that considering this question might be “more significant than our 
comforting attempts at distinguishing the good conscience of just warriors from the evil acts of 
terrorists.”326 By insinuation, Asad focuses the conversation toward a habit of thinking Daniel 
Berrigan, in conversation with Thich Nhat Hanh, terms as that “terrible casuistry that trades off 
human bodies and looks on an abstract, future good as an excuse for present evil.”327
 Having expanded the sphere of appropriate subject matter for an anthropologist and, in the 
process, presented pressing questions for religious studies, Asad recasts these matters further by 
describing all the practices of violent conduct (that of insurgents, soldiers, state-sponsored 
 
                                                 
324 Talal Asad, On Suicide Bombing, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 45. 
325 Ibid. 62-63. 
326 Ibid. 92. 
327 Thich Nhat Hanh and Daniel Berrigan, The Raft Is Not the Shore: Conversations Toward a 
Buddhist-Christian Awareness, (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2001), 22. 
 118 
torturers) “in our secular world” as being “thought to ultimately secure a kind of collective 
immortality.” It’s all faith-based initiative all the time, he might say. But Asad takes it further in a 
fashion that provokes further questions concerning how he means to define religion. This faith in 
violent conduct, he says, is “what some scholars call civil religion and others pseudoreligion.”328
 
 
Does Asad here allude to a space for describing religious practice as true or false? Faithful or 
unfaithful? His work is already undoubtedly a form of witness with a certain binding potential, but 
what might he make of the concept of sacramental poetic witness? 
Sacramental Poetics as Illegal Thinking 
In a piece entitled “Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism,” in Is Critique Secular?: 
Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech, Asad enters the conversation surrounding  the matter of 
Danish cartoons of Mohammad. In his conclusion, he poses a series of provocative questions 
that seem to signal the notion of a sacramental poetic witness in sync with the concerns of the 
Berrigans’ activism. What if the perception of Muslims’ worries over blasphemy was to extend 
beyond what many non-Muslims consider petty issues? What if traditionally religious language in 
the key of social protest meant something to Europe? He ponders the possibilities of reception: 
What would happen if religious language were to be taken more seriously in secular 
Europe and the preventable deaths in the global South of millions from hunger and war 
was to be denounced as "blasphemy," as the flouting of ethical limits for the sake of what 
is claimed to be freedom? What if this were to be done without any declarations of 
"belief," and yet done in all seriousness as a way of rejecting passionately the aspiration 
to totalized global control? Of course Europe's proscription of theological language in the 
political domain makes such a use of the word "blasphemy" inconceivable. But does this 
impossibility merely signal a secular reluctance to politicize "religion," or is it the symptom 
of an incapacity?329
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 While my hope for the term sacramental poetic is, on the one hand, to draw ostensibly 
non-religious voices like Ellison and Joyce into a more knowingly religious discourse, I intend, on 
the other, to lift those voices who are marginalized for being labeled merely religious, a 
designation I am not prone to ascribe to any human voice even as I find it critically helpful, to 
describe, with the Berrigans, the will to totalized global control as ineluctably religious. The 
terminology of sacramental poetic witness is, needless to say, an attempt to overcome the 
cultural incapacity to which Asad alludes, an incapacity toward the reception, in my sense, of 
sacramental poetic intelligence, the witness that will often see the world illegally, in Berrigan’s 
parlance, because it insists upon the relationality, the interdependence, which dominating forces 
will find it necessary to deny as legitimate or realistic.  
As I read him, Richard King is driven by a similar concern. By King’s lights, reduction of a 
witness, the site of enunciation of a wisdom tradition, for instance, to a  “religion” is “the 
epistemological equivalent of immigration and border control. It is the point at which ‘foreign’ 
wisdom traditions become naturalized as “religions” and it is on these that such worldviews and 
forms of life are allowed to enter the mainstream world of western intellectual debate.”330 In 
another context, King notes how the same move is often at work when we characterize historical 
or contemporary personages as mystical: “The very fact that ‘the mystical’ is seen as irrelevant to 
issues of social and political authority itself reflects contemporary, secularized notions of an 
attitude toward power. The separation of the mystical from the political is itself a political 
decision!”331 Or as William Cavanaugh observes, making a related point, “The distinction between 
politics and religion was not discovered but invented.”332
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“Don’t call me a saint,” she said. “I don’t want to be dismissed so easily.”333
  
 Better to be legally 
barred than to have ones witness spiritualized or cordoned away in the realm of the saintly, the 
pious, or the mystic. Better to be allowed to ring true. 
The Religious Situation 
The sacramental poetic witness allows for no such distinctions but asserts itself, 
liturgically, in any and every scene, challenging us to examine our own abstractions religiously to 
examine what they’re doing, who they’re helping, what costs they’re exacting. As we’ve seen in 
Asad’s account of the unacknowledged soteriology at work in avowedly non-religious projects of 
universal redemption and Le Guin’s tale of Akan Corporation religion and the sad caricature of 
the conned man, there is no non-liturgical space in human societies, but there is much in the way 
of what Doug Meeks terms “a distorting transcendence”334
 In a diagnosis that might serve the conned man well, David Loy characterizes this 
distorting transcendence as that which haunts “the ‘commonsense’ everyday world, riddled as it is 
with unconscious, because automatized, ontological commitments.”
 which reigns in the absence of poetic-
critical consciousness.  
335 Being alive to them, alive 
to the complexities of one’s own religious situation is nothing less than a commitment to become 
aware of what’s going on in one’s mind (commitment to seeing our heretofore unconscious and 
ever-shifting, ever-enslaving commitments) and of the damage our fixations do. Our fixations 
generate suffering (our own and others) by constantly sabotaging the possibility of love, life, and 
communal mindfulness even as we mistake our fixations for our only hope for love, life, and 
ultimate significance. These fixations are what Loy calls (drawing the phrase from Otto Rank) 
“immortality projects.”336
                                                 
333 Dorothy Day, Selected Writings, ed. Robert Ellsberg, (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1992), xviii. 
 
334 M. Douglas Meeks, God the Economist: The Doctrine of God and Political Economy, 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), 42. 
335David Loy, “Dead Words, Living Words, and Healing Words: The Disseminations of and Dōgen 
and Eckhart,” in Healing Deconstruction: Postmodern Thought in Buddhism and Christianity, ed. 
David Loy (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996), 34.  
336 David Loy, Lack and Transcendence: The Problem of Death and Life in Psychotherapy, 
Existentialism, and Buddhism, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996), 3. 
 121 
Grounded (if I may be permitted a paradox) in his understanding of Buddhist traditions, 
Loy is able to name our drive to “immortality projects” as “a sense of ontological lack.” This lack 
names the anxiety generated by “two opposed but complementary fears”: “Life fear is anxiety in 
the face of standing out from nature, thereby losing connection with a greater whole. Death fear is 
anxiety in the face of extinction, of losing individuality and dissolving back into the whole.”337 Or 
as Loy so effectively puts it in his description of the lack that drives the people of the West 
individualistically, politically, and spiritually, our immortality projects are funded by our 
misapprehension of the intuition that informs the feeling that “’I’ am not real right now.”338
The intuition is explained by the Buddhist notion of anatta (no self) and Loy draws on this 
teaching as he describes the immortality project that is the ego-self (the big one that drives all our 
little ones): “The ego-self is this never-ending project to realize oneself by objectifying oneself, 
something consciousness can no more do than a hand can grasp itself, or an eye see itself.” Out 
of the “perpetual failure” of this project, a failure no amount of money, fame, or accomplishment 
can prevent, we develop a fear of the shadow, this “sense-of-lack” from which we’re forever on 
the run.
 
339  Unconscious commitments to myriad forms of distorting transcendence follow, the 
transcendence that would deny at every turn (or try to deny) the binding and potentially 
emancipating fact of interdependence and the irretrievably relational essence of human being. 
Meeks describes the religious situation thusly: “There is in reality no such thing as a radically 
individual and isolated human being. We are what we are as a result of being constituted by our 
relationships.” Where Loy posits anatta in response to deluding forms, Meeks raises the Christian 
witness of “communal coinherence”340 (drawn from the Trinitarian doctrine of the Cappadocian 
Fathers, perichoresis, mutual indwelling of God the Father, the Son, and the Spirit) which critically 
counters the myths of self-sufficiency and self-possession: “The self-giving life of the trinitarian 
community of God is a criticism of the self as private property.”341
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counter “unhealthily religious” forms with a more redeeming poetics of human meaning-
making.342
 
 
We Can Never Escape a Religious Interpretation of the World 
In the Zen teaching of Huang Po, the idolatrous commitment to immortality projects is tied 
to the feverish formation of concepts or the making of forms:  
When all such forms are abandoned, there is the Buddha. Ordinary people look to their 
surroundings, while followers of the Way look to the Mind, but the true Dharma is to 
forget them both. The former is easy enough, the latter very difficult. Men are afraid to 
forget their minds, fearing to fall through the void with nothing to stay their fall. They do 
not know that the Void is not really void, but the realm of the real Dharma. This spiritually 
enlightening nature is without beginning, as ancient as the Void, subject neither to birth 
nor to destruction, neither existing nor not existing…It cannot be looked for or sought, 
comprehended by wisdom or knowledge, explained in words, contacted materially or 
reached by meritorious achievement. All the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, together with all 
wriggling things possessed of life, share in this great Nirvanic nature…You cannot use 
Mind to seek Mind, the Buddha to seek the Buddha, or the Dharma to seek the Dharma. 
So you students of the Way should immediately refrain from conceptual thought. Let a 
tacit understanding be all!343
To the extent that we make of Buddhism (or any tradition, ideology, or enthusiasm) an attempt to 
transcend the realm of tacit understanding, to leap past the sense of finitude that informs our 
existence, to somehow definitively overcome our sense of lack, we condemn ourselves to never 
seeing the world and our place within it properly, to never entering the realm of real dharma. 
According to Loy, the attempt to transcend religiosity (at its best a self-consciously tacit 
understanding) is another doomed immortality project. Derrida suggests as much when he asks 
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rhetorically: “Should one save oneself by abstraction or save oneself from abstraction?”344The 
play of religion is that with which we have to do or the way in which we do everything we do or 
think we do or, as Le Guin might put it, the way we have the world. ”If that lack is a constant, and 
religion is understood as the way we try to resolve it, we can never escape a religious 
interpretation of the world.”345
What sort of religion might form around such a realization? A religion of awakened 
insights that don’t presume to expiate the lack, insights recorded and put into engaged and 
engaging practice of constant interrogation with an eye toward further insight. As Morny Joy 
testifies, these insights “represent neither a nihilistic nor determinist description of reality, but a 
radical interrogation of the assumed self-sufficient status of any entity—be it a person or an 
object.”
 There is, after all, no stepping back from religion. We are, in this 
sense, mything persons through and through . 
346 As Loy maintains, this is the religious interpretation (the way of life) the Buddha taught. 
In view of anatta (“the strange but essential Buddhist claim that our sense of subjectivity does not 
correspond to any real ontological self”347), this interrogation, an interrogation whose end is 
compassionate practice, is what we have (all we have) to do, a pilgrimage that involves, over and 
over again, “the deconstruction and reconstruction of the fictive sense of self.”348 It is a journey of 
new and ever-renewed awareness. As Joy describes it, “What is needed is a new way of relating 
to the world: a different sense of self. This would be a version that both critiques and constructs 
its practice with insights born of self-questioning honesty, i.e., by a mindfulness of our selves, in 
whatever guise they are manifested.”349
This form of sacramental poetic privileges a sense of mystery (of knowing that we are not 
knowing) in all of our dealings. It remains perpetually open to the unforeseen possibilities in the 
way we’ve, thus far, sought to organize our worlds. It assumes, as a given, that the status quo 
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never goes far enough in imagining further, in widening the sphere of humaneness and 
hospitality, in refusing to settle for the deadened and deadening practice of already-made-up-
minds. It is a radical open-endedness hell-bent on seeing what it has yet to see. As Loy explains: 
Buddhist awakening does not grasp or otherwise resolve the essential mysteriousness of 
our being in the world. It opens us up to that mystery, a mystery that is an essential 
aspect of the meaning of ‘sacred.’ In practice, this means that the broadest context for all 
our intellectual efforts is a wonder in the face of a world that always exceeds our ideas 
about it. That excess does not signify any defect in our understanding. Rather, it is the 
source of our understanding, allowing for a perpetual bubbling-up of insights and 
images—when we do not cling to the ones that we have already become comfortable 
with.350
 
 
The Way This World Is Experienced 
In his attentiveness to the insights and images to which we’ve become comfortable and 
accustomed, Loy turns this interrogating, religious tradition toward the unacknowledged religious 
traditions that vandalize our physical and psychic landscapes. Our damaging activity originates in 
our damaging, perverting imaginations which are founded, in Buddhist terms, in a deluded sense 
of duality that can only be overcome by an awakening to our ”interpenetrating nonduality with the 
world, which is wisdom.”351
In histories of violent conflict, he notes the way one gang of oppressors is eventually 
replaced by another whose mission was founded, ironically enough, upon involves overturning 
oppression.  Engaged Buddhism has an illuminating word concerning the necessity of a hyper-
mindfulness concerning one’s attempt at revolutionary practice: 
  
From a Buddhist perspective, there is nothing surprising about that. If I do not struggle 
with the greed in my own heart, it is quite likely that, once in power, I too will be inclined 
to take advantage of the situation to serve my own interests…If I remain unaware that my 
sense of duality is a dangerous delusion, I will understand the problem of social change 
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as the need for me to dominate the sociopolitical order…Emphasis on transience implies 
another nonduality, that between means and ends…Peace is not only the goal, it must 
also be the way; or as Thich Nhat Hanh and Mahaghosananda have put it, peace is 
every step. We ourselves must be the peace we want to create.352
This commitment to a practiced wisdom (which never stops asking itself if it’s still wisdom 
and therefore, in fact, still practiced) is especially devastating (or redeeming) in its refusal to settle 
for rhetoric or any abstraction that would draw attention away from narratives of inter-being.  
Morny Joy describes this sensibility especially well: 
 
Buddhism does have much to offer a technologically dominated society, which often 
equates the mere verbalization of the factors in a problematic situation with an instant 
solution to it. In contrast, Buddhism eschews arid theorizing in the name of commitment 
to awareness of the internal and external barriers which cause estrangement in its many 
guises.353
The understanding of estrangement on offer within Engaged Buddhism offers an 
especially holistic understanding of the world in its counter-witness to the mythologies of 
economic “progress.” It also involves a certain de-spiritualizing of otherwise other-worldly 
religious imagery to better sharpen its powers of social witness (a witness that was perhaps loud 
and clear—alive and signaling--in an age when sacramental poetic witness had yet to be 
spiritualized away). Loy describes the six realms of samsara as “the different ways we experience 
this world as our attitude toward it changes.” This is especially helpful in his account of hell: “The 
hell realm is not necessarily a place I will be reborn into, due to my hatred and evil actions. It can 
be the way this world is experienced when my mind is dominated by anger and hate.” In a 
manner especially well-suited toward the deconstruction of an anxious mindset, “The twelve 
interlinked factors of pratitya samutpada (interdependent origination) do not necessarily refer to 
different lifetimes; that teaching can be understood as describing the various causes and effects 
of ‘my’ mental processes right now.”
  
354
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The Conceptual Necessity of Global Poverty 
This description enables Loy to offer a diagnosis of “a fundamental and inescapable 
poverty built into a consumer society.” He traces the misguided pilgrimage compelled by the 
anxious craving whereby we desire objects, fall into a sense of frustration and impotence, and 
then avoid an awareness of our sadness by craving something else. With this hellish religion at 
work in the world of so-called wealth, he questions the efficacy of grand, international projects 
which mean to end poverty by creating economies focused on consumption. Drawing from 
Buddhist texts, Loy maintains that such endeavors “are grasping a snake by the wrong end” in an 
effort to help people not yet “seduced by the utopian dream of a technological cornucopia,” not 
yet fixated on Western fantasies. ”It is presumptuous to assume that the only way to become 
happy is to get on the treadmill of a lifestyle dependent on the market and increasingly 
preoccupied with consumption.” 
Most provocatively, Loy notes how the notion of global poverty has become “conceptually 
necessary” in our drive to commodify and monetarize the world.” Instead of focusing only on 
neoliberal understanding of poverty, “we also need to address the personal, social, and ecological 
costs of our obsession with wealth and growth.” We have to allow other narratives other 
testaments (other religions?) alternative to “the neoliberal economic understanding of what 
happiness is and how to achieve it.”355 Engaged Buddhism insists “that the single-minded pursuit 
of material wealth does not make human beings happy or even rich, for a world in which envy and 
miserliness predominate cannot be considered one in which poverty has been eliminated.”356
Loy highlights the tragic and dangerous presumptuousness at work in asserting (in 
policy) that the non-Westernized poor, in order to be happy and fulfilled, need to be converted to 
the unacknowledged religious commitment to running ones life away on “the treadmill of market 
consumerism.” And he proposes that ”our evangelical efforts to economically ‘develop’ other 
societies, which cherish their own spiritual values and community traditions, may be viewed as a 
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contemporary form of religious imperialism. Does that make the globalization of capitalism a new 
kind of mission to convert the heathen?”357
Loy certainly thinks so. And if we concede his point but maintain that global capitalism is 
still, as a religion, more scientific and less idealistic than any possible alternatives, Loy flips the 
script:  
 
Contemporary economics is much more ‘idealistic’ in the sense that it presumes an 
unrealistic image of human nature derived from an eighteenth-century ethical system, 
utilitarianism, which was not derived from empirical observation but conceived in a 
philosopher’s study. As a result, economists today tend to live in an idealized, one-
dimensional world of statistics and equations that do not accurately reflect human values 
and goals. 358
 
 
Psychic Strip-mining 
As Loy’s articulation of Buddhist witness has it, global capitalism is a religion that 
undermines the possibility of flourishing for other religions performing a psychic strip-mining upon 
cultures where it holds sway:  
Where there are no restrictions to protect social relations, commodification tends to occur 
with every potential resource that can be utilized for economic gains. This includes the 
very moral fabric of society, woven of innumerable personal relationships, now 
commodified into ‘social capital’ or ‘moral capital’—ugly economist terms that describe 
how market forces rely upon but damage that fabric of interpersonal responsibility.  
As a religion, global capitalism operates under the limited criteria of merely mercantile 
values. Most paradoxically, “it requires character traits such as honesty and trust in order to work 
efficiently, yet it is primarily motivated by a desire for profit that erodes such personal 
responsibility for others.”359
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unable to be enlightened, and unable to love because every gesture, even before it is conceived, 
is reduced to public relations’ gambits aimed at converting populations. Loy marvels at “how 
extraordinarily persuasive their conversion techniques are,” and maintains that “If we are not 
blinded by the distinction usually made between secular and sacred, we can see that advertising 
promises another kind of salvation, i.e., another way to solve our lack.” By his assessment 
“religions are not fulfilling their responsibility if they ignore this religious dimension of capitalism, if 
they do not emphasize that this seduction is deceptive because this solution to our unhappiness 
leads only to greater dissatisfaction.”360
Global financial profiteering as an end in itself corrodes a culture’s resources for thinking, 
imagining, and acting humanely, devaluing (or dissolving altogether) the ethical reservoir of other 
religious traditions. And the marketing machinery it employs and to which it expends most of its 
resources “constitutes the greatest effort in mental manipulation that humanity has ever 
experienced—all of it to no other end than creating consumerist needs for the sake of corporate 
profit.” 
 
361
 As Meeks notes, “The most successful ideology is one that is not recognized as an 
ideology,”
   
362 and the broadband powers of proselytization at work within consumerist ideology go 
undetected and unengaged so long as its work of religious formation are rendered immune from 
the religious critique of sacramental poetic witness. Perhaps it is primarily this very witness which 
remains to assert that the human commitment of “communal cooperation” is “a higher survival 
value than increased [financial] profits.”363
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and others that shores up the social structures institutionalizing greed, ill will, and delusion.”364 
And with this issue in mind, he suggests that one possible beginning might be “a movement to 
restrict the role of advertising, on the grounds that today much of it has become as bad for our 
psychological and spiritual health as tobacco is for our physical health.”365
 Such initiatives hardly begin to form in our minds until we begin to see and interrogate 
the connections between our states of mind and the way the world is being badly, dualistically 
organized with our presumed consent. Engaged Buddhism widens the sphere of sight and 
interrogation When we see the connections, the relatedness of phenomena, and learn to enjoy 
seeing them, we can begin to put questions to ourselves, our habits, our ways of seeking peace.   
 
There Are No Unrelated Phenomena 
As a kind of mantra that signifies an aliveness to relationality, alertness to the social 
fact—not the idea—of an inescapably communal essence to everything and everyone we might 
otherwise ignorantly and destructively come to view as our and ours alone, Meeks recalls an 
expression that once peppered the exchanges of older, English-speaking generations: “Much 
obliged.” The habitual resistance to such awareness is increasingly evident: “Now one seldom 
hears this in our society, for we do not want to be obligated.”366 But the sacramental poetic 
witness I’ve attempted to trace is a lively summons, whether in story, song, image, or action to 
what Meeks calls “complex participatory consciousness,”367 and to the extent that we think of it as 
a religious summons, we do so properly only to the extent that religion is here manifest as an 
ethical witness to the relationality in which we live and move and have our being, the provocative 
sense in which Derrida asserts that “Religion is responsibility or it is nothing at all.”368
 In this way sacramental poetics is a summons to ever-renewed perception and 
 And as 
Butler reminds us, our irresponsible breaks with the relationality that sustains and addresses us 
are only ever the mad presumptions of deluded minds. 
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recoginition of accountability. As the witness of Thich Nhat Hanh has it, this is a call to see 
ourselves anew and simultaneously a call to see poetically and to perceive reality as it is. As his 
Buddhist renders the call, it is an active awareness of interpenetration which, incidentally, does 
not depend upon our awareness. He will hold a piece of paper, for instance, in front of his listener 
and observe, “If you are a poet, you will see clearly that there is a cloud floating in this sheet of 
paper.” Without a cloud, there is no rain. Without rain, no trees. And without trees, there will be no 
paper (on down—or up—to loggers, packaging, and transportation). When we bring our thoughts 
to bear on the detailed histories of what has been made manifest (or simply is manifest) before 
our eyes, we receive the sense that “the cloud and the paper inter-are.” This is the intensely 
reality-based notion of “Inter-being,”369
Hanh subverts the Cartesian formula and seamlessly inserts an ethical imperative born of 
a determination to be realistic by being awake:    
 a showing business to which practitioners of sacramental 
poetics (perhaps the most serious people in the world) mean to give and receive constant 
witness. Far from being an escape into disembodied bliss, this sensibility dissolves whatever 
dichotomies might keep us from perceiving and responding to the complex relatedness of all of 
life. It is a call to a deeper investment than our usual abstractions allow.                                                      
There are hundreds of thousands of stems linking us to everything in the cosmos, and 
therefore we can be. Do you see the link between you and me? If you are not there, I am 
not here. That is certain. If you do not see it yet, look more deeply and I am sure you will 
see. As I said, this is not philosophy. You really have to see.370
Sacramental poetics resists the barricades that await it (“this is not philosophy”), 
barricades that would reduce its witness to a merely intellectual exercise or a form of spiritual 
consolation. It challenges the language games that obstruct the possibility of insight: “You have to 
see life. You should not say, life of the leaf, you should only speak of life in the leaf and life in the 
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tree.”371
The affluent society and the society deprived of everything inter-are. The wealth of one 
society is made of the poverty of the other. ‘This is like this, because that is like that.’ 
Wealth is made of non-wealth elements, and poverty is made by non-poverty elements. It 
is exactly the same as with the sheet of paper. So we must be careful. We should not 
imprison ourselves in concepts. The truth is that everything is everything else. We can 
only inter-be, we cannot just be. And we are responsible for everything that happens 
around us.
 And it speaks to “the issues” by deftly refusing (and rendering hopelessly illogical) the 
very concept of issues in their present organization and staging: 
372
While religion is often characterized as a commitment to concepts (concepts which, more often 
than not, impede the possibility of thinking coherently or acting humanely), the sacramental 
poetics is a practice of lively and committed mindfulness of the causal web. In this sense, it 
doesn’t exactly spiritualize anything, and its concepts, to whatever extent they’re allowed to 
momentarily form, are designed (or narrated) to heighten our awareness that all our activity of 
doing, saying, and consuming is always already, ineluctably involved in socio-political-economic 
enterprise. As I understand her, Iris Murdoch characterizes the witness I have in mind in her 
definition of love not as a flight from reality but a constant engagement with it in ongoing 
discovery: “Love is the perception of individuals. Love is the extremely difficult realisation that 
something other than oneself is real. Love, and so art and morals, is the discovery of reality.”
   
373
 
  
Insert Soul Here 
To review, there is no escaping a religious interpretation of the world. There are, now and 
then and often, apocalyptic forms that comes to us through the witness of sacramental poetic 
ventures which we might call, with Eliot, a kind of redeeming “raid on the inarticulate.”374
                                                 
371 Ibid. 26. 
 And in 
view of this, I offer what I take to be a redeeming word on listening and making from the poet 
372 Ibid. 33-34 
373 Iris Murdoch, “The Sublime and the Good,” in Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on 
Philosophy and Literature, ed. Peter Conradi, (New York: 1997), 215. With thanks to Sallie 
McFague for the tip. 
374 T.S. Eliot, “East Coker,” in Four Quartets, (London: Faber and Faber, 1944), 22. I owe my 
awareness of this passage to Damien Durr. 
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Robert Haas. The poetic intelligence he describes constitutes an alive and signaling ethical 
summons: 
 I have it in mind that, during the Vietnam War, one of the inventions of American 
technology was a small antipersonnel bomb that contained sharp fragments of plastic 
which, having torn through the flesh and lodged in the body, could not be found by an X-
ray. Often I just think about the fact that some person created it. At other times I have 
thought about the fact that the bomb works on people just the way the rhythms of poetry 
do. And it seems to me that there are technes on the side of life and technes on the side 
of death. Durable and life-giving human inventions—tragedy, restaurants that stay open 
late at night, holding hands, the edible artichoke—were probably half-discovered and half 
invented from the materials the world makes available, but I think that they were also the 
result of an active and attentive capacity for creation that humans have—that is, finally, 
the only freedom they have—and that a poetry that makes fresh and resilient forms 
extends the possibility of being alive.375
As Certeau instructs, sacramental poetics does not express a practice, nor does it limit itself to 
telling about a movement. It makes it. One understands if one enters into the movement oneself. 
Insert soul here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
375 Robert Hass, “Listening and Making,” in Twentieth Century Pleasures, (New York: Ecco 1984), 
132-133. 
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